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ABSTRACT 
 
SOUNDINGS: MUSICAL AESTHETICS IN  
MUSIC EDUCATION DISCOURSE  
FROM 1907 TO 1958  
by 
Jeremy M. Kopkas 
 
In this dissertation I examine the discourse of music educators as it relates to 
musical aesthetics in the United States from the creation of the Music Supervisors’ 
Conference in 1907 to the year of the publication of Basic Concepts of Music Education: 
The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1 in 
1958.  The purpose of this dissertation is to show that philosophical discussion, especially 
in relation to musical aesthetics, was much more comprehensive than previously 
acknowledged.  The conventional view that the arguments supporting music education 
were primarily utilitarian is a limited interpretation of the discourse prior to 1958.  In 
actuality, arguments about music extended beyond its practical social, economic, and 
political utility.  Additional aesthetic theories guided the field and girded ideas of musical 
understanding and informed instruction.  A better understanding of the discourse of this 
period contributes to more informed conversations about musical aesthetics and its 
relation to music education.  Utilizing philosophical analysis and archival research, I 
argue in this dissertation that the philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics 
was rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive.  The evidence in this dissertation refutes the 
standard interpretation which eschews the possibility of discourse on aesthetics taking 
place prior to 1958.  I show that there was deeper philosophical analysis than what is 
 currently acknowledged by those who presently make the claim that what was intended to 
happen generally in the field of music education and during instruction was solely guided 
by utilitarian philosophy.  In other words, it expands the current understanding of 
philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics in music education before the 
Music Education as Aesthetic Education movement that is argued to begin with the 
publication of Basic Concepts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
SOUNDINGS: MUSICAL AESTHETICS IN  
MUSIC EDUCATION DISCOURSE  
FROM 1907 TO 1958 
by 
Jeremy M. Kopkas 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the 
Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in 
Educational Policy Studies 
in 
the Department of Educational Policy Studies 
in 
the College of Education 
Georgia State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Atlanta, Georgia 
2011
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Jeremy M. Kopkas 
2011 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
Writing, much like the disciplines of philosophy and history, is a process which 
incorporates numerous perspectives and is often the result of thought over time.  Rarely 
are large works written in one sitting, and while there may be the occasional genius who 
is able to sequester himself/herself and produce works of brilliance, I am not one of them.  
Instead I am indebted to many individuals and unnamed forces that have influenced my 
thinking and this dissertation.  In particular those who have endured the challenges of 
interacting with me during this process deserve special mention.  It is because of them 
this project has taken its present form. 
The guidance, thoughtful advice, and personal attention I received from members 
of my dissertation committee were integral to my own thought process and to this work.  
On several occasions my committee chair, Deron Boyles, took more time away from his 
busy schedule than he could spare.  Had he not given this dissertation the attention he did 
it would be a much more scattered and longer study.  His profound influence on me has 
helped to guide my thinking about knowledge issues in education.  Philo Hutcheson 
provided important historical insights from the time I began to struggle with the topic, 
which was almost at the beginning of the doctoral program.  The guilt I felt by asking 
him to read so many long iterations of ideas contained within this larger work runs deep, 
yet he read my papers with great attention and care each and every time.   I was also 
privileged to work with David Myers, whose knowledge and experience in the field of 
music education were indispensible.  It is with his help, over the course of several 
individual meetings, that this topic took its final form.  Even while he was hundreds, and 
sometimes thousands of miles away, he continued to assist me in this research.  Jodi 
Kaufmann, a last moment addition to the team, was willing to pitch in and participate as 
an important member of the committee.  Each of you has bought to this dissertation 
important insights from your areas of expertise making it a more thorough and substantial 
study.  Finally, I am thankful to the members of the Southeastern Philosophy of 
Education Society and Southern History of Education Society who helped critique 
aspects of this paper. 
There are many others who have helped me through the program and with this 
dissertation.  Tom McIntyre is largely responsible for recommending that I pursue a 
doctorate and, understanding my interests, nudged me toward the Educational Policy 
Studies program at Georgia State University.  John and Marcia Robinson, my parents and 
musicians in the truest sense, taught me many important lessons, of which music was a 
bigger part than they are aware.  Their invaluable perspectives as music educators and 
their stories of their own training as musicians and scholars helped me to think of this 
project as something that could be managed.   
Finally, it is with the utmost sincerity and heartfelt emotion that I thank my family 
for putting up with me for the past five and one-half years.  Grace and Charlie have been 
patient beyond what should be required of any six and two-year-old while I wrote this 
iii 
“blah, blah, blah” book.  Most of all, I thank Diane, my dear and loving wife, for whom 
none of this would have been possible.  She read countless papers over the course of the 
program and many drafts of this dissertation to ensure that I submitted work that had 
proper comma placement and grammatical structure – no small matter since my topics 
and writing style can be considered less than dynamic.  Hers was truly a labor of love.  
She held the family together and was an exceptional parent, wife, and teacher, while I 
took on a project that was far more selfish and far less formidable than anything she was 
doing.  She is the most remarkable intellectual I have ever encountered, and it is to her 
that this project is dedicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................... vi 
 
Chapter 
 1 OVERTURE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM .........................................1 
Significance of the Study .........................................................................................9 
Problem Statement and Research Questions..........................................................11 
Objectives of the Study ..........................................................................................14 
 
 2 EXPOSITION: AESTHETICS ..............................................................................19 
Part I – Aesthetics ..................................................................................................19 
Part II – Problems and Theories in Aesthetics .......................................................39 
Explanation and Problems on the Nature of Music ...............................................40 
Theories on the Nature of Music ...........................................................................45 
Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/ 
Comprehension/Revelation ........................................................................62 
Theories on the Meaning and Interpretation of Music...........................................73 
Explanations and Problems of Value .....................................................................78 
Theories on Value (additional perspectives on intrinsic, instrumental, 
and inherent value) .....................................................................................94 
Part III – Problems with the Conventional View .................................................101 
 
 3 NATURE .............................................................................................................109 
Performance Based Courses – Chorus .................................................................114 
Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and  
Individual Instrument Classes ..................................................................122 
Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory,  
Harmony, and Music History ...............................................................................125 
Generalized Topics and Integration .....................................................................134 
 
 4 MEANING ...........................................................................................................157 
Performance Based Courses – Chorus .................................................................159 
Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and  
Individual Instrument Classes ..................................................................166 
Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory,  
Harmony, and Music History ...................................................................171 
Generalized Topics and Integration .....................................................................184 
 
v 
 5 VALUE ................................................................................................................210 
Evaluation and Judgment .....................................................................................211 
Why Music Matters..............................................................................................220 
 6 CODA ..................................................................................................................260 
References ........................................................................................................................266 
 
  
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
MEAE  Music Education as Aesthetic Education 
 
MENC  Music Educators National Conference 
 
MTNA Music Teachers National Association 
 
MSC   Music Supervisors’ Conference 
 
MSNC  Music Supervisors National Conference 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
OVERTURE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
An examination of the writing and research on the subject of music education 
from the time of music’s official sanction in the public schools in the United States 
during the first half of the nineteenth century to the present reveals a consistent theme of 
justification for music’s inclusion as a course of study in the curriculum.  Leading public 
figures in United States education and music education history from the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries such as Horace Mann, and numerous music educators including 
Charles Aiken, Luther Whiting Mason, Frances Elliott Clark, Osbourne McConathy, Will 
Earhart, Peter Dykema, Lilla Belle Pitts, Russell V. Morgan, and Robert Choate supplied 
a variety of arguments supporting the instruction of music in schools.  In 1836 the Boston 
Academy of Music, of which Lowell Mason was a member, issued a report that argued 
for music education’s importance on the grounds of its intellectual, moral, and physical 
benefits in addition to the Academy’s assertion that music was an important recreational 
diversion from more “laborious” academic work.1  Since these early years research has 
been conducted and opinions given with the goal of showing the ways in which music 
does indeed improve the intellectual, moral, and physical capacities of the student and by 
extension society.  The prevailing logic of this largely utilitarian philosophical 
                                                 
1 Edward Bailey Birge, History of Public School Music in the United States (New York: Oliver 
Ditson Co. 1928; reprint Washington D.C.: Music Educators National Conference, 1966), 40 – 43.  1838 is 
the date often given as the point at which public school music received public support.  It was on August 
28, 1838 that the Boston School board voted to place music side by side with arithmetic and grammar in 
several of the public schools in the city.   
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perspective is that if music can be shown to improve the student and society, then it ought 
to continue to be an important part of the school curriculum and valued as integral to a 
student’s educational experience at public expense.   
Confronted with the dynamic nature of politics, public opinion, and economic 
conditions, music educators have relied on traditional rationales focused on intellectual, 
moral, and physical benefit as justification for music’s inclusion in the curriculum.  
Music educators rely on this type of justification because of music’s historically 
marginalized status as extra curricular.  Music’s marginalized status in schools is due in 
part to its abstract nature and the view that it is not a necessary means of satisfying the 
needs of a society whose notions of success and usefulness are based largely on material 
concerns.  Therefore, music educators have made utilitarian arguments so music would 
be perceived by the public as more than just an aside.  The common view of music as 
merely educational “icing” contributed to music education historian Michael Mark’s 
assertion that prior to 1958 music educators employed utilitarian philosophy to justify 
music’s existence.2  Mark’s analysis, however, is problematic because of the limited way 
in which he interprets the writings of music educators prior to 1958 as focusing solely on 
the defense of music education using utilitarian philosophical perspectives. 
That music educators have argued for music’s importance using utilitarian 
justification is not in question.  What is questionable is the view that utilitarianism was 
the singular perspective held by music educators from 1907 to 1958.  Mark’s other 
arguments relating to the views of music educators prior to 1958 are also problematic.  In 
addition to his primary argument that utilitarianism was the sole perspective of the time, 
                                                 
2 Michael Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” 
Journal of Research in Music Education 30, no.1 (Spring 1982). 
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he also states there was nothing written by music educators prior to 1958 that was 
philosophical, or there was only rationale—not philosophy—given on the importance of 
music instruction.3  Nevertheless Mark’s views, especially as they relate to utilitarianism, 
are valid because music educators are required to appease many masters – music, 
students, society, and education itself.  The field of music education is faced with the 
challenge of reconciling music with and in the realm of wider human experience.  
Furthermore, external and broader educational concerns regarding the nature of music 
education, or for that matter any so called school subject, necessarily involves promoting 
goals such as clear thinking, empathy, and being “able to detect when a man is talking 
rot.”4  Although Mark’s analysis is valid, it is ultimately limited.   
While music educators have infused broader educational goals, they have also put 
into practice ideas rooted in philosophy prior to 1958 that had fidelity to their subject 
matter, specifically musical aesthetics.  Mark, however, asserts this happens after 1958.  
Mark specifically argues in “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from 
Utilitarian to Aesthetic” that the movement of MEAE began in 1958 with the publication 
of an article in Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the 
National Society for the Study of Education, by Allen Britton titled “Music in Early 
American Public Education: A Historical Critique.”5  Scholars also support the idea that 
                                                 
3 Michael Mark , “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy” in Michael Mark, ed.,  
Music Education: Source Readings from Ancient Greece to Today (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002).  
Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 33, no. 4 
(Winter 1999), and Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic.  
See also Michael Mark and Charles Gary, A History of American Music Education, 3d ed. (Lanham, MA: 
Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2007), 417 – 422. 
4 Jan Morris, ed., The Oxford Book of Oxford (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), 
331. 
5 Mark, “Evolution,” 18.  Henceforth, Basic Concepts is a reference to Basic Concepts of Music 
Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1, ed. 
Nelson B. Henry (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
4 
 
the MEAE movement was furthered in the following year with the publication of Charles 
Leonhard’s and Robert House’s, Foundations and Principles of Music Education.  Mark 
also makes the same claim in, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” and 
again in “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy.”  More recently 
Marie McCarthy and J. Scott Goble echo Mark’s interpretation in “The Praxial 
Philosophy in Historical Perspective.”  These authors also assert that “prior to the 1950s 
music education had been associated with a variety of functional values…in post-World 
War II years…a number of scholars…began to work toward formulating a new 
philosophy built on principles drawn from Western aesthetics.”6  Supporting Mark’s 
general argument, McCarthy and Goble go on to state “Basic Concepts in Music 
Education (1958)…was a landmark in formally launching the philosophy of music 
education as aesthetic education.”7  Mark’s analysis, echoed by McCarthy and Goble, is 
so generally accepted that I will henceforth call it the standard interpretation or 
conventional view.    
What is not generally accepted is that philosophical discourse relating to 
aesthetics existed prior to this time.  I argue the term musical aesthetics and its core 
principles which focus on the nature, meaning, and value of music are embedded in the 
discourse of music educators between 1907 and 1958.  Justification for my argument is 
forthcoming in chapters three, four, and five.  A concern of the present work is the 
narrow, confusing, and restrictive views of what existed on the topic of musical aesthetics 
prior to MEAE philosophy of music education.  As such, a central issue is what is 
                                                 
6 Marie McCarthy and J. Scott Goble, “The Praxial Philosophy in Historical Perspective” in 
Praxial Music Education: Reflections and Dialogues, ed. David J. Elliott (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 19-20. 
7 Ibid. 
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considered philosophical.  Scholars such as Mark, Leonhard, House, and music education 
philosopher Bennett Reimer insist that philosophical work is systematic.8  Specifically for 
Reimer, “a philosophy of music education should be a systematic statement of music 
education’s nature and value.”9  I am not suggesting that philosophy cannot be a system 
or does not at all contain a systematic analysis in the style of writing, but the idea that 
philosophy encompasses just this is limited.  There is more to philosophy than the 
creating of a system or simply writing systematically.   
Philosophy broadly conceived is an attitude toward the world as Quentin Lauer 
asserts in his work titled The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry.  Lauer acknowledges that 
philosophy is difficult to define because “it [philosophy] is more like a way of life, an 
attitude that human beings bring with them in approaching reality—both the reality they 
themselves are and the reality in which they live.”10  In Lauer’s statements there are 
echoes of Ludwig Wittgenstein who asserts “all philosophy can do is destroy idols.  And 
that means, not making any new ones – in the ‘absence of an idol.’”11  In the case of 
Wittgenstein part of his point of philosophy is to destroy systems.  Additionally, Marie 
McGinn states that “Wittgenstein himself emphasizes over and over again that it is a 
method or a style of thought, rather than doctrines, that characterize his later 
                                                 
8 See Mark, “Historical Interpretation,” 11 and Charles Leonhard and Robert House, Foundations 
and Principles of Music Education  (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), 83-84. 
9 Bennett Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1970), 1.  Emphasis added. 
10 Quentin Lauer, The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University 
Press, 1989), 27. 
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, vols. 1 & 2, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Macmillan College Publishing Company, Inc, 1953) quoted in Anthony Kenny, ed., The Wittgenstein 
Reader (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1994; reprint 2000), 267. 
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philosophy.”12  A purpose of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, according to 
McGinn, “is to bring about a change in our attitude, or in how we see things…[it is] 
aimed at working on the individual’s style of thought.”13  In order to achieve this “the 
Investigations requires us to accept that it sets out to bring about a shift in our 
understanding which cannot be conveyed to a passive audience in the form of ‘results’ or 
‘conclusions.’”14  Because of the nature of Wittgenstein’s thought and objectives, 
McGinn asserts, the Philosophical Investigations “cannot be communicated in the form 
of a statement of systematic doctrines or theories.”15  Invoking the thrust of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of philosophy, Lauer goes on to describe philosophy as a process 
that involves active doing.16  His point is best exemplified by the description of his book 
entitled G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher without Portfolio.  Lauer asserts “by no stretch of 
the imagination could one call Chesterton a professional philosopher, and yet his writings 
are replete with what has to be called philosophical wisdom.”17  In relation to musical 
aesthetics there is also more to examine than surface notions of music’s nature and value. 
Philosophical analysis, then, is not in place to put restrictions and limits on what 
philosophy is because the discipline is much more than a loose grouping of systems; it is 
also an attitude, a way of life, a process, and how one approaches and sees problems.  
Specifically related to musical aesthetics it is more than saying what music’s value for the 
field of music education is.  It is also considering the numerous ways scholars have 
examined its nature and meaning to help students better understand this abstract art.  My 
                                                 
12 Marie McGinn, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and the Philosophical 
Investigations (London, UK: Routledge, 1997), 10.  Philosophical Investigations is part of Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy. 
13 Ibid., 31. 
14 Ibid., 30. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Lauer, The Nature of Philosophical Inquiry, 16. 
17 Ibid., 24. 
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point is that a limited view of philosophical thinking and musical aesthetics by music 
education historians and philosophers is problematic because it creates a monistic view of 
the field of philosophy and musical aesthetics, which in turn stultifies philosophy of 
music education.   
The result of a limited interpretation of what philosophy is has generated a limited 
view of the kinds of conversations on philosophical topics that occurred in music 
education prior to 1958 as being merely socially based, absent altogether, or simply 
justification.  In other words, as Michael Mark suggests, the writings of music educators 
prior to 1958 are not philosophical.  Another problem with Mark’s view is the idea that 
writings dealing with music education are provided by scholars outside the field for the 
support of music education.18   This narrow conception of philosophical discourse by 
contemporary music education historians and philosophers does not take into account 
evidence that suggests music educators in the early twentieth century actively discussed 
topics and shared ideas central to aesthetics and music.19   
This dissertation examines the discourse of music educators as it relates to 
musical aesthetics in the United States from the creation of the Music Supervisors’ 
Conference in 1907 up to the year of the publication of Basic Concepts in 1958.  The 
purpose of this dissertation is to show that philosophical discussion, especially in relation 
to musical aesthetics, was much more comprehensive than previously acknowledged.  
                                                 
18 Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” asserts “those people who left 
writings about the role of music education, who explained to us why music education was important to 
their societies, were not music educators….It is here that the overlooked significance of aesthetic education 
as an historical turning point comes into play.  There are two relevant points.  First, music educators 
became the major spokespersons for their own profession….Second, some intellectual leaders, notably 
Bennett Reimer and Abraham Schwadron, began the serious study of philosophy and became philosophers 
themselves;” 8, 13. 
19 In Bennett Reimer’s preface to A Philosophy of Music Education, xi – xii there is a hint that 
there were aesthetic aims, albeit secondary to utilitarian ones, for music education in the past but the idea is 
not developed.   
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The conventional view that the arguments supporting music education were primarily 
utilitarian is a limited interpretation of the discourse prior to 1958.  In actuality, 
arguments for music’s inclusion in the curriculum extended beyond its social, economic, 
and political utility.  Additional aesthetic theories guided the field and girded ideas of 
musical understanding and informed instruction.  A better understanding of the discourse 
of this period contributes to more informed conversations about musical aesthetics and its 
relation to music education.  Utilizing philosophical analysis and archival research, I 
argue in this dissertation that the philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics 
was rich, varied, insightful, and pervasive.  The evidence in this dissertation refutes the 
standard interpretation which eschews the possibility of discourse on aesthetics taking 
place prior to 1958.  I show that there was deeper philosophical analysis than what is 
currently acknowledged by those who presently make the claim that what was intended to 
happen generally in the field of music education and during instruction was solely guided 
by utilitarian philosophy.  In other words, it expands the current understanding of 
philosophical discourse relating to musical aesthetics in music education before the 
MEAE movement that is argued to begin with the publication of Basic Concepts. 
The fact that contemporary scholarship in music education continues to explore 
intellectual currents in philosophy and history indicates that there is sufficient interest in 
these areas of music education to warrant further analysis of specific matters relating to 
philosophy and music education in history.  Generating a better understanding of the 
nature, meaning, and value of music in music education history will lead to more 
informed debate and discussion in the field.  By examining evidence in music education 
discourse from the perspective of theories in aesthetics that focus on the nature, meaning, 
9 
 
and value of music, this study revises some elements of the standard and conventional 
views of what music education looked like philosophically before the MEAE 
movement.20 
Significance of the Study 
Mark argues, “although they often used the word ‘philosophy,’ there is little 
actual philosophy in this body of literature, as we might define it today.  For the most 
part, what has been referred to as philosophy were actually rationales.”21  He also asserts 
philosophy prior to MEAE rested on the claim that previous philosophy “was not actually 
about music education.”22  Furthermore, although music educators in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries built a body of music education literature, material from the 
pre-MEAE time is labeled as “justification,” not philosophy.23  The standard 
interpretation asserts that the writers and thinkers mentioned in the pre-MEAE period 
write about “the benefits of music education and reasons why it should be supported in 
schools.”24  That pre-MEAE philosophy was utilitarian and as such emphasized 
extramusical aims suggests that the pre-MEAE arguments were limited to justification, 
not philosophy.25 
Mark’s interpretation of music educator’s pre 1958 writing vacillates.  Generally, 
however, he implies there is a gradation of sophistication between justification, rationale, 
and philosophy. While I am not taking issue with this general notion of graded 
sophistication, it is nevertheless necessary to draw distinctions between the concepts of 
                                                 
20 I do not examine the MEAE movement in this dissertation. 
21 Mark, “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” 145. 
22 Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,” 8. 
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Mark, “Historical Precedents of Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” 145. 
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view, justification, rationale, theory, and philosophy.  Giving basic descriptions here is 
important because these terms are seen in a variety of locations in this dissertation.  For 
the purpose of this dissertation I take the term view to mean a particular perspective a 
scholar takes when advancing or critiquing an argument or stating a belief.  Justification 
is the specific support given to defend a position or a basic reason for holding a belief.  
Rationale is a further developed explanation and argument that presents more elaborate 
reasons for taking and defending a position based on a belief or a particular principle.  
Theories are well developed statements from a particular perspective, usually generated 
by abstract thought, that involve a sophisticated analysis of material relating to a topic of 
study.  Finally, philosophy is very difficult to define and can be a number of things.  
Some see philosophy as systems or doctrines developed by particular schools of thought.  
Platonic idealism is one example.  Others view of philosophy as systematic approaches to 
the study of problems not answerable by science, math, or history.  In that vein John 
Hospers suggests philosophy fundamentally deals with three “areas of thought…: the 
study of reality…the study of justification; it is concerned with how we justify the claims 
we make…[and] the analysis of various concepts that are central to our thought.”26  And 
as previously stated, philosophy is also an attitude, a way of life, a process, and how one 
approaches and sees problems.  I include elements of each of these notions of philosophy 
in this dissertation.  
This study is significant because it revises the conventional view that pre-MEAE 
discourse was limited to utilitarian justification.  By expanding the existing notions of 
philosophical discourse in music education before 1958, the end in view is threefold.  
                                                 
26 John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis 4t ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1997), 5. 
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First, the study reveals a better understanding of what music educators discussed from 
1907 to 1958 in the area of musical aesthetics.  Second, the relationship between a 
utilitarian justification of music’s value to aesthetic theories is clarified.27  Third, more 
informed discussion on music education history and musical aesthetics takes place.  This 
dissertation argues that philosophical discourse existed in the field of music education 
prior to the late 1950s, and it was rooted in aesthetics, its problems, and its place in 
classroom instruction. 
Problem Statement and Research Question 
 Prior to the formalized movements of MEAE and praxialism, the historical and 
philosophical interpretations of the period prior to 1958 in the works of Mark, Reimer, 
McCarthy and Goble, and David Elliott suggest philosophical discourse was nonexistent.  
Aesthetics is argued to have only entered into the discussion after 1958.  Since the 
conventional view has been accepted by the field, discourse on musical aesthetics from 
1907 to 1958 is not an area of research that has received widespread attention.  This may 
be due to a lack of highly formalized philosophical work written before 1970.  While 
providing a rationale for music’s inclusion in the general curriculum, much of the 
available research mentioning philosophy and music education focuses on philosophy’s 
                                                 
27 It is interesting that the argument for music education to move beyond utilitarian justification is 
similar to the one used by scholars such as Charles Leonhard, who embraced the notion of music education 
as aesthetic education in the first place.  My challenge is to the current conventional view that aesthetic 
theories were not a concern at all until the late 1950s.  The MEAE view of its purpose to educate for 
music’s values is still ultimately a justificatory claim but no longer one exclusively along the lines of 
relating music to solely extramusical values.  The emphasis shifted, but the goal was still for arguing that 
music should be part of the general curriculum.  The difference was, again, one of emphasis; one was 
seeing music for its value in relation to what society needed for stability and progress whereas the other, the 
post 1958 aesthetic view, argued that music was valuable because of its merits as music.  Perhaps it is not 
possible to completely move away from all types of justificatory claims since by its very nature music 
education seeks to educate students in music, but this type of education exists in a larger context.  There is 
an unavoidable overlap between musical practice and musical understanding.  For another explanation of 
the purpose and development of MEAE see Mark and  Gary, A History of American Music Education, 3d 
ed., 417 – 422. 
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role in support of the goal of utilitarian justification.  To my knowledge, no research 
exists that has as its focus the philosophical work of music educators relating to musical 
aesthetics prior to the MEAE movement.  The historical and philosophical research that 
does exist asserts one of three conclusions: first, there was an absence of philosophy; 
second, there was no true philosophy, only rationale given on the importance of music 
instruction;28 and third, the philosophical perspective was utilitarian, that is, music is a 
justified part of the curriculum because of its practical use. 
Although it would be beneficial to look at philosophy of music education from its 
inception in the school curriculum in 1838, the scope would be too broad.  The same can 
be said for choosing the year 1876 when the Music Teachers National Association 
(MTNA) was formed.  This dissertation, therefore, investigates the history of 
philosophical discourse of music education beginning in 1907, the year of the founding of 
the Music Supervisors’ Conference.29  It would not be a stretch to suggest the 
overlapping qualities of the two groups—MTNA and MSC/MSNC—render the choice of 
one date instead of the other as trivial.  For example, as John Molnar states,  
The carryover of the discussion from the MTNA to the MSNC was caused by the 
fact that the relationship existing between these two organizations was similar to 
that between the MSNC and the music section of the NEA.  The leaders of the 
MSNC were the same persons who assumed an active leadership in school music 
affairs in the other two groups.30 
 
                                                 
28 John Molnar, “The Establishment of the Music Supervisors National Conference, 1907-1910,” 
Journal of Research in Music Education 3, no. 1 (Spring 1955) 40-50.  Mark , “Historical Precedents of 
Aesthetic Education Philosophy,” and  Mark, “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education,”, and 
Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic.”  See also Mark and 
Gary, A History of American Music Education, 3d ed., 417 – 422. 
29 Between 1907 and 1910 the organization was called the Music Supervisors’ Conference (MSC).  
In 1910 the MSC wrote a formal constitution, met annually, and became known as the Music Supervisors 
National Conference (MSNC).  By 1934 the MSNC had become the Music Educators National Conference 
(MENC), an organization that exists today. 
30 Molnar, “The Establishment of the Music Supervisors National Conference, 1907-1910,” 46. 
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Even though some of the leadership and other parts of the membership were the same, 
there is an important difference between the two groups.  The MTNA had a large 
contingency of private music teachers whose main interaction with public school students 
was in the one-on-one lesson in their studios.  On the subject of the MTNA compared to 
the MSNC, John Beattie refers to the MTNA as representing the interests of the “outside 
music teacher” while the MSNC represents the “school music teacher.”31   
The field of music education also began to achieve a greater degree of unity and 
cohesion by creating another forum in which ideas were explored, exchanged, and 
debated by those who were considered “teachers and musicians,”32 and matters that may 
have transcended those that had been discussed by the Music Teachers National 
Association which had formed in 1876.  Additionally, Mark and Gary suggest the efforts 
of the MSNC “brought social, musical, educational, and organizational development to 
the music education profession.”33  Finally, 1907 is around the time that the music 
curriculum expanded in schools, and classes such as appreciation and harmony were 
added.  These additions were important because the very nature of these courses was 
based in examining the elements of music – the end goal was not the performance of a 
particular piece of music but to reach a better understanding of music.  The content of 
matters in musical aesthetics discussed by music education scholars is at the heart of this 
research.  It is central to this dissertation because music educators of the period not only 
transcended the practical rationale of utilitarianism in their writings but also used ideas 
from aesthetics for the purpose of informing instruction.  The work focuses on the field of 
                                                 
31 John Beattie, “The Music Supervisors’ National Conference,” Studies In Musical Education, 
History and Aesthetics: Paper and Proceedings of The Music Teachers’ National Association (Hartford, 
CT: MTNA Publication Office, 1921), 89-95, 89. 
32 Mark and Gary, A History of American Music Education, 252. 
33 Ibid. 
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music education in the United States from 1907 to 1958.  The central question is: Is there 
compelling evidence to show that scholarly work of the period reflected and advanced 
theories of musical aesthetics that focused on the nature, meaning, and value of music 
with the intended purpose of guiding practice and informing the field at large? 
Objectives of the Study 
 
 The period of history that includes 1907 to 1958 in the United States was one of 
educational and philosophical ferment.  The span of time from the formation of the MSC 
to the dawn of the MEAE movement is embedded in the progressive era.34  During this 
time there was an emphasis on improving society via efficient and practical means, all of 
which coincides with the interpretation that philosophy of music education, if it existed 
prior to 1958, was utilitarian.  I do not claim that the utilitarian philosophy did not exist 
or was not discussed by music educators.  I think for the purpose of better informed 
music education policy, however, it is necessary to find out if it was the only 
philosophical view held in the discipline, especially relating to practice.   
One of the concerns of this study, specifically relating philosophy to the practice 
of music education, is rooted in an idea put forth in John Dewey’s The Child and the 
Curriculum.  He argues for reconciliation between subject matter and the interests and 
experiences of the child.  For Dewey, the role of the teacher is to figure out “how his [sic] 
own knowledge of the subject-matter may assist in interpreting the child’s needs and 
doings, and determine the medium in which the child should be placed in order that his 
growth may be properly directed.”35  Dewey continues:  
                                                 
34 The progressive era in the United States is often accepted as beginning in the early 1890s and 
drawing to a close in the 1950s. 
35 John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
1900/1990), 201.  
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Somehow, somewhere motive must be appealed to, connection must be 
established between mind and material…if the subject-matter of the lessons be 
such as to have an appropriate place within the expanding consciousness of the 
child, if it grows out of his own past doings, thinkings, and sufferings, and grows 
into application in further achievements and receptivities, then no device or trick 
of method has to be resorted to in order to enlist “interest.”36   
 
Dewey’s ideas emphasize the importance of both subject matter and the interests of the 
child.  Therefore, in relation to the subject of music in the Deweyan sense, it is improper 
to connect music to some distant and externally imposed notion of civic responsibility or 
goal of higher achievement scores.  What is necessary is for the teacher to use knowledge 
of music to assist in the growth and expansion of the child’s consciousness and 
experiences.   By leaving the idea of “proper direction” undefined, Dewey leaves open 
possibilities that do not exclude music in relation to practical purposes, but neither does it 
rule out the development of musical experiences for the purpose of experiential growth 
and the expansion of consciousness. 
 Educative experiences are central to the process of a child’s education.  Another 
particular manifestation of progressive thought in education was the integration 
movement.  Integration took many forms, but the basic idea was to expose a child to 
multiple areas of thought and experience while attempting to draw on common themes 
among what appear to be disparate groupings.  For example, a social studies teacher 
studying the ancien régime might include works and writings of Mozart to illuminate the 
tensions existing between traditional bases of socio-economic power and the rising 
merchant class.  Another example could be the physics and music classes studying the 
properties of sound in the school’s auditorium.  In music education the integration 
movement prompted music educators to take a hard look at the nature, meaning, and 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 205. 
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value of music.  Music educators asked themselves questions such as, “Should music be 
integrated into the larger curriculum or should it remain a standalone subject because of 
its alleged uniqueness?”  This period was rife with musical aesthetics arguments from 
music educators, yet there are gaps in the existing research that give credit to those in the 
field discussing such matters.  This research fills in some of the gaps.       
 Another gap in existing research on the philosophical writings during this period 
has to do specifically with aesthetics.  An important example is Eduard Hanslick’s 
seminal work titled On the Musically Beautiful, first published in 1854.37  Hanslick’s 
book sparked a lively debate which continues today on the subject of meaning in music.  
Music educators of the time had heard about Hanslick’s ideas and incorporated his 
theories on some level into their discourse for the purpose of relating it to their pursuits of 
more informed music instruction.  In other words, Hanslick had adherents to his ideas in 
the field of music education, and as a result Hanslick’s aesthetic position entered the 
discourse of early twentieth century music educators.  Another example is Dewey’s Art 
as Experience, which explores artistic meaning through interaction with art.38  These two 
works are examples that philosophical dialogues in the area of aesthetics and music 
continued unabated since aesthetics became popular in the eighteenth century.39  With 
works such as these generating discussions in the general fields of music and education, 
the historical record of the MSC, MSNC (later MENC)—groups that consisted of 
                                                 
37 Originally written in German, the first English translation was Gustav Cohen’s 1891 version 
based on Hanslick’s seventh edition of 1885.  By 1922 this work had reached 15 editions.  A review of the 
book was published in the April 24, 1892 edition of the New York Times. 
38 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York, NY: The Berkley Publishing Group, 1934/2005). 
39 John Dewey’s work is not exclusively about music, but he does write extensively on the topic of 
music within the book.  The term “aesthetic” was reconstituted in modern times thanks to a debate on its 
meaning between A.G. Baumgarten, who is said to have coined the term in his Aesthetica (1750), and 
Immanuel Kant.  See T.J. Diffey, “A Note on Some Meanings of the Term ‘Aesthetic,’” British Journal of 
Aesthetics 35, no. 1 (January 1995): 61-72, 63.  
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“musicians and teachers”—reveals numerous aesthetic perspectives that have not been 
adequately accounted for in research.  An objective of this research is to show that 
aesthetics was very much a part of the conversation in music education from 1907 to 
1958.   
One problem that surfaced, however, is in how these music educators interpreted 
the term aesthetics and used it.  I seek to elucidate what was said by music educators in 
relation to musical aesthetics.  In so doing the murkiness of the language within the 
literature of the common interpretation on the topic of utilitarianism is clarified, but more 
importantly clarification on the larger topic of musical aesthetics in the discourse of the 
time is achieved in my analysis of the evidence. One definition of the term aesthetics in 
relation to the music is that “musical aesthetics is the study of the relationship of music to 
the human senses and intellect.”40  Another very basic approach is to consider aesthetics 
as “the philosophy of art and beauty – a subdivision of philosophy that deals with 
fundamental questions about the arts which the arts themselves are not able to answer, or 
are not entirely able to answer.”41  Dewey asserts aesthetic theories deal with the “general 
significance” of art.42  Like Dewey, Gordon Graham asserts, aesthetics is “an attempt to 
theorize about art, to explain what it is and why it matters.”43  Again, my argument 
contests the conventional view’s assertion that the period prior to 1958 was 
philosophically barren.  Musicians and leading music educators during this period were 
                                                 
40 Willi Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music, 2d ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1972), 14. 
41 Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (London, UK: Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2007), 1.  Hamilton elaborates on the meaning of aesthetics in the remainder of the first chapter. 
42 Dewey, Art as Experience, 2. 
43 Gordon Graham, Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 1997), 2. 
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well aware of matters relating to musical aesthetics on some level and thereby included 
such contemporary topics in their own dialogue. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPOSITION: (AESTHETICS) 
Part I – Aesthetics 
 This chapter clarifies what aesthetics is in order to show how the discourse of 
music educators coincided with the problems and theories of this branch of philosophy.1 
Dabney Townsend writes, “if one were speaking strictly historically, the history of 
‘aesthetics’ would cover only the period from the mid-eighteenth century when the 
modern idea of aesthetics first appeared through the last two thirds of the twentieth 
century.”2  In a similar vein, Carl Dalhaus characterizes aesthetics as an immature field 
only being reconstituted in the eighteenth century and still only being attached to music 
in the nineteenth century.3  Perhaps due to its immaturity Dalhaus suggests that 
All attempts to define it, whether as a theory of perception or as a 
philosophy of art or as a science of beauty, suffer from dogmatic 
narrowness, one-sidedness, and arbitrariness…to do justice to this 
phenomenon requires recognizing that it is not so much a distinct 
discipline with a firmly limited object of inquiry, as, rather a vaporous, far 
flung quintessence of problems and points of view that no one before the 
eighteenth century could have imagined coalescing into a complex with its 
own name.4 
                                                 
1 While distinctions exist between histories of philosophy (which is where I position this work) 
and intellectual histories, a striking similarity between the two is seen in Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream: 
The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession.  In his book he cites an unnamed 
“crusty political historian’s” characterization of attempting to write intellectual history as a task that is “like 
nailing jelly to the wall.”  The writing of this dissertation has been no less difficult than attempting to “nail 
jelly to the wall.”  Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American 
Historical Profession (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988/1999), 7. 
2 Dabney Townsend, Historical Dictionary of Aesthetics, Historical Dictionaries of Religions, 
Philosophies, and Movements, No. 72 (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006), xvii. 
3 Carl Dalhaus, Esthetics of Music, trans. William Austin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967/1982), vii – viii. 
4 Ibid., 3. 
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A basic approach is to consider aesthetics as “the philosophy of art and beauty – a 
subdivision of philosophy that deals with fundamental questions about the arts which the 
arts themselves are not able to answer, or are not entirely able to answer.”5  Stemming 
from the nineteenth century, musical aesthetics, however “narrow, one-sided or 
arbitrary,” is often recognized as something distinct.   
The idea of musical aesthetics as a distinct field of study is given by Wayne 
Bowman who argues musical aesthetics is a narrow term that is subsumed by the 
philosophy of music.6  For him, music philosophy is the more appropriate term because it 
“explores areas musical aesthetics often regards as musically incidental: matters 
epistemological, ethical, social, cultural, and political.”7 Bowman confines musical 
aesthetics to an “effort to describe what is distinctive about music and musical 
experience.” 8  In contrast Edward Lippman writes “aesthetics as traditionally defined is a 
philosophy of art in an empirical sense: it considers art as it is revealed in perception and 
in practice.”9  Later, Lippman asserts 
We cannot really take issue with the retention of the term musical 
aesthetics.  Its meaning has expanded, for one thing well beyond the 
sphere of actual auditory impressions and their effects, and although 
philosophy of music is doubtless a more accurate designation for our 
increasingly diversified world of musical thought, musical aesthetics has 
the advantage of an established use that will probably overcome its 
disrepute.10 
                                                 
5 Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (London, UK: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
2007), 1.  Hamilton elaborates on the meaning of aesthetics in the remainder of the first chapter. 
6 Wayne D. Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 6. 
7 Ibid., 5 
8 Ibid., 6-7. 
9 Edward Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1992), 219.  Lippman continues, using Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling’s 
arguments, that “the philosophy of art…is concerned with ‘art in itself,’ or the essential nature of art.” Ibid.  
10 Ibid., 352. Italics in original. 
21 
 
Finally, Willi Apel defines musical aesthetics as “the study of the relationship of music to 
the human senses and intellect.”11 
 Whether it was a focus on the listener’s response or the form and content of the 
music, the basis of what was studied in musical aesthetics in the nineteenth century and 
much of the twentieth century was rooted in ideas relating to Western Art Music.12  
Music from other cultures or the jazz that would become popular in the twentieth century 
were not often considered worthy topics for serious study.  For that matter music 
emanating from what is labeled Modernist generated plenty of controversy within the 
field of musical aesthetics, but the Modernist tradition, at least from the perspective of the 
critic, had emerged from the tradition of Western Art Music.  Even though aesthetics had 
existed as an area of study since the mid-eighteenth century, its relative immaturity had 
the effect of lacking exhaustive development of what the object or essence of the study 
was.  There simply was not the time for the field to develop a multiplicity of counter 
arguments to be formed or reworked.  This is contextually important because the 
historical development in the field of musical aesthetics in the nineteenth century left 
legacies that influenced subsequent approaches to what was at the core of the discipline.  
That is, although a twentieth century aesthetician might reject an idea advanced in a 
particular theory from the nineteenth century, the two writers still worked from 
                                                 
11 Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music, 14. 
12 John Drummond asserts “Western Art Music has its origins in Europe, and the ‘canon’ of 
classical music consists of the works of European composers. The expanded term ‘Western’ (rather than 
merely ‘European’) allows the inclusion of music created and performed by others outside the region: by 
European immigrants into North America and their heirs; by other members of the European diaspora who 
settled in colonies around the world and their successors; and, more recently, by anyone who wishes to 
participate in what has become a global music…But what does ‘art music’ mean? It may be broadly 
defined as a music possessing five characteristics: it is performed by professionals who have undergone 
disciplinary training; it has a canon of traditional musical works, usually by identified composers; there is a 
notation through which these works are preserved; it has a theory of music; and it claims to be ‘artistic’. 
These characteristics (especially, perhaps, the last one) allow it to claim to be ‘serious music’, in contrast to 
‘popular’ or ‘folk’ musics.”  John Drummond, “Re-thinking Western Art Music: A Perspective Shift for 
Music Educators,” International Journal of Music Education 28, no. 2 (May 2010): 117 – 126, 120, 121. 
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assumptions primarily grounded in Western Art Music.  The notable exception to this 
idea of musical aesthetics being based solely on Western Art Music is what Graham calls 
the “sociological or sociohistorical approach”13 and what Lippman describes as 
“socioaesthetics.”14  Each scholar suggests that in the twentieth century certain 
aestheticians and theorists such as Theodor Adorno argued musical production had a 
cultural connection.  Sociological approaches notwithstanding, aesthetics remains 
difficult to discern. 
 The challenges of defining the term echoed in Dalhaus’ previous statement about 
aesthetics being a “vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view” are 
compounded by historical transformations.  Dalhaus argues “nineteenth century writers 
on music…were fascinated by the problem of esthetic judgment and its philosophical 
basis, in the twentieth century discussion rather focuses on technical questions.”15  
Lippman sees the transformation as much the same.  For him there is a move from 
subjective content of feelings and moods where much attention is given to the emotional 
realm to one where a major concern in the twentieth century is reactive and holds that 
meaning is based on the objective form of music, that is, how compositions are to be 
analyzed intrinsically.16  These delineations between the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, however, may not be strict.  Overlap is common in the articulation of theories 
where one theory often is the basis on which another theory emerges.  Theoretical 
                                                 
13 Graham writes “the concern of the sociological approach is with art as an historical 
phenomenon and a social construction.”  Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 3.  Also see further elaboration 
on 158 – 171 and 176-177.   
14 Lippman describes the socioaesthetic as “the social component of aesthetic ideas.”  Lippman,  A 
History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 398. 
15 Dalhaus, Esthetics of Music, 2. 
16 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 351. 
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transformations are nevertheless necessary for building a general framework, which is 
important because theory provides one way of organizing the evidence. 
Contextually, the study of aesthetics that informs this research is primarily from 
the mid-nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries.   More specifically, I focus on 
problems and theories from this time that examine what music is (nature), how music is 
comprehended and interpreted and what it allegedly reveals (meaning), and musical 
judgment and why music matters (value).  This framework is based on the work of both 
Monroe Beardsley and T.J. Diffey.  In Diffey’s essay titled “A Note on Some Meanings 
of the Term ‘Aesthetic’” he asserts that 
Whatever discipline…aesthetics finds itself to be a branch of, the same problems 
tend to recur, such as the nature and defining characteristics of art, the meaning 
works of art are said to have, how they may be judged, valued, or interpreted, the 
nature of imagination and of creativity, the kinds of experience offered by art, 
&C.17 
 
The version of Diffey’s explanation used in this paper substitutes the words 
music/musical where he uses the term art.  Therefore, a la Diffey, whatever discipline 
musical aesthetics finds itself to be a branch of, the same problems tend to recur, such as 
the nature and defining characteristics of music, the meaning musical works are said to 
have, how they may be judged, valued or interpreted, the nature of imagination and of 
creativity, and the kinds of experience offered by music.  And from Beardsley’s 
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, I rely on both the structure and 
content of his 1958 work which is divided into three basic sections that correspond to the 
domains I have labeled nature, meaning, and value.  The philosophical work of Roger 
Scruton, Andy Hamilton, Wayne Bowman, Morris Weitz, and Graham as well as the 
                                                 
17 T.J. Diffey, “A Note on Some Meanings of the Term “Aesthetic,’” British Journal of Aesthetics 
35, no. 1 (January 1995): 61-66, 61. 
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historical work of Lippman, and a number of others, also informs elements of this 
chapter.18  The primary analytical tool for this section, however, and what forms the basis 
of much of the remaining analysis comes from Beardsley, who writes, “The problems of 
philosophical aesthetics…fall into three main groups…the problems raised by descriptive 
statements…the more debatable problems raised by interpretive statements…[and] the 
problems raised by the critic’s value judgments.”19  What are the characteristics, 
differences, and similarities seen in the general organizational concepts of nature, 
meaning, and value?  Although the quality of unity or wholeness exists with these 
organizational concepts because each informs how we think about and experience music 
every one simultaneously has distinct boundaries, which is akin to the notion of part-
whole relations. 
 The notion of the nature of music is one in which the fundamental issue is 
explaining what music is.  In other words these theories seek to describe the essence of 
music and focus on music as a concept, and fall within what is often referred to as 
philosophical aesthetics.   More specifically, Graham asserts the task of philosophical 
aesthetics is “to arrive at a definition, conception, or characterization of art that makes 
                                                 
18 These other works were used to clarify some points made by Beardsley and were included in 
areas where Beardsley has what I perceive as holes or underdeveloped ideas in his work, particularly since 
his approach to aesthetics is primarily object-centered rather than subject-centered. 
19  Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (New York, NY: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1958), 10.  Even though a second edition was published in 1981 to further 
clarify some of his points and address various criticisms of his 1958 edition, the year of publication of the 
earlier work is particularly important to this dissertation since, as stated in the previous chapter, this is often 
the date given as the beginning of the music education as aesthetic education movement.  Therefore, 
Beardsley’s work represents a sound depiction of what was understood in the field of aesthetics to that 
point in time.  For Beardsley there is a natural path to the problems of the nature, meaning, and value of art.  
In order to evaluate a work he insists that at first certain questions must be answered, “for often critics are 
interested in describing and interpreting works of art because they want to evaluate them; they use 
descriptive and interpretive statements as reasons for, or partial reasons for, normative statements.”  Ibid., 
10-11. 
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explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s being a work of art.”20  In 
a subsequent section of this paper, the problems and theories that focus on the nature of 
music will be addressed; this is also the case for meaning and value.  The next concept to 
define is meaning. 
 Again, in its simplest form meaning is how music is comprehended and 
interpreted.  Or, to put it another way, what is allegedly revealed by music.  The 
articulation of this category comes from Lippman’s argument of the difference between 
nineteenth and twentieth century musical aesthetics.  As mentioned above, for him there 
was a move from subjective content of feelings and moods where much attention is given 
to the emotional realm to one where a major concern in the twentieth century is reactive 
and holds that meaning is based on the objective form of music, that is, how 
compositions are to be analyzed intrinsically.21  Beardsley is, again, particularly helpful 
in explaining one way I am using the term meaning.  He writes, “A critical 
interpretation…is a statement that purports to declare the ‘meaning’ of a work of art…I 
use the term ‘meaning’ for a semantical relation between the work itself and something 
outside the work.”22  The difficulty of articulating meaning lies in the relations between 
composer, musical work, and the percipient.  Are we to comprehend and interpret music 
for its alleged expression of emotion, or how it may represent an external idea or symbol, 
or are we only able to analyze the structural form of the composition?  Although there are 
no simple solutions to these questions, these questions are the very ones at the core of the 
                                                 
20 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 151. 
21 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 351. 
22 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 9.  Italics in the original.  Beardsley goes to give examples and writes 
“suppose it is said that a tone poem contains a joyful affirmation of life, or that it ‘refers to’ something in 
the life of the composer; or that a dance ‘represents’ the awakening of young love; or that a bridge in a 
novel ‘symbolizes’ or ‘signifies’ the crises of life; or that a modern office building ‘expresses’ the 
functional efficiency of modern business.  These statements are critical interpretations.” 9-10. 
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idea of meaning.  And more often, as suggested by Lippman, meaning is based on 
analysis of the composition.   
Meaning is distinct from the notion of nature because, as Graham explains, there 
are problems with descriptive theories.  He poses the following question: “is a 
[descriptive] theory of art about the kind of human judgment and/or perception that arises 
when we are confronted with a work or art, or is it a theory about actual objects – 
paintings, poems, plays, pieces of music, and so on?”23  Likewise it is distinct from ideas 
of value because the primary focus is not one that contains the same emphasis on the 
extramusical as certain normative theories do.  This is not to say that normative theories 
are only concerned with the extramusical but to simply state that the importance of 
internally constituted understanding is not the only aspect of the idea of value.  The idea 
of meaning is closely related to Immanuel Kant’s perspective on aesthetics.  Graham 
writes, “Kant has a philosophy of art as well as an account of the aesthetic judgment. 
That is to say, he is concerned both with the artifact of art and the attitude we bring to 
them.”24  Kant argues “in all beautiful art what is essential consists in the form, which is 
purposive for observation and judging.”25  Or as Donald W. Crawford explains 
Experiencing beauty is thus, for Kant, a doubly reflective process.  We reflect on 
the spatial and temporal form of the object by exercising our powers of judgment 
(imagination and understanding), and we acknowledge the beauty of an object 
when we come to be aware through the feeling of pleasure of the harmony of 
these faculties, which awareness comes by reflecting on our own mental states.26 
 
                                                 
23 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 153.  
24 Ibid., 13. 
25 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment §52, 5:326, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul 
Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 203. 
26 Donald W. Crawford, “Kant,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics 2d ed., eds. Berys Gaut 
and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 62. 
27 
 
Meaning has at its core the uncovering of the artistic process by examining the musical 
work and our interpretation/understanding/comprehension/ of it or what is revealed by it; 
in the twentieth century, according to Dalhaus and Lippman, the analysis of the 
composition is the way in which we are to better understand how we make sense of it, 
which leads us to the concept of value.   
Value-based theories are concerned with why music matters (music’s intrinsic, 
inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian worth) and how it is possible to make an 
evaluation.27  These theories, as described by Graham and Beardsley, are called 
normative.  Should we care about music and if so why?  Graham claims normative 
theories “see what values music, or painting, or poetry can embody, and how valuable 
this form of embodiment is.”28  Graham’s explanation, however, is not wholly satisfying.  
There are significant and subtle differences between different types of value, especially in 
relation to music educators’ attempts to justify music’s inclusion in the curriculum based 
on certain notions of the value of music.   
The problem I brought to light in the previous chapter on the difference between 
justification and philosophy has at its core the issue of value.  Justification for something 
can be achieved in a philosophical manner; it depends in large part on what types of 
arguments are used to support such justificatory claims.  One specific aspect of the use of 
                                                 
27 The terms intramusical and extramusical, in relation to normative theories, are aligned closely 
with the concepts of intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value, with intrinsic and instrumental 
value being explained later in the paragraph and with all terms being explained and related later in the 
chapter. 
28 Crawford, “Kant,” 173.  Graham’s treatment of the notion of value is not always clear.  At one 
moment he claims normative theories have an evaluative component as seen in his assertion the aim of a 
normative conception of art “is to sort out from among the things known as art those which truly deserve 
the label.” Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 153.  This use of the term is not consistent with his use of the 
term in the above section of the paper.  For the purposes of this paper Graham’s notion and understanding 
of value from page 173, which stems from his subsequent development of the idea of value citing Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, Collingwood, and Scruton on pages 173-175, informs just one way that I will use the term 
value.  
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justificatory claims for music education comes from differences associated with the 
general heading of extrinsic value.  Under the general label of extrinsic value lie the 
terms instrumentalism and utilitarianism.  The latter term has frequently been the 
philosophical view used to support music’s value in the schools.  Writers on the topic of 
value have positioned themselves in numerous ways regarding their view on the utility of 
music.  One example is Gordon Graham’s description of Benedetto Croce’s expressivist 
position on value in the latter’s Guide to Aesthetics.  Graham writes that Croce “denies 
that art has anything ‘utilitarian’ about it…to understand its [art’s] meaning and value we 
need only look at the work itself and can ignore the world beyond the work,” 29  Ancient 
Greek thinkers had a different view of music’s utility by citing its effect on the character, 
known as ethos theory.  The differences between the various theoretical perspectives on 
the value of music lie in how the theorist uses, sees, and understands differences between 
intrinsic, instrumental, inherent, and utilitarian value.  Making a distinction among these 
types of value is important because many music educators looked to the arguments from 
utilitarian theory in an attempt to place school music on par with other subjects.   
Philosophically speaking the term utilitarianism shares overlapping characteristics 
with instrumentalism.  The two terms, sometimes used interchangeably, are not 
identical.30  The chief difference is that the theory of instrumentalism, as used in 
                                                 
29 Gordon Graham, “Expressivism,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut and 
Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 133-145, 135. 
30 Another component of the problem with the use of the term utilitarian by music education 
historians in particular is that it is applied too loosely.  That is, because writers such as Michael Mark do 
not focus on the shades of difference between utilitarianism and theories such as Marxism or the ideas of 
Collingwood, for example, all such designations get labeled as part of a theory that is ill-defined.  The lack 
of attention to the variations within instrumentalism is part of the reason there has been a misinterpretation 
of pre-1958 philosophy of music education.  Additionally, while there are differences between pragmatism 
and utilitarianism, and even instrumentalism and pragmatism, detailed explanations of the delineations are, 
like the variations of German idealism, not necessary here, and there is not the space in this dissertation to 
explain the differences.  For descriptions and differences between pragmatism and utilitarianism, see 
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discourse on the arts, places value and importance on the experiencing of the object 
where the possible ends-in-view are not fixed, final, or necessarily practical.  
Utilitarianism, on the other hand as used in discourse on the arts, sees particular and 
practical ends-in-view that include social, political, moral, and/or economic effects being 
generated from the experience between the aesthetic object and percipient.  The social, 
moral, political and/or economic effects are said to influence the individual and society.  
An additional difference is that instrumentalism relies on the so-called doctrine of 
immediacy which posits that “aesthetic value is something that is immediately 
experienced and known; it does not have to be calculated or inferred, but is open to direct 
inspection—consummatory, if anything is.”31  Utilitarianism does not rely on the 
necessity of the immediate experience but rather on the consequences which follow the 
experience or are somehow indirectly related.  The overlapping quality is that both 
incorporate extramusical or extrinsic elements—those that may not be exclusively related 
to music—in determining value.  Beardsley describes the instrumentalist position on 
aesthetic value as such, “if it be granted that aesthetic experience has value, then 
‘aesthetic value’ may be defined as ‘the capacity to produce an aesthetic experience of 
some magnitude.’”32  He continues by arguing using the instrumentalist position that “To 
say that an object has aesthetic value is (a) to say that it has the capacity to produce an 
                                                                                                                                                 
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 8, Modern Philosophy: Empiricism, Idealism, and 
Pragmatism in Britain and America (New York, NY: Image Books, 1966/1994); John Dewey, “What Does 
Pragmatism Mean by Practical?” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 5, no. 4 
(February 1908): 85-99; Ernst Moritz Manasse, “Moral Principles and Alternatives in Max Weber and John 
Dewey,” The Journal of Philosophy 41, no. 2 (January 1944): 29-48; William Meyer, “Democracy: Needs 
over Wants,” Political Theory 2, no. 2 (May 1974): 197-214; Chaïm Perelman, “Pragmatic Arguments,” 
trans. A.J. Ayer, Philosophy 34, no. 128 (January 1959): 18-27.  For descriptions and differences between 
pragmatism and instrumentalism and experimentalism in relation to music education, see Foster 
McMurray, “A Pragmatic Approach to Certain Aspects of Music Education,” Journal of Research in Music 
Education 4, no. 2 (Autumn 1956): 103-112. 
31 Ibid., 534. Italics in the original. 
32 Ibid., 533. 
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aesthetic effect, and (b) to say that the aesthetic effect itself has value.”33  Notice in 
Beardsley’s explanations there is evidence of the importance of the experience but 
nothing beyond that immediate happening.  To put it another way, using the 
instrumentalist line of reasoning one is not necessarily expected to become a better 
mathematician as a result of playing the saxophone, but the believer in utilitarianism 
would make the argument that the value of music is that it does. 
Beside the differences between the instrumentalist and utilitarian positions there 
are also distinction made between intrinsic, inherent, and instrumental value.  Beardsley 
defines each as follows:  
To say that a value of an object is an instrumental (or extrinsic) value is to say 
that the object derives its value from being a means to the production of some 
other object that has value…to say that a value of an object is an intrinsic (or 
terminal) value is to say that the object has that value independently of any 
means-end relation to other objects.34 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 510.  Beardsley takes time to analyze each of these positions and shows the weaknesses of 
each.  For something to have intrinsic value, according to the rationalist, the effect or quality of the object 
or experience is self-evident “and without any indirect or covert appeal to human experience.”  Therefore, 
the truth or beauty in an object or event would be self-evident regardless of any prior contact or experience. 
Trying to imagine something that has no reference to our experience is very difficult, especially for the 
empiricist.  Beardsley makes note of the difference between the empiricist and the rationalist and one can 
infer from his analysis that the empirical position pushes the intrinsic theory of value very close to, if not 
completely in, the instrumentalist camp.  His analysis of instrumentalism includes the criticism that “it is 
said to be self-contradictory…[and] meaningless.”  To put it another way, if you can only judge whether 
something has value in relation to other things or actions, how can anything ever be said to be of value?  
Where does the value really lie?  To this question the instrumentalist might reply using support from the 
doctrine of immediacy, but this type of response leans toward intrinsic value, something the instrumentalist 
rejects.  In relation to the idea of meaninglessness he is a bit unclear, but if I understand his example it is 
that for something to be a value instrumentally it must be in relation to something that has value, so never 
getting to anything that has value is not only self-contradictory but also makes the position meaningless.  
Even though he critiques both positions, he also provides examples in his analysis of how each position can 
be valid.  It is not, however, important to consider the supporting arguments for each theory here.  
Beardsley, Aesthetics, 540 – 543. 
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Relying on the work Values of Art by Malcom Budd, Matthew Kieran in his essay titled 
“Value of Art” describes the difference between instrumental value and intrinsic value.35  
Kieran writes that 
If we value a work instrumentally, it is merely a contingent means to a particular 
end.  To value Bach’s Cello Suites just because they cheer me up implies that they 
are replaceable by something that performs the same function as well or 
better…however, to find intrinsic value in a work is to appreciate the imaginative 
experience it properly affords, which may be beautiful, moving, uplifting, 
pleasurable, insightful or profound.  But it is the particular nature of the work that 
guides our active mental engagement and responses to it.  Hence there is 
something about the experience of a particular work, if it is intrinsically valuable, 
that cannot be replaced by any other.36 
 
The difference between the two, as Kieran argues, is “for something to possess inherent 
value it must not only be the means to a valuable end, but also the means must partly 
constitute and thus be internal to the ends involved.”37   Kieran suggests “that the primary 
value of art concerns the ways in which works enrich how we understand ourselves and 
the world.”38  By asserting music is infungible, its value comes from creating a unique 
experience where important insights are gained about ourselves (individually and 
collectively) and the world, emotionally or otherwise, which is just one example of the 
way value is used.  My use of the term value not only includes the intrinsic and 
instrumental perspectives on the concept but also inherent and utilitarian views as well as 
the aspect of evaluation/judgment which in some cases overlaps the aforementioned 
terms on value.  Music’s intrinsic value is simply one where “any experience enjoyed as 
                                                 
35 Matthew Kieran, “Value of Art,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut and 
Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 293-305.  Kieran places the idea of value 
within philosophical aesthetics whereas Graham does this only partially.  For Graham the notion of value 
falls more clearly within what he calls normative theory.   
36 Ibid., 293. 
37 Ibid., 294.  Italics in original.  Kieran conflates intrinsic and inherent value, a mistake in my 
view (the difference will be seen later in the chapter).   
38 Ibid., 299. 
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an end-in-itself or as complete in itself.”39  Intrinsic value is a term occasionally 
substituted for inherent value, but like instrumentalism and utilitarianism there are 
differences.   
Kieran leaves a middle ground between his explanation of the difference between 
instrumental value and his description of intrinsic value mentioned above.40   This middle 
ground hinges on the word inherent.  Beardsley describes inherent value as “the capacity 
of aesthetic objects to produce good inherent effects—that is, to produce desirable effects 
by means of the aesthetic experience they evoke.”41  In the same section on inherent 
value Beardsley argues “aesthetic objects differ from… directly utilitarian objects in that 
their immediate function is only to provide a certain kind of experience that can be 
enjoyed in itself.”42  Therefore, as I echo Beardsley’s use of instrumentalism, inherent 
value inclines toward intrinsic value while still clinging to the basic precepts of 
instrumental value theory.  Beardsley’s assessment of Clarence Irving Lewis’ An Analysis 
of Knowledge and Valuation further clarifies the relationship between intrinsic, inherent, 
and instrumental value as a way to delineate the terms.43  Beardsley states, 
Note that my term “instrumental value” covers the same ground as his term 
“extrinsic value,” but is defined in a more neutral way: where as I say simply that 
if Y has value—whether this value is itself intrinsic or instrumental—and X is a 
means to Y, then X has instrumental value, Lewis puts into the definition of 
“extrinsic value” that the object having it is a means, directly or indirectly, to the 
realization of intrinsic value.  Lewis holds that only experiences or their qualities 
can have intrinsic value; when an object directly, or immediately, causes an 
experience having intrinsic value, the extrinsic value of the object is said to be 
“inherent”; when an object is a means to the production of an object with inherent 
                                                 
39 Archie J. Bahm, “The Aesthetics of Organicism,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
26, no. 4 (Summer 1968): 449 – 459, 449. 
40 Beardsley describes his use of instrumentalism in Beardsley, Aesthetics, 524 – 543. 
41 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 573. 
42 Ibid., 572. 
43 Clarence Irving Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salic, IL: Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1946). 
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value, its value is said to be “instrumental.”  Thus inherent value and instrumental 
value are, for Lewis, subdivisions of extrinsic value.44 
 
In addition to the idea of value being connected with intrinsic and/or extrinsic 
explanations of why music matters there is another aspect of the domain and that is 
evaluation. 
Beardsley’s explanation of normative statements are “critical evaluations…that 
apply to works of art the words ‘good’ or beautiful,’ their negatives, or other predicates 
definable in terms of them.”45  Assessments on the merits of a work either in isolation or 
in relation to others are just as important to musical aesthetics as gaining insights about 
ourselves.  Discussions regarding base music, good music, and great music have existed 
at least as far back as the ancient Greeks.  And these types of value judgments are made 
using informed analysis, but how the judgments are made and the justification for such 
assertions are key problems in musical aesthetics—one of the tasks of musical aesthetics 
is to generate ideas as to how these types of assessments can be made.  Interestingly, 
these notions of value also relate to each other.  The very act of evaluating tells us 
something about our humanity.  That we can experience an aesthetic object and provide a 
reasoned explanation and engage in dialogue regarding its quality and significance is 
uniquely human.  The challenge of explaining the distinctions between these notions of 
the nature, meaning, and value of music is difficult because these ideas contain many 
overlapping characteristics that create a quality of unity. 
 In terms of unity, assertions regarding the meaning of music in the evidence also 
take into account notions of why music matters, just as arguments focusing on music’s 
value may result in a better understanding of the characteristics of music.  For example, 
                                                 
44 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 547. 
45 Ibid., 9.   
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though dealing with the arts generally as opposed to music specifically, R.G. 
Collingwood in Principles of Art explains the process of imaginative discovery and the 
expression of emotion, which lead him to conclude that art is a process of self-discovery 
for both creator and percipient.46  While asserting art’s peculiar value Collingwood 
concurrently argues that a defining characteristic of art is that it involves emotional 
experience.  This is similar to both Tolstoy, who, in his What is Art?, argues art is “a 
medium for the transmission of feelings” [of the artist] and for Croce who claims art is 
intuitive expression.47  In the case of these theorists the value lies in the variety of 
insights art provides while each establishes necessary requisites for art.  Additional 
examples that display the quality of unity are given by Dewey. 
 Dewey connects the ideas of why art matters with those of interpretation and 
comprehension (meaning).  For him meaning is connected with experience, and more 
specifically in Art as Experience, with “aesthetic experience.”48  Dewey describes the 
aesthetic experience as connecting both artist and percipient in an active process of 
“doing and undergoing,” involving “outgoing and incoming energy” where there is 
“perception organically, sensory satisfaction, external embodiment, and dynamic 
organization.”49  Additionally, Dewey asserts “that which distinguishes an experience as 
esthetic is conversion of resistance and tensions, of excitations that in themselves are 
                                                 
46 The ideas of self-knowledge and self-discovery in relation to the artist as individual and the 
community in which the artist functions are discussed in great detail in chapters thirteen and fourteen of 
R.G. Collingwood, Principles of Art (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1938/1960). 
47 Stephen Davies, “Definitions of Art,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut 
and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 227-239, 228. 
48 Dewey, Art as Experience. 
49 Ibid., 50-53, 57. 
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temptations to diversion, into a movement toward an inclusive and fulfilling close.”50  
Furthermore,  
In art as an experience, actuality and possibility or ideality, the new and the old, 
objective material and personal response, the individual and the universal, surface 
and depth, sense and meaning, are integrated in an experience in which they are 
all transfigured from the significance that belongs to them when isolated in 
reflection.51 
 
Meaning is achieved through experience in the undergoing and doing, and art, therefore, 
offers a unique way of experiencing.  For Dewey this active process is what makes art 
valuable, particularly in the social sphere.  Again, each of these examples shows the 
quality of unity between nature, value and meaning of art generally, though it is possible 
to transpose these ideas to music specifically.  Concurrently, these examples show 
apparent distinction of how the nature of art can be isolated from its interpretation and 
comprehension.  And in the discourse of music educators similar threads appear.  Rarely 
if ever did a music educator address the meaning of music without also addressing its 
value, for example.  There is unity through distinction. 
Defining what music is, for example, has been and undoubtedly will continue to 
be an important part of musical aesthetics.  However, examining the characteristics of 
music is not the only way music has been examined in aesthetics.  Therefore, rather than 
being focused solely on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called 
music—its nature— the subsequent chapters also focus on notions of meaning and value.  
Taking a wider view of what aesthetics examines—nature, meaning, and value— enables 
the nuanced language from the discourse of music educators relating to aesthetics in the 
first half of the twentieth century to be better understood.  In other words, if leading 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 58. 
51 Ibid., 309. 
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proponents of the conventional view take aesthetics to be consumed with the idea of 
articulating  necessary and sufficient conditions of music or one version of the 
instrumentalist position on value, then their position might make more sense.  It would be 
a worthwhile endeavor to further research the assumptions present day music education 
scholars make about aesthetics.  Although research examining the assumptions of present 
day music education scholars regarding the discipline of aesthetics might be valuable, it 
is not the focus of this work.  This dissertation may, however, act as a catalyst for 
subsequent analysis of contemporary discourse in music education philosophy. 
As a way of showing what is meant by looking beyond the scope of aesthetics just 
converging on the nature of art, the work of Collingwood is again a good example.  
While Collingwood states emotional experience and imaginative discovery are necessary 
and sufficient properties for something to be called art, this point is not the sole aim of his 
Principles of Art.  For Collingwood, the idea of imaginative discovery and emotional 
expression lead to self-discovery and self-knowledge.52  Collingwood’s assertion is more 
in line with what is referred to as the cognitivist notion of value rather than with a 
necessary and sufficient property of art.53  That is, his assertion is tied more closely to 
normative theory than to descriptive or conceptual theory, although he makes arguments 
that are appropriate to each group of theories, the emphasis is simply on the normative 
side.  Therefore, the most appropriate course of action in terms of organization of this 
complex field of aesthetics is one which holds that a distinction of its parts is necessary 
                                                 
52 Collingwood, Principles of Art, chs. 13 and 14. 
53 In the strict sense of the term cognitivism Gordon Graham denies that Collingwood is a 
cognitivist.  For Graham, he is an expressivist.  Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 175.  No doubt Graham is 
correct but because of his particular emphasis on normative ideas I place him in league with someone 
having cognitivist leanings.  Interestingly enough my understanding of cognitivism comes largely from the 
work of Graham who writes “it is a theory that art is valuable because of what we learn from it.”  Graham, 
Philosophy of the Arts, 43.  To me, self-knowledge and self-discovery are important in terms of “what we 
learn” from art. 
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for the sake of clarity while simultaneously accepting a quality of unity in the relations of 
distinct parts. 
   The parts (nature, meaning, and value) of musical aesthetics, while inextricably 
linked with the whole (how we think about and experience music), provide a clear way of 
organizing the evidence, which influences the structure of the remainder of the 
dissertation.  Music’s nature, meaning, and value as seen in the problems and theories of 
musical aesthetics discussed by music educators brings into relief the rich, varied, 
insightful, and pervasive perspectives of this group.  This organizational structure also 
allows for key problems and theories to be addressed without having to go into great 
detail on every development in the field from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
Additionally, it allows for the examination of particular key problems and theories that 
focus on music.  Finally, this organizational structure acknowledges the basic principles 
of musical aesthetics while also recognizing the complexity of the discipline.  Proceeding 
this way, however, will not be easy since the discipline is “a vaporous, far flung, 
quintessence of problems and points of view.”  However, in order to carry on there must 
be some form of organizing the material so the numerous problems and theories make 
sense to both the writer and reader.  After all, these scholars who claim that aesthetics is 
difficult to define and explain wrote books and papers on the subject that are organized 
along the themes those authors found important, which typically are developmental 
accounts of specific theories and ideas in time.  So, even though Dewey suggests the 
abundance of aesthetic philosophies makes it “impossible to give even a résumé of them 
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in a chapter,”54 the work marches onward in what I see as one approach to organize the 
material that helps answer my question. 
While musical aesthetics specifically plays a predominant role in this analysis 
because of its explicit connection to music, it cannot be the sole means of coming to a 
better understanding of the philosophical discourse in general aesthetics among music 
educators in the first half of the twentieth century.  So, before elaborating on the various 
aesthetic problems and theories that are contained within the tripartite mode of 
examination, it must be understood that while musical aesthetics is of primary importance 
in my work, it is not exclusive.  It would be myopic to assume that the early writers and 
thinkers in the field of music education only exposed themselves to scholarly work 
specifically relating to music.  It is just as likely for these writers and thinkers to have 
read general aesthetic theorists like Tolstoy, Santayana, Croce, or Collingwood, and 
apply the ideas of these philosophers and their comments on music and the arts as it 
would have been for them to have read Hanslick, Busoni, or Adorno.  Just as I have 
borrowed from Beardsley’s general arguments on aesthetics (with a few examples from 
music), these music educators borrowed heavily from general aesthetics and applied the 
ideas to their discussion of music and music education.  Now that aesthetics has been 
explained in general, and a workable definition of musical aesthetics as a way to interpret 
music education discourse has been given, we move to the next step.  The next part of the 
dissertation is a detailed explanation of the substance of each of the categories of musical 
aesthetics within the context of aesthetic problems and theories. 
 
 
                                                 
54 Dewey, Art as Experience, 286. 
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Part II – Problems and Theories in Aesthetics 
 
 Morris Weitz argues, “each of the great theories of art –Formalism, Voluntarism, 
Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism, Organicism—converges on the attempt to 
state the defining properties of art.”55  Gordon Graham agrees and states, “philosophical 
aesthetics has been concerned with the definition of art, of trying to say what art is, rather 
than why it is valuable.”56  Weitz and other critics have pointed out the failure of many 
definitions dwelling on necessary and sufficient properties. Such difficulty leads me to 
believe there is simply more to understanding art than is able to be accounted for in a 
limited definition.  That definitions of art fail because of the emphasis on necessary and 
sufficient properties of art is really at the heart of what Weitz is doing.  My critique of 
Weitz, however, is that what he proposes is still largely within the bounds of what is 
labeled as philosophical aesthetics.  He merely broadened the definition of art to include 
nearly everything. 57   Rather than stating how this or that definition is incomplete for the 
whole of aesthetics, I look at aesthetics in a way that tries to capture the complexity of the 
“far flung, vaporous, quintessence of problems and points of view.”  I do not, however, 
try to offer my own definition of what art generally, or music specifically, is.  Instead the 
work in the rest of this section is an examination of how others have defined and 
problematized musical aesthetics.  I do this to establish a basis on which to judge the 
                                                 
55 Morris Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
15, no. 1 (September, 1956): 27-35, 27.  The statement above is not Weitz’s primary argument.  For Weitz 
the definitions proposed by each of the great theories are essentialist and therefore fail.  What he proposes 
instead is looking at art as an open concept and considering the ways in which the arts are built upon a 
network of resemblances. 
56 Graham, Philosophy of the Arts, 149.  It is important to note, however, that Graham also 
acknowledges the normative theories as being important to aesthetics, though he says that approach is not 
as common.  See also page 149. 
57 I do note that Weitz uses the word “converge” for a reason, which is most likely an 
acknowledgement that aesthetic theories work on additional problems as well, but by choosing the word 
“converge” without acknowledging what else is explored by the various ‘great theories,’ he is also guilty of 
essentialism, even reductionism, in much the same manner he takes issue with in his paper. 
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extent to which problems and theories relating to the nature of music are part of the 
conversation of music educators.  I suggest that studying music education discourse 
through the lens of aesthetic problems and theories better captures the variety of 
philosophical perspectives of music educators.  Problems in aesthetics are necessarily 
attached to the various theories that seek to explain the nature, meaning, and value of 
music.  That is, without the problems there would be no development of theory, and these 
music educators were in a position to understand problems inherent to the nature, 
meaning, and value of music every bit as much as they were capable of citing a specific 
theory and its proponents.  One aspect of recognizing problems or theories in musical 
aesthetics is in regard to how the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are 
examined and explained.  Trying to define music creates a number of problems and 
numerous theorists provide examples of the characteristics of music. 
Explanations and Problems on the Nature of Music 
 
The first domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and 
theories is the nature of music.  Key problems are rooted in questions such as what is 
music?  How is music described?  What are its characteristics?  It is in this domain that 
the aesthetic object is studied and analyzed.  Beardsley’s description of analysis involves 
“distinguishing, discriminating, and describing in detail…first, what is true of the parts, 
and, second, how the parts contribute to the peculiar qualities of the whole.”58  Later in 
his chapter Beardsley elaborates on numerous terms that are important for this 
investigation since each sheds light on ways in which music educators talked about music 
with each other and devise plans to relate the perception of music in practice.  The 
material below aids in the interpretation of aspects of discourse among music educators 
                                                 
58 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 77. 
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from 1907 to 1958.  The basis of Beardsley’s establishment of categories for aesthetic 
analysis is the part-whole relationship.  Simply put the parts are the “obvious and 
emphatic features, its dominant patterns or qualities”59 that emerge when perceiving the 
object, and in combination make up the whole.  Subordinate to the fundamental part-
whole category of aesthetic analysis are additional categories for further aesthetic 
analysis Beardsley calls complexes, elements, local qualities and regional properties 
(summative and emergent).60  Although these terms might seem cumbersome at first, they 
are helpful when attempting to analyze music aesthetically.  These terms are important 
points of departure from which the meaningful discourse of music educators is analyzed 
in order for teachers of music to more clearly describe what is often considered the most 
abstract of the arts, music. 
Though not flawless Beardsley’s assertions about the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of music, and his application of these and other categories of aesthetic analysis 
to music provide a solid framework from which music education discourse can be 
examined in the area of the nature of music.  The extensive quotation below shows his 
application of his notion of part-whole relations specific to music, and these views are 
seen—in chapter three—in the discourse of music educators on the nature of music.  
Beardsley asserts that 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 78. 
60 In general relation to art complexes are defined by Beardsley as “any part of a sensory field 
[where] further parts can be discriminated within it,” while elements are partless homogenous parts, and, 
therefore, aesthetic analysis cannot go beyond elements. The elements, however, according to Beardsley, 
do have certain qualities that can be perceived which he calls local qualities.  His example is of the white 
area inside the letter “O” as being a local quality.  He continues by explaining what a regional property is, 
the most complicated of his categories of aesthetic analysis.  Beardsley defines a regional property as “a 
property, or characteristic, that belongs to a complex but not to any of its parts.”  For him there are two 
additional distinctions behind his notion of regional property – summative and emergent.  According to 
Beardsley, a summative regional property is a combination of parts that is not present in each part by itself.  
While an emergent regional property is “something new and different that seems to emerge from the 
combination.”  For example, Beardsley writes, “the brightness of a white light made up of two white lights 
is summative; the color of a light made up of two different colored lights is emergent,” 84. 
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a musical composition, or auditory design, is a complex event, and its elements 
are smaller events, little—though sometimes momentous—changes that are 
occurring simultaneously and successively…these changes can be described by 
their termini, for a change is always from something to something-from loud to 
soft, from low to high, from sweet to harsh.  The termini of musical changes are 
sounds, and these we shall here regard as the elements of music.  Sounds have 
many properties, all of which can be of musical significance, but like the 
properties of visual areas they are conveniently divided into two groups: basic and 
dependent.  Every sound has (1) a certain duration, that is, it lasts a certain length 
of time, (2) intensity, or degree of loudness and softness, (3) timbre, or quality—
for example, shrillness, smoothness, scratchiness, hoarseness.  Some sounds also 
have (4) pitch, that is they are high or low; and these sounds are called tones, the 
rest noises…Not every random collection of sounds, however, is music—not even 
every collection of tones…the essential quality of music…is a special auditory 
movement…Certain sounds or sound complexes seem to call for, or point toward, 
other sounds to come…The series of sounds fuses into a single process, and 
exhibits direction and momentum…When a series of tones becomes a melody it 
acquires some further regional qualities that are of the greatest importance in 
music.  First, it acquires direction: it moves upward or downward or remains 
steady, grows louder or softer, and tends toward an implicit goal…And second, it 
becomes a whole, in which the parts, without losing their identity, fuse together.  
The wholeness of the melody seems to depend upon two other regional qualities, 
cadence and contour.61 
 
Beardsley goes on to explain rhythm and tonality, and describes harmony as “two or 
more tones sounded together: the resulting chord fuses into a whole with a quality of its 
own.62  He discusses many other related points in detail, but I think the point has been 
made that his explanations include many of the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
music and are foundational to any meaningful basic aesthetic analysis.   
Beyond the basic categories of aesthetic analysis outlined by Beardsley that 
pertain to the nature of music are the more sophisticated concepts of form, structure, and 
texture, and the relations between them.  These terms make up the last points in this 
section relating to the nature of music.  While texture is “anything going on at a given 
moment that can be described in terms of relations among the nearby parts,” structure is 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 97-100.  Italics in original. 
62 Ibid., 104. 
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“classified by reference to the number of their main parts, or sections,” and it is here 
Beardsley begins to highlight some problems that surface with this understanding as well 
as the problem that emerges from the relation between form and structure.63  First, “what 
constitutes a section, or main part, or a musical composition?”64  Second, “can either 
[texture and/or structure] occur without the other?”65  But the most important problems 
deal with what Beardsley calls kinetic pattern and musical expectation.66  Kinetic pattern 
is “the pattern of variation in its propulsion, or intensity of movement,” and he relates 
these ideas to the “regional qualities of the musical process.”67  For Beardsley musical 
expectation is divided into two parts, and the first of these parts is tied to the subjective 
listener.  The first part of musical expectation is explained as an experience in which “the 
listener’s feelings are constantly guided and aroused.”68  The second part is more 
intellectually focused and “based on generalizations from past experience of certain types 
of music.”69  And with each of the aforementioned parts, the important problem that 
emerges, and one debated by philosophers, musicians, and music educators for hundreds 
of years, is “what is it that arouses our expectations about music?”70  The answers to 
these problems are given by a number of philosophers espousing this theory or that, but 
these will be addressed in a subsequent section.  For now the last item to determine is 
form.   
                                                 
63 Ibid., 179. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid., 180. 
66 Beardsley argues that the notion of kinetic pattern is often overlooked by critics because it is 
less formal.  He asserts that it is “the most fundamental aspect of musical form.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics, 
184. 
67 Ibid., 185. 
68 Ibid., 187. 
69 Ibid., 188. 
70 Ibid. 
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Beardsley uses the term form, again, in two ways.  The first way he uses the terms 
is to make a distinction between aesthetic objects, and in using it in this manner he 
acknowledges there is “a distinction between its form and its other aspects,” which causes 
problems.  For example, “can form be separated from content?  Is the form of an aesthetic 
object more, or less, important than its content, or its meaning?”71  The second way he 
uses form is as a way of asking “how well formed it is.”72  And it is with this latter 
designation he sees the ideas of complexes, elements, and regional qualities as being 
categories converging in the concept of unity, which is the term Beardsley substitutes for 
this second notion of form.73  Beardsley asserts that 
When we speak of the unity of an aesthetic object, or say that one object is more 
or less unified than another, we mean to refer to a quality that different objects 
can possess in different degrees…we could say that an object has organic unity if 
and only if it is a complex – in other words, reserve “organic unity” for unity that 
is a regional quality…In critical discourse, we are not concerned with the unity 
possessed by elements of aesthetic objects, but only of complexes; in this context 
unity, if it is a quality at all, will always be a regional quality.74 
 
Discussions focusing on determining whether one piece of music is more unified than 
another based on the regional properties of melody, harmony, rhythm, and tonality and 
the concept of kinetic pattern, and of these relations in the complex are the basis of what 
happened in harmony and theory classes like those outlined by Thomas Tapper and put 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 165. 
72 Ibid., 190. 
73 Ibid., 191.  Beardsley again divides the term unity into two distinct parts: completeness and 
coherence.  He describes completeness as “appear[ing] to require, or call upon, nothing outside itself; 
[having] all that it needs; [being] all there.”  In negative terms, and in relation to music, one might think of 
Shubert’s Symphony no. 8 in B minor as having a state of incompleteness.  Beardsley’s notion of coherence 
contains three principles: “focus…the dominant pattern, or compositional scheme…balance and 
equilibrium, [and] similarities [or] harmony…in other words, consistency of style, throughout the design.”  
Beardsley, Aesthetics, 193 – 195. 
74 Ibid., 191.  Italics in the original. 
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into practice by Brock McElheran.75  A related problem is “what makes a group of 
movements, as in a sonata or suite, constitute a coherent whole?”76  Though by no means 
an exhaustive list of all categories of analysis or list of problems, these introductory 
statements are a good starting point from which to examine music education discourse 
from 1907 to 1958 relating to the first area of aesthetic enquiry, the nature of music.  The 
following section under the category of the nature of music shows various aesthetic 
theories and their attempts at working through these specific types of problems in musical 
aesthetics. 
Theories on the Nature of Music 
 
The material for this section comes largely from Weitz’s essay titled “The Role of 
Theory in Aesthetics” and his book Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of 
Readings.77  Other material is based on selections from The Routledge Companion to 
Aesthetics edited by Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes, Lippman’s A History of 
Western Musical Aesthetics, and Bowman’s Philosophical Perspectives on Music, as well 
as a few other sources.78  As mentioned above Weitz’s purpose in his essay is to critique 
“each of the great theories of art,” with the aim of opening up the concept of art rather 
than relying on restrictive definitions that limit what art can be.  His critique provides the 
                                                 
75 Brock McElheran, “The Use of Theory in Rehearsal.” Music Educators Journal 36, no. 1 
(September–October 1949): 20, 52-53. 
76 Ibid., 199. 
77 Morris Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings (New York, NY: 
Macmillan Company, 1959).  Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 27 – 35.  Like Beardsley’s 
Aesthetics: Problem in the Philosophy of Criticism, the aforementioned works of Weitz’s were published 
during the period covered in this dissertation, which provide valuable insight to the issues as each was 
understood in aesthetics up to that point in history.  Even though 1959 is one year removed from this study, 
the readings included are from earlier than 1959.  The only exception is one essay by Erich Kahler titled 
“What is Art?”, which was written particularly for this publication, but even it is a response to Weitz’s 
1956 essay. 
78 Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes eds., The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2005).  Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics.  Bowman, Philosophical 
Perspectives on Music. 
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names of the leading proponents of each theory as well as concise and appropriate 
definitions for “Formalism, Voluntarism, Emotionalism, Intellectualism, Intuitionism, 
[and] Organicism.”79  Prior to the more modern “great theories” listed by Weitz, 
however, were definitions proposed by Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.  The descriptions of 
art given by these ancient thinkers served as a foundation for the field of aesthetics.  
Furthermore, although the work of these authors is far removed from the period covered 
in this dissertation, it is difficult to locate modern discussions that neglect to mention 
their descriptions or fail to critique their ideas, in fact, music educators of the period were 
no strangers to these classical thinkers, even citing them on a number of occasions.  
Because music educators made use of the work of classical thinkers a brief overview of 
the perspectives of these forerunners of modern aesthetic thought are mentioned below 
before getting to the other theories listed by Weitz. 
                                                 
79 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 27.  For some unknown and unstated reason Weitz 
does not define Intellectualism in this essay.  One clue of what he might mean by Intellectualism comes 
from an essay in a book he edits titled Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings.  The 
essay that offers a clue as to a possible intended definition is titled “Art as a Virtue of the Practical 
Intellect.”  Interestingly enough it comes just prior to Croce’s work “Art as Intuition,” and just after DeWitt 
H. Parker’s “The Nature of Art,” which in Weitz’s “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” is the work he uses 
to define Voluntarism.  His publication titled “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” originally written for The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism—cited above— is also included in his Problems in Aesthetics: An 
Introductory Book of Readings, but after the three aforementioned works.  Since it is unclear whether the 
Maritain work was meant to characterize what Weitz calls Intellectualism, I describe intellectualism here in 
the footnote instead of in the main body of the dissertation.  In Jacques Maritain, “Art as a Virtue of the 
Practical Intellect,” in Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings, ed. Morris Weitz (New 
York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1959/1964), 79  “art…is the straight intellectual determination of 
works to be made.”  He goes on in a footnote to state “as a rule the thing to be made, or the work to be 
done, refers to the realm of knowledge for the sake of action, not of knowledge for the sake of knowledge.  
That is why it is said in a general way that art belongs to the sphere of the practical intellect.”  After 
clarifying the difference between speculative intellect (knowing for the sake of knowledge) and practical 
intellect (knowing “for the sake of action…to mold intellectually that which will be brought into being.” 
Ibid., 78) and the useful  arts (arts created by the intellect to meet and satisfy a specific and practical need.  
Ibid., 84) and fine arts (the need of the intellect to manifest externally what is grasped within itself, in 
creative intuition, and to manifest it in beauty.” Ibid., 85) he says “the work to be made is an end in itself, 
and a certain singular and original, totally unique participation in beauty, reason alone is not enough for the 
artist to form and conceive this work within himself in an infallible creative judgment…and we see that the 
fine arts, though they are more fully intellectual than the useful arts, imply, however, a much greater and 
more essential part played by the appetite [drive/motivation/desire], and require that the love for beauty 
should make the intellect co-natured with beauty.”  Ibid., 87.  Therefore, according to Maritain, art is the 
“operative virtue of the practical intellect.”  Ibid., 91. 
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Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus give descriptions of art that are metaphysical and 
“all three are deeply concerned with art as imitation.”80  For Plato, art is imitation of an 
ideal form, which to him is real.  But the artistic object, according to Plato, is twice 
removed from the ideal/real form.  For Plato the artist relies on secondary mimesis.  In 
other words the artist imitates a representation of the form made physical, such as a chair.  
Plato’s idea of form is more problematic for music than the visual arts, but according to 
Plato in his Laws, music is mimetic for the good.81  Frederick Copleston argues “that to 
make music imitative implies a widening of imitation to include symbolism.”82  Similar 
to Plato, Aristotle argues, art “like natural objects in general, embodies universals or 
Forms, it is not…metaphysically suspect, but a revelation of reality.”83  Copleston relates 
Aristotle’s theory to music by suggesting Aristotle believes “musical tunes contain in 
themselves imitations of moral moods.”84  Aristotle’s version of mimesis differs from the 
Platonic view because he does not see the mimesis as twice or thrice removed but rather 
as manifested in the art form itself.  Last, Weitz suggests art for Plotinus  
is one aspect of the truly Real, which is also the truly Beautiful.  It is the 
embodiment of the One in the materials of this world, engendered by the activity 
of the artist’s soul.  Indeed, art is more real than the natural object it may 
represent because of this participation in it of the artist’s soul.85  
 
Traces of the definitions of art proposed by these three ancient philosophers are seen in 
the more modern theories of expressivism and German idealism.  Descriptions of the 
                                                 
80 Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings, 4.  Though Aristotle’s 
version is less metaphysical than that of Plato or Plotinus. 
81 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics 
to Plotinus (New York, NY: Image Books, 1962/1993), 257. 
82 Ibid., 258. 
83 Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings, 4. 
84 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 362.  Italics in the original. 
85 Weitz, Problems in Aesthetics, 4. 
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modern theories and how each defines the nature of art, and by extension, music are also 
intriguing. 
Formalism is the first theory addressed by Weitz in his essay “The Role of Theory 
in Aesthetics.”  He relies on the work of Clive Bell and Roger Fry to assert “its defining 
property is significant form, i.e. certain properties of lines, colors, shapes, volumes—
everything on the canvas except the representational elements—which evokes a unique 
response to such combinations.”86 Weitz continues by suggesting “the nature of art, what 
it really is, so their theory goes, is a unique combination of certain elements…in their 
relations.”87  Rather than writing about the visual arts, which is what Bell and Fry did, 
Eduard Hanslick wrote about music and is the prototypical formalist on the topic.  
Hanslick’s On the Musically Beautiful is seminal in the field of music.88  The importance 
of his work for the field of music and aesthetics is due to his assertion that music is 
beautiful in and of itself, descriptions and definitions of music ought to focus only on the 
essence of music, nothing outside the music itself.  His ideas are the basis of the notion of 
music for music’s sake.  He argues the beauty of a musical composition is 
a specifically musical kind of beauty.  By this we understand a beauty that is self-
contained and in no need of content from outside itself, that consists simply and 
solely of tones and their artistic combination.  Relationships, fraught with 
significance, of sounds which are in themselves charming—their congruity and 
opposition, their separating and combining, their soaring and subsiding—this is 
what comes in spontaneous forms before our inner contemplation and pleases us 
as beautiful…a musical idea brought into complete manifestation in appearance is 
already self-subsistent beauty; it is an end in itself, and it is in no way primarily a 
medium or material for the representation of feelings or conceptions.89 
 
                                                 
86 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 28. 
87 Ibid.  Italics in the original. 
88 Hanslick, On the Musically Beautiful:  A Contribution towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of 
Music, 8t ed., 28. 
89 Ibid., 28. 
49 
 
The overlap with meaning and value is apparent in the above explanations.  In 
terms of meaning, musical analysis is self-contained and is defined more easily in 
negative terms.  That is, instead of stating what formalism is, it is more convenient to 
argue what it is not.  According to the formalist music is not analogous to language, 
politics, or feelings.  Relying on the work of Moritz Lazurus, Edward Lippman writes  
music cannot represent a conceptual content…nor is it an imitative art since it 
cannot properly be directed to the imitation of natural sounds.  Even definite 
feelings and affections…cannot really be represented by it.  In short, music can 
represent nothing other than itself, that is, measured tones in relations that are 
beautiful.90 
 
It follows, then, that in connection with the category of value the formalist argues it is 
intrinsic.  R.A. Sharpe asserts “a formalist is somebody who thinks that the value of 
music lies in its formal properties of design and line and not in its expressive 
capacity…what matters is beauty and that beauty is a matter of form.”91  The linking of 
formalism’s nature with its meaning and value returns us to the basic idea that it “is a 
view of music that finds the distinguishing or most significant aspects of the art to be its 
form, the property in fact, that defines its essential nature.”92  The formalist’s notions of 
the nature of music are different from the so-called emotionalist. 
 Emotionalism, according to Weitz, is a theory where art is not to be defined by its 
“significant form but rather the expression of emotion in some sensuous medium.”93  
Emotionalism is also referred to as Expressivism, which is the word used in the 
remainder of the dissertation. Gordon Graham, who like Weitz cites Tolstoy as the 
prototypical emotionalist/expressivist, defines the latter term as the view that art “is 
                                                 
90 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 302. 
91 R.A. Sharpe, Philosophy of Music: An Introduction (Montreal & Kingston, Canada: McGill-
Queens University Press, 2004.), 16, 23. 
92 Ibid., 292. 
93 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 28. 
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essentially a form of expression, and what is more, the expression of feeling.”94  This is 
to say “that artists are people inspired by emotional experiences, who use their skill…to 
embody their emotions in a work of art, with a view to stimulating the same emotion in 
an audience.”95  The theory of emotionalism sees meaning and value in the emotional 
experience and the act of expressing and reacting.  The problems associated with 
emotionalism as well as intuitionism, in relation to the meaning of music, are mentioned 
in the section below.   
The term expressivism as defined by Graham also contains ideas of what Weitz 
calls Intuitionism—the next term defined in this section.  Weitz says  
Art is identified not with some physical, public object but with a specific creative, 
cognitive and spiritual act.  Art is really a first stage of knowledge in which 
human beings (artists) bring their images and intuitions into lyrical clarification or 
expression.  As such, it is an awareness, non-conceptual in character, of the 
unique individuality of things; and since it exists below the level of 
conceptualization or action, it is without scientific or moral content.96 
 
The similarity between the terms expressivism and intuitionism is based on Graham’s 
quoting of Croce’s Guide to Aesthetics, originally published in 1920.  Graham describes 
Croce’s argument that art is intuition by stating “what lends coherence and unity to 
intuition is intense feeling.  Intuition is truly such because it expresses an intense feeling 
and can arise only when the latter is its source and base.”97  Beardsley suggests “in 
intuition we are in direct communion with the object; since our grasp of it is not mediated 
by symbolic devices, intuitive knowledge is ineffable, and conveyable, if at all, only be 
                                                 
94 Graham, “Expressivism,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 133.  It is worthwhile to 
mention that on the same page Gordon Graham argues the expressivist theory is applied only to musical 
compositions from approximately 1850 – 1930, which overlaps the period covered in this dissertation. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 28. 
97 Ibid., 134. 
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nonverbal aesthetic objects.”98  According to Croce, intuition and feeling are bound to 
each other, which is why I believe Graham combines the ideas Weitz views as distinct, 
namely the latter’s understanding of emotionalism and intuitionism. Expressivism and 
intuitionism are also similar in that each position asserts art’s non-conceptual character.99  
The difference between Weitz’s emotionalism and Graham’s expressivism is located in 
the distinction Graham makes between “being an expression of and being expressive 
of.”100   He argues that  
 Where a specific emotion can be assigned to a work of art, the work is an 
expression of that emotion and appreciation of the work consists in feeling that 
emotion itself.  If now we say that the work is not an expression of, but rather is 
expressive of, the emotion, appreciating would seem to consist in being brought to 
a heightened awareness of that emotion.  However, this does not involve 
undergoing any element of that emotion.101 
 
The language of expression and expressive is common among music educators discussing 
music’s relation to feeling, which is seen in chapter four.  Another important perspective 
on expressivism is the thought of Dewey.  
Dewey’s view put forth in Art as Experience bears mentioning not only because 
this book was published in the midst of the years covered in this study but also due to the 
fact he was a leading philosopher working in the United States whose writings had 
received attention in the field of education.   For Dewey  
What has been said in general about the power of an art to take a natural, raw 
material and convert it, through selection and organization, into an intensified and 
concentrated medium of building up an experience, applies with particular force 
                                                 
98 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 388. 
99 Graham makes a distinction between conceptual knowledge and intuition by asserting 
“conceptual knowledge (and under this label we may include philosophy, history, and science) is founded 
upon a distinction between reality and unreality, so that it must compare its hypotheses with ‘the world out 
there.’”  And quoting directly from Croce’s Guide to Aesthetics, he writes, ‘in contrast, intuition refers 
precisely to the lack of distinction between reality and unreality—to the image itself—with its purely ideal 
status as mere image.”  Graham, “Expressivism,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 135. 
100 Graham, “Expressivism,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, 141. 
101 Ibid., 142. 
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to music.  Through the use of instruments, sound is freed from the definiteness it 
has acquired through association with speech.  It thus reverts to its primitive 
passional quality.  It achieves generality, detachment from particular objects and 
events.  At the same time, the organization of sound effected through the 
multitude of means at the command of the artist…deprives sound of its usual 
immediate tendency to stimulate a particular overt action.  Responses become 
internal and implicit, thus enriching the content of perception instead of being 
dispersed in overt discharge.102 
 
So, for Dewey a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be called music is 
for it to be a particular kind of experience, more specifically, an aesthetic experience, 
which is privileged over the aesthetic object.  The aesthetic object is simply “the product 
of an interaction between the living organism and its environment, an undergoing and a 
doing which involves a reorganization of energies, actions and materials.”103  The next 
theory on the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be called art is from 
the Organicist. 
 Organicism, according to Weitz, is the view that “art is in its nature a unique 
complex of interrelated parts,”104 which is akin to Beardsley’s description’s of the 
necessary and sufficient elements included in his description of music seen above.  Since 
much of this theory was alluded to earlier in the chapter it is hardly necessary to develop 
the ideas further here.105 
 The last example Weitz gives is of Voluntarism.  The leading proponent of this 
definition of art is Dewitt Parker.106  Weitz paraphrases Parker’s theory defining art as the 
                                                 
102 Dewey, Art as Experience, 248.  Italics added.  Dewey’s explanation on having an experience 
was mentioned earlier in the chapter. 
103 Richard Shusterman, “Pragmatism: Dewey,” The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics, eds. 
Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 121 – 131, 122. 
104 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 29. 
105 See Beardsley’s chapter titled “Artistic Form.” 
106 Dewitt Parker lived from 1885 – 1949.  He was a professor of philosophy at the University of 
Michigan and his many works include The Principles of Aesthetics (Boston, MA: Silver, Burdett and 
Company, 1920) and The Analysis of Art (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1926).  The reason I am 
giving this background on Parker and his work is because not only were his writings on aesthetics 
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“embodiement of wishes and desires imaginatively satisfied, language, which 
characterizes the public medium of art, and harmony, which unifies the language with 
layers of imaginative projections.”107  The definition of Voluntarism brings to an end the 
list of Weitz’s “great theories of art.”  Beyond the “great theories” listed by Weitz are a 
few additional theories that Lippman and others mention which specifically have to do 
both with the general field of aesthetics and musical aesthetics. 
Idealism, which has its roots in Platonic thought, is transformed in the late 
eighteenth and through the nineteenth century by German thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Schiller where it becomes German idealism.  Although 
each thinker represents a particular strand of idealism, the similarity of each rests, like 
Plato, on metaphysical descriptions of art.  It is not necessary here and there is not the 
space in this dissertation to explain the differences, for example, of the critical idealism 
of Kant and the transcendental idealism of Schopenhauer.  What is important, however, is 
to locate similarities among these thinkers in terms of their discourse on aesthetics, more 
specifically, musical aesthetics.  Dale Jacquette asserts the similarity among 
Schopenhauer, Schiller, and Schelling “is a commitment to the problem set by Kant of 
trying to reconcile the fundamental opposition between freedom and necessity.”108  He 
continues by suggesting there are two levels of this struggle.  The first is the “will 
                                                                                                                                                 
published during the time period covered in this dissertation but also because the publisher of The 
Principles of Aesthetics (Silver, Burdett and Company) published a great deal on the topic of music and a 
number of song books used by music educators.  Therefore, this title may well have been one to which 
music educators of the time were exposed.  An excerpt from Parker’s Analysis of Art shows up in Eliseo 
Vivas and Murray Krieger, eds., The Problems of Aesthetics (New York, NY: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 
1953), which is used again in both of Weitz’s works “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 27 – 35, and 
Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings and is the work from which Weitz takes the 
definition of Voluntarism. 
107 Weitz, “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” 29. 
108Dale Jacquette, “Idealism: Schopenhauer, Schiller and Shelling,” The Routledge Companion to 
Aesthetics, eds. Berys Gaut and Dominic McIver Lopes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 83-95, 83. 
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struggling tragically or heroically against the forces of moral and political authority, 
social conformity and the regimentation of artistic styles in the world of art.”109  The 
second is metaphysical.  Here Jacquette argues “it is the same battle for the supremacy of 
the human spirit and its sense of freedom in conflict with the necessity of natural forces 
represented by the rigidity of natural scientific law.”110  The ideas Jacquette describes 
lead to a description of art, specifically music, then, as an idea.  In more sophisticated 
terms, Bowman says “idealism often attributes to music extraordinary significance as a 
surrogate for something beyond its own phenomenal existence.”111  Because of music’s 
alleged surrogate nature, the task of these nineteenth century idealists was to “wrestle 
with music’s ephemeral, felt nature, seeking to explain how such ephemerality relates to 
the realm of ideas, and to show how music differs from the baser, sensory experience in 
which it obviously originates.”112  Last, Bowman writes that music to the idealists is 
at once autonomous and heteronomous; important for what it is and for what it 
reveals; expressive without expressing anything definite; feelingful, yet not 
concerned with feelings-felt.  Music is not a referential or representational affair, 
yet it affords intuitions or insights of profound transcendental significance.  Music 
is at once an end in itself and a means to spiritual elevation, at once fundamentally 
mindful and fundamentally felt.113 
 
The idealist is someone who sees importance in the extramusical, such as morality, while 
also looking to intramusical elements, such as the mindful construction of harmonic 
phrases. 
 The next theory on the nature of music is Symbolism, which has similar features 
with idealism.  Beardsley, who lumps symbolism and semiotics together under the term 
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signification theory, says the significationist argues “music is an iconic sign of a 
psychological process.  It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does 
so by presenting auditory equivalents to some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”114  
Bowman, who argues that symbolism has similar characteristics to idealism because of 
its emphasis on the thoughtful and feelingful, explains the theory as one where music 
signifies, inclines toward, and/or refers or represents something extramusical.115  Leading 
thinkers on symbolism/semiotics/significationism, are Ernst Cassirer, Charles Peirce, and 
Ferdinand de Saussure, with the work of Cassirer having significant influence on Susanne 
Langer who specifically addresses and spends much time on the topic of music.  Because 
of Langer’s influence on the philosophy of music education, which is described in the 
forthcoming section of this chapter, her take on symbolism is of particular importance.  
For Langer, music is a symbol which is “non-discursive or presentational,” and 
“unconsummated.”116  To put it another way, music is symbolic not for how we think 
linguistically but rather as insight into “how feelings go.”117  Additionally, music is 
“unconventionalized, unverbalized freedom of thought.”118   For her, “we cannot know 
the world as it ‘really’ is…only those aspects that get refracted for us by symbols and are 
                                                 
114 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 333.  Where Beardsley describes a “sign” as “any object or event that 
stands for something else, or leads us to take account in some way of something else besides itself, “iconic 
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332 – 333.   
115 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 199. 
116 Langer explains discursiveness this way: “all language has a form which requires us to string 
out our ideas even though their objects rest one within the other…only thoughts which can be arranged in 
this peculiar order can be spoken at all.  Any idea which does not lend itself to this ‘projection’ is ineffable, 
incommunicable by means of words whereas symbolism in non-discursive or presentational form is 
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Art, 3d ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 81-82, 93, 241. 
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thus rendered conceivable.”119  In Langer’s view music has a very important function for 
humankind because of its symbolic presentation.  Not all, particularly the next group of 
theorists called the Objectivists, agree with the perspective of 
symbolism/semiotics/significationism. 
 Lippman argues the objectivists “examined music in its own right, seeking a 
rationale for the musical work without looking beyond the music into any attendant 
circumstances or extramusical influences.  He continues by suggesting the disagreements 
between symbolism/semiotics/significationism contrasted with those of objectivism, a 
formalist legacy.120  Two well known thinkers on objectivity in musical aesthetics are 
Heinrich Schenker and Ferruccio Busoni.  In relating the work of Schenker, Lippman 
writes  
Schenker takes issue in particular with Schopenhauer’s claim that the composer 
reveals the innermost core of the world.  What he really reveals is the organic and 
absolute nature of the life of tone.  The intrinsic laws of tone are like the laws of 
the cosmos: they rest on only a few fundamental forces. 
 
Like Schenker, Busoni argues “representation and description are not the nature of music; 
herewith we declare the invalidity of program-music.”121  Later he says of music “let it be 
pure invention and sentiment, in harmonies, in forms, in tone-colors.”122  Lippman claims 
for the theorists of objectivity that there was an emphasis on “simplicity… forms, styles, 
and stylistic features of the past…Simplicity in itself somehow fosters musical 
objectivity, which is thus connected with both historicism and the social motive of 
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accessibility.”123  His latter statement on simplicity is pertinent because the objectivity of 
Busoni and other thinkers of the so-called Young Classicist and “Neue Sachlichkeit (new 
objectivity, new matter-of-factness)”124 movements were in relation to tradition.   
Busoni senses the new trends in music happening in the early twentieth century 
and, according to Lippman, writes about “artists that cling to the tradition that is currently 
in favor and those who seek to free themselves from it.”125  One indication from Busoni 
on what Lippman is trying to express in relation to tradition comes from a letter to 
Busoni’s son Raffaello on June 18, 1921.  In it Busoni writes “every recent or new 
means, should it be capable of expressing something which cannot be expressed in any 
other way, ought to be adopted and employed; intentional disdain of effective new 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 398.  Here forms is not identical to the Platonic essence of the term but rather as 
described by Wallace Berry in Form in Music (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966): “It is the 
sum of those qualities in a piece of music that bind together its parts and animate the whole.  It is the 
product of intellectual control over the musical ideas which bring a composition into existence.  It is a 
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(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), preface.  Italics in the original.  Examples include, 
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124 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 400.  Busoni wrote in German, and there 
are different ideas behind the term “classicism.”  Edward Lippman calls the movement “Young 
Classicism,” while Antony Beaumont uses the term “Young Classicality” and Della Couling calls it 
“Young Classicity.”  In Antony Beaumont’s translation of a letter to Busoni’s son Raffaello on June 18, 
1921 Ferruccio Busoni writes, “I have been misunderstood, in that the multitude construed Classicality as 
something retrospective… I lay stress on the importance of the word ‘Young’ in order to distinguish 
Classicality from conventional classicism.”  The German term is junge Klassizität and, according to Della 
Couling the translation to “Young Classicism” comes from the loose translation of the German by 
Rosamund Ley.  Recent differences on the translation of the term stem from Rosamund Ley’s Ferruccio 
Busoni: The Essence of Music and Other Papers (New York, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1965) 
translation.  The Ley piece is the one cited by Lippman.  At this point the reader might be wondering how 
could Busoni’s scholarly work, if not translated until 1965, be included in this study?  Busoni, a composer, 
musician, conductor, teacher, and writer, coined the term “Young Classicality” in 1919.  He is referenced 
by W. Otto Miessner in 1912 at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference 
held at St. Louis, Missouri, March 19 – 22, 1912 in a paper titled “The Child Voice in Song Interpretation.”  
Therefore, it would appear as if at least some of his work had either been translated or the scholar who was 
exposed to Busoni understood German.  In any case the point is that some music educators were familiar 
with Busoni’s musical or scholarly work and perhaps both.  
125 Ibid., 398. 
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achievements strikes me as unreasonable and impoverished.”126  At the same time, in 
explaining his doctrine of Young Classicity as related by both Lippman and Della 
Couling in Ferrucio Busoni “A Musical Ishmael,” Busoni calls for  
a return to what he conceived to be the true purpose of music: a return to 
harmony, to melody, to “the most highly developed (not the most complicated) 
polyphony,” and away from what is “sensuous,” music as description, not 
“profundity and personal feelings and metaphysics, but Music which is absolute, 
distilled, and never under a mask of figures and ideas which are borrowed from 
other spheres.”  He certainly did not mean by this a return to the styles of the past, 
but faithfulness to what he conceived as the higher purpose of music, “the 
conclusion of previous experiments.”127 
 
This material on Busoni’s Young Classicality says two things.  First, the doctrine of 
Young Classicality is connected with the tradition of Hanslick’s formalism, which is 
evidenced by Philip Stoltzfus, who asserts, “Busoni helped renew scholarly interest in 
Hanslick and Mozart.”128  This connection between Busoni’s philosophical position and 
formalism reinforces Hanslick’s influence in the twentieth century.  Second, the Young 
Classicist and Neue Sachlichkeit movements, as elucidated by Erich Dolflein, who was a 
critic of the time and participant in the Neue Sachlichkeit movements, led to another type 
of objectivity.129  What Dolflein suggests in his “Die Neue Musik des Jahres” in 1926, as 
cited by Lippman, is “along with this acquisition of a self-evident quality and a relaxation 
into objectivity and playfulness, the public of modern music has fundamentally 
changed.”130  Lippman correctly takes Dolflein’s idea to mean “there was a change in the 
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social situation of music.”131  Reinforcing the change Dolflein proposes in the situation of 
music and aesthetics at the time, Lippman includes another excerpt from Dolflein’s 
article in Melos titled “Über Grundlagen der Beurteilung Gegenwärtiger Musik” in 1928.  
Here Dolflein argues 
this orientation to use and the style connected with the use is the real outcome of 
the Neue Sachlichkeit….Thus a closer tie of music to the human being and to 
human beings among one another in their relation to music, a human resolution, 
was yielded by the idea of objectivity.132 
 
Lippman’s analysis of Dolflein’s writings shows the connection of a social component to 
music.133  What happens historically and philosophically, suggests Lippman, is the 
“social influence and social explanation [of Neue Sachlichkeit] are replaced here by 
social interpretation and by an incisive criticism of the social order.”134  The 
philosophical transformation of objectivism now focusing on social critique, called 
socioaesthetics here, is exemplified by Theodor Adorno.135   
Socioaesthetics is tied to objectivism by Lippman.  Furthermore, because of the 
theory’s connection with modernism and its examination of the relation of society and 
music, a natural association existed for music educators to discuss.  Marxist views on 
music of the time also resemble the place of music in society.  Adorno, one of the leading 
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philosophers on musical aesthetics in the twentieth century, wrote a number of works in 
the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s on topics covering aesthetics and music’s relation to 
society.136  Discussions regarding socioaesthetic and/or Marxist themes taken up by 
music educators with the aim of influencing practice were limited.  As a theory, however, 
it shares some basic tenets with modernism (a topic mentioned in music education 
discourse), which brings the conversations about contemporary music into clearer 
focus.137  Music educators occasionally explored socioaesthetic concepts and even 
brought some of them to the attention of other conference members.  More specifically, 
in the words of Lippman interpreting Adorno, the socioaesthetic perspective is one where 
“music reflects society.”138  Furthermore, and elaborating on the Marxist perspective, 
Beardsley argues the “Principle of Nonneutrality…is the statement that every aesthetic 
object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote, or to 
interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.”139  The notion of 
reflecting society is a bit simplistic which is why Hamilton rejects Lippman’s claim 
regarding Adorno’s work.  Instead, Hamilton argues that Adorno thinks “music is not 
                                                 
136 Of the numerous works on music and aesthetics he wrote during this time period his 
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simply a reflection of society, and so he does not subordinate aesthetic values to social 
and economic ones as classical Marxism does.”140  To Hamilton, Adorno saw music as an 
important component of society, not merely a reflection of it.  Hamilton’s assessment is 
closer to Adorno’s definition of art, which is “concentrated social substance.”141  As such 
it “contains within itself the contradictions of social reality.  Its material is a sediment of 
social relations and is ‘historical through and through.’”142 According to this view, art is 
very much an embedded part of social relations and the historical process and as such 
occupies an interesting position.  First, in relation to the social nature of art Hamilton 
cites directly from Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: 
Art…is social not only because of its mode of production…not simply because of 
the social derivation of its thematic material.   Much more importantly, art 
becomes social by its opposition to society, and it occupies this position only as 
autonomous art.  By crystallising in itself as something unique to itself, rather 
than complying with existing social norms and qualifying as ‘socially useful’, it 
criticises society by merely existing…through its refusal of society, which is 
equivalent to sublimation through the law of form, autonomous art makes itself a 
vehicle of ideology.143 
 
Second, Wayne Bowman points out the relation between modern music and its social 
context in the philosophy of Adorno:  
Truly “modern” music has the capacity to undermine the sense of organic 
wholeness that lulls people into the false belief that all is well.  Thus though 
music often functions ideologically, it can also function redemptively.  It may 
function as an instrument of propaganda or as a bearer of truth.  Music can sever 
the status quo, but it can also resist it…music in modern society is situated 
between two dialectically opposite poles: as commodity, it perpetuates false 
consciousness; as social critique, it subverts ideology and serves authentic 
consciousness…it is capable of revealing with utmost clarity “the contradictions 
and flaws which cut through present-day society”…because music is itself a 
social fact, it cannot directly resolve the problem of its own alienation.  The most 
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it can do is “portray within its own structure the social antinomies which are also 
responsible for its own isolation.”144   
 
Since art is part of the historical process in the view of theorists of socioaesthetics 
and in terms of philosophical aesthetics, music is both social critique and social force.   
 From Socioaesthetics and Objectivism to Formalism, Idealism, and Expressivism 
the many theories in aesthetics and musical aesthetics presented here each posit a unique 
definition of art and/or music.  Whether a necessary and sufficient condition for 
something to be called art or music is intuition, experience, or idea, it is clear that what 
music is is an actively debated topic now and in the history of musical aesthetics.  
Another contested area in musical aesthetics is explanations and problems on 
Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension. 
Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension/Revelation 
 
The second domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems 
and theories in musical aesthetics is the meaning of music—how music is comprehended, 
interpreted, and what is revealed by music.  The idea of meaning is approached in part by 
analysis of the relations between composer, musical work, and the percipient as well as, 
depending on the theory, each of these independently.  Generally, key problems are 
rooted in questions such as “does music have a meaning, in some noteworthy sense?  If 
so, how do we know what that meaning is?”145  More specifically, other key questions 
generate debate by asking if we are to comprehend and interpret music for its alleged 
expression of emotion; how it may represent an external idea or symbol, or; are we only 
able to analyze the structural form of the composition?  One of the most familiar 
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problems of musical aesthetics falls in this domain, the problem of music as a language, 
and/or its relation to words.  It is in the category of meaning where uncovering of the 
artistic process by examining the musical work and our response (interpretation and 
comprehension) to it is central. 
Beardsley’s notions of meaning are divided in ways where interpretation and 
comprehension may be informed by the composer, composition, and listener individually 
and/or collectively.  In this section, however, problems are combined with theories to 
show how the theories address the problems.  The two main groups of theories are 
expressionist and significationist, which he writes about with the purpose of proving each 
is false while admitting “a large part of discourse about music consists of just such 
statements.”146  These theories give insight to musical meaning and interpretation, and 
from a philosophical standpoint they lead only to further speculation.  The arguments that 
take place among the theorists espousing one theory over another, for example the 
formalist versus the expressivist, are some of the most charged in musical aesthetics 
because meaning necessarily involves interaction between subject and object.  Beardsley 
writes 
When descriptions are put into the form of descriptions, they back up their claims 
by the music itself, and they lead attention to the music.  When they are put in the 
form of statements about signification they lead away from the music, very often 
either into biographical internationalism disguised as musicological expertness or 
affective free-associationism disguised as semiotical profundity.147 
 
The difficulty given above might be one reason the proponents of MEAE have 
had such a difficult time trying give direction to the movement let alone justify music’s 
place in the curriculum.  This is because the debates, although fruitful and healthy for the 
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field, led to no certain philosophical conclusions of meaning and understanding in all 
instances of music.  Good cases have been and will continually be made arguing the 
position of expressivism over formalism, or for some middle ground between the two, but 
for now the problem of definitive and certain meaning in all music continues to beguile 
the field.  Furthermore, the debate between expressivism and formalism is just one 
element of aesthetic discourse, and as I suggested earlier, this is a reason to more 
thoroughly examine the discourse of the first half of the twentieth century through the 
lens of a more complete definition of musical aesthetics. These arguments over the 
meaning and comprehension of music have existed in musical aesthetics since the 
beginning of the discipline and continue in the field of music education today.  My work 
establishes that the period from 1907 to 1958 was not a philosophically barren place but 
rather one where musical aesthetics and its accompanying problems and theories were 
being actively discussed and meaning is one area where there was little concensus.  
Therefore, even though Beardsley attempts to dismiss the expressive and signification 
theories, the debates that occurred surrounding these two leading theories generated 
important progress in both musical aesthetics and music education of the period, 
especially in relation to notions of the language of music.148 
Expressive theories in musical aesthetics advance the idea that the music is 
expressive of some quality, emotion, or feeling.  Again, it is not the explicit task here to 
critique or to prove this or that of the various theories within this category as false but 
rather to show, with the aim of better understanding, how expressivism explains meaning 
in music or presents a problem for aesthetics.  Beardsley asserts that expressive theories 
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are explained using the formula “X expresses Y, where X is the musical work, or some 
part of it, and Y is a psychological state or quality.”149  Theorists who support 
expressivism deal with problems that relate to examining how a piece of music expresses 
the composer’s state of mind, the state of mind of the percipient, or some combination of 
the two in relation to the music.150  For example, how was the composer’s supposed state 
of melancholy at the time of the composition of the piece shown in the work?  Or, is the 
composition, as a whole or at least in part, written to evoke melancholy in the listener?  
Beardsley suggests the heart of the expressivist theory espouses the embodiment or 
objectification of emotion rather than a mere venting of emotion.151  According to him 
the notions of “embodied” and “objectified” as explained by an expressivist using the 
first sentence below are as follows:  
“The composer has objectified (embodied, expressed) joy in his scherzo” means 
“(1) he has been moved by a feeling of joy to compose the scherzo; (2) he has 
given the scherzo a joyful quality; and (3) the scherzo has the capacity to give him 
the same feeling of joy when he hears it again, and consequently to give it to the 
listeners, too.”152 
 
Even if the composer could embody or express the emotion of joy in music, problems 
arise with the standpoint of the listener to comprehend the so called joy.  Additionally, 
the subjective quality of the interpretation creates difficulties in determining whether it is 
joy, delight, contentment, or serenity.  However, Beardsley goes on to argue that 
expressivism points to “an important fact about music—namely, that it has human 
regional qualities.”153  These human regional qualities are in relation to the idea of 
regional qualities mentioned above.  According to Beardsley, there is similarity “to 
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qualities of human behavior, especially to mental states and processes: somberness, 
serenity, frolicsomeness, determination, calm, voluptuousness, [and] indecisiveness.”154  
So, distinguishing between what music allegedly expresses and what it means is an 
extremely difficult task. 
 The second theory for examination is signification.  In the two decades 
surrounding the center of the twentieth century there was much attention being given to 
the work of Langer’s Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite 
and Art.155  Her ideas in Philosophy in a New Key and the follow-up work Feeling and 
Form are integral components in the writings of such leading lights of the MEAE 
movement as Reimer.156  Her work is also cited in Basic Concepts and Foundations and 
Principles of Music Education.  As mentioned in the previous chapter Basic Concepts 
and Foundations and Principles are credited by contemporary music education historians 
and philosophers as launching the MEAE movement.  In these works, especially the 
latter, there is an emphasis on expressivism and signification a la Langer.157  The 
attention she as a significationist and the expressivists have received is important and 
justifiable.  This attention, however, has limited the degree to which aesthetics in music 
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education is seen as anything other than the reification of the phrases “music is the tonal 
analogue of emotive life”158 or music as “non-discursive symbolism.”159  Dwelling on 
this single facet of aesthetic discourse has limited the understanding of how aesthetics 
was, and might currently be, used in music education practice.  Regardless of whether 
one agrees or disagrees with signification theory, these ideas are important developments 
in the philosophical discourse in music education.  But, again, her theories and 
signification are just one aspect of aesthetic discourse. 
 Signification theory posits that “music does have a referential relation to things 
outside itself, and [significationists] propose to analyze this relation in semiotic terms, 
that is, using the concept of sign.”160  Beardsley separates this group of theorists from 
expressivists because, in his words, “signification theorists set aside the venting and the 
evoking of emotions as not properly a matter of meaning at all,” furthermore, “they do 
not think statements about musical meaning can be reduced to descriptions.”161  More 
precisely, “music is an iconic sign of psychological processes.  It ‘articulates’ or 
‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory equivalents of 
some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”162  This theory, Beardsley argues, rests on 
the following propositions: “(1) A musical composition can be iconic with a 
psychological process, that is, it can be similar to such a process in an important way. (2) 
By virtue of its iconicity, the composition is a sign of the psychological process.”163  He 
also says that music shares similar aspects to what has been previously referred to as 
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“kinetic patterns” or “kinetic qualities.”  That is, there can be overlap between such 
musical and mental features as “tempo, variations of intensity, impulsiveness, relaxation, 
and tension, crescendo and diminuendo.”164  For Langer, meaning in music is “as a 
formulation and representation of emotions, moods, and mental tensions and 
resolutions—a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life and a source of insight into 
it.”165  Furthermore, Lippman writes that Langer asserts “the content of music is 
symbolized, and what it invites is not emotional response but insight.”166  Also in relation 
to signification theory in terms of meaning, interpretation, and revelation Bowman asserts 
What music does…is enable conception.  This act of coherence making is…the 
common foundation of thought and music; this achievement of coherence, not the 
logical operations by which it is subsequently manipulated and ordered is the root 
of humankind’s distinctive mental power.  In other words, thought and music are 
each ways—albeit contrasting ways—of ‘transforming reality symbolically’.167 
 
But, although plausible and defensible, signification, like expressivism, generates the 
challenge of specifically determining if the accurate meaning is derived through the so 
called sign.  Here Beardsley uses an example: “One chair may be exactly like another, 
but that does not make it signify the other.”168  For him, “we cannot decide among the 
innumerable possible qualities, so that if the music is a sign at all, it is ambiguous.”169  
Whether we accept or reject signification theory is not the issue.  The point of the brief 
explanation of the theory, and its merits and defects, is that it shows a way of seeing the 
discourse of music educators presenting, elaborating on, and possibly defending an 
important theory in aesthetics.  However, making the historically developmental 
                                                 
164 Ibid. 
165 Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 367. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 199 – 200. 
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associations and connections from the conclusions drawn in this dissertation to 
contemporary music education philosophy and musical aesthetics is not what is 
undertaken in this work. Links between the past and present can be topics of further 
study, especially in relation to the next problem in musical aesthetics, the relation of 
music to words and/or language. 
 This section on the relation of music to words and/or language has three main 
components.  The first two, music’s uses of words in song and the idea of program music, 
are talked about by Beardsley, and the third, the relation of linguistic structure and 
musical structure, is addressed by Scruton from The Aesthetics of Music.170  Beardsley 
poses two questions on the relation of words and music: “How is music related to the 
sound of the words?  And how is music related to the sense of the words?”171  For him 
these questions are superseded by the problem of “the connection between the sound of 
the music and the meaning of the words.”172  Regarding the first two problems Beardsley 
presents what he calls Fusion Theory as way to see the degree to which music and words 
might be associated.  For Beardsley, Fusion Theory rests on the principle that 
 A musical passage is coherent with—appropriate to—a verbal discourse sung to it 
if it has some fairly intense human regional qualities that are either qualities 
                                                 
170 Although Scruton is a contemporary philosopher and some of his arguments rely on material 
that was not available to earlier scholars, he brings the problem of the notion of the language of music into 
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designated by the words or qualities of the events or situation described by the 
words.173 
 
With this theory the reader can most likely remember his or her beginning chorus teacher 
instructing the group on calmly singing a lullaby or giving an enthusiastic rendition of 
Happy Birthday.  In relation to the idea of word meaning and musical sound the issue is 
complex because in program music the composition “depends on its own musical unity 
and continuity upon purely musical relations among its parts:  it calls for development, 
for recapitulations, for variations or thematic combination.”174  On the other hand a story 
follows a path which is not necessarily similar, and it must achieve other aims such as 
“character-development and conflict resolution.”175  Although the problem above of word 
meaning in relation to musical sound begs the question to an extent, Beardsley’s assertion 
“where the music is large and symphonic, and the story must be recalled from an earlier 
reading that has no perceptible connection with the music itself, the correspondence of 
music to words will probably remain a mere correspondence”176 is warrantable.  His 
argument is justified based on the main problems related to meaning and interpretation 
given at the outset of this section, namely how can we be certain that intentionally and 
particularly organized musical sounds mean something such as farm, flying, fantastic, or 
furor.  Showing specific relations between words and music is a common but suspect 
practice by aestheticians and some music educators.   Another relationship, no less 
common or suspect, was presented by aestheticians and music educators who argued that 
organized sound had a closer association with language. 
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 The notion of music as a language is based upon the ideas that music and stories 
do have special structures.  And it is within this idea of structure that Scruton analyzes 
the similarity between the structure of music and the structure of language and linguistic 
and musical rules.  But while analyzing and comparing the structure of each may give 
some clues about how we might begin the process of interpretation, where does it leave 
us regarding insights into meaning?  Attempting to move closer toward solving the 
music-as-a-language problem, Scruton examines what language is and the elements that 
make it work.  For him “language is essentially an information-carrying medium, 
intelligible in principle to every rational being, and governed by rules which organize a 
finite vocabulary into a potential infinity of sentences.”177  Though music does not 
contain rules in relation to parts of speech, is there something about music’s structure that 
enables us to display our humanness?  Can music convey information the way language 
does?178  Scruton uses the linguistic terminology of syntax and semantics for the purpose 
of discovering whether music shares the qualities embodied by these terms.179  Scruton 
writes, 
 Our sense of musical syntax is not of a step-by-step substitution of syntactically 
equivalent components, but of context-dependent affinity between tones.  Certain 
elements belong together, even when separated by intervening material—like the 
dominant and the tonic chords in a lengthy cadence.180 
 
                                                 
177 Scruton, The Aesthetic of Music, 172.  Although it is not clear whether music mirrors all of the 
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more than a “mere surface level phenomenon—a mere matter of style.” 
178 Ibid., 172. 
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Taking a cue from signification theory in relation to semantics, Scruton seeks another 
possible solution to music as a language problem.  He suggests, 
 We could use the linguistic analogy to cast light on the meaning of music, 
therefore, only if we could also think of music in the same structural terms—in 
other words, only if we could envisage the meaning of any piece of music as in 
some way composed from the meanings of its elements.  We should need some 
musical equivalent of a vocabulary—phrases, harmonies, progressions, and so on 
with a fixed and repeatable significance, whose contributions to the meaning of 
any musical whole is, if not exactly rule-governed, at least regular and 
predictable.181 
 
As will be seen in chapter four, music educators of the time also debated the kind of 
vocabulary or parts of speech music contained and what a parallel with language might 
mean for the instruction of students.  Examples of the music to language comparison 
occurred when classes dissected a composition in a theory or music appreciation class as 
well as when instructors helped a choir attempt to capture the essence of a piece for a 
performance.  Between the concepts of syntax, semantics, and structure there exists a 
number of ways music educators associated language and music. 
 The problems of meaning as presented in this section are numerous and complex 
and are only part of the field of musical aesthetics.  Problems such as deciding if and how 
compositions can be comprehended and interpreted according to theories provided by 
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significationists or expressivists are compounded when trying to understand the relations 
between composer, composition, and percipient.   
Theories on the Meaning and Interpretation of Music 
 
Because of the longstanding traditions of expressivism and significationism, these 
theories are in the forefront of the debate among music educators discussing ideas and 
problems related to meaning.  Although the theories of expressivism and significationism 
generally encompass a great variety of perspectives on meaning (as mentioned in the 
above section Explanations and Problems on Meaning/Interpretation/Comprehension), 
these two positions, however, are not the only views on meaning in music. 
 For the ancient Greek thinkers, especially Plato, mimetic theory interpreted music 
as revealing “things about the harmony of the universe we could not otherwise 
know….music imitates the beauty of the harmoniously balanced soul.”182  Meaning for 
the formalist rests on self-contained musical analysis and is defined more conveniently in 
negative terms.  That is, instead of stating what formalism is, it is easier to argue what it 
is not.  According to the formalist music is not analogous to language, politics, or 
feelings.  In the words of the formalist Hanslick “Music consists of tonal sequences, tonal 
forms; these have no other content than themselves…its content is nothing but the 
audible tonal forms; since music speaks not merely by means of tones, it speaks only 
tones.”183  He continues by clarifying that although  
Music has no content in the sense of ‘subject matter.’ It does not follow that 
music lacks substance…regarding the accusation of contentlessness, music has 
content, but musical content…but only by firmly denying any other kinds of 
‘content’ to music can we preserve music’s substance.  This is because from 
indefinite feeling, to which at best such a content is attributable, no spiritual 
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content derives; rather, in each composition, the content derives from its 
particular tonal structure as the spontaneous creation of mind out of material 
compatible with mind [i.e., the tones].184 
 
The formalist sees music as revealing and interpreting the art form in relation to itself, 
that is, musically. 
 The position of the German idealist on meaning and interpretation is different 
from the formalist.  Generally for the idealist, in relation to meaning, “Music and musical 
experience are somehow, uniquely able to penetrate and reveal the innermost nature of 
the world and human experience.”185  Bowman writes that for Kant meaning exists within 
the aesthetic experience, which is  
contemplative delight in the imaginative perception of form…an experience at 
once feelingful and mindful, yet reducible to neither feeling nor mind…judgments 
of taste represent a kind of knowing of which intellect is incapable, a distinctive 
kind of cognitive activity mediated by natural and artistic beauty.186 
 
Similarly for Hegel, “Music’s abstract inwardness promises to acquaint people with the 
inner soul-life, while at the same time enriching and vitalizing it through its immediacy, 
vividness, and intimacy.”187  In other words, for thinkers such as Schiller, Schelling and 
Schopenhauer, whose ideas can be linked to the work of Kant and Hegel, what is 
interpreted is music’s revelatory power of “inward, sensual, expressive 
phenomenon…the ineffable, inner nature of reality.”188  Like the German idealist view on 
the nature of music, the perspective of these writers on the subject of meaning is also 
metaphysical. 
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 Metaphysical perspectives on meaning are not the concern of the experientialist.  
Thinkers such as Dewey see meaning and the revelatory power of music in direct relation 
to the experience itself.  The type of experience sought by Dewey is one in which “the 
material experienced runs its course to fulfillment…that its close is a consummation not a 
cessation.  Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing 
quality and self-sufficiency.  It is an experience.”189  For a philosopher such as Dewey 
the meaning, interpreting and revealing brought forth by an experience has both an 
immediate and distant quality because “what the live creature retains from the past and 
what it expects from the future operate as directions in the present.”190  The immediacy of 
meaning in an experience is an observation “that is both action in preparation and 
foresight of the future.”191  The distant quality of meaning is difficult to determine since 
the exact long term outcome of an experience may not be elicited until it is brought into 
relation with other such experiences or other ends pursued at a later time. In summation, 
the immediate and distant qualities of deriving meaning through experience are where “in 
life that is truly life, everything overlaps and merges.”192  Dewey’s explanation of an 
experience is rooted in the primary aim of his work.  In this book Dewey puts forth the 
argument that for art to reach its fullest potential in terms of meaning and value it must be 
integrated with life.  To put it another way, the process of living in the world, according 
to Dewey,  
is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions…the live 
being recurrently loses and reestablishes equilibrium with his surroundings.  The 
moment of passage from disturbance into harmony is that of intensest life….In a 
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world made after the pattern of ours, moments of fulfillment punctuate experience 
with rhythmically enjoyed intervals.193  
 
With its arguably outward focus in terms of human relations, Dewey’s perspective on 
meaning in art is one where an aesthetic experience is “the fulfillment of an organism in 
its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in germ.”194  Arts’ revelatory 
power and value, according to Dewey, is one that enables us to more fully understand and 
deal with our environment, which is the case for both artist and percipient. 
 The experience of the composer and listener in relation to the production and 
reception of music within the larger society are ideas developed by the sociological 
offshoot of musical aesthetics called socioaesthetics here.  Theodor Adorno is arguably 
the prototypical scholar of the time in the field of the philosophy of music as it relates to 
sociology.  Music for Adorno is cultural and as such any search for meaning necessarily 
involves commenting on social relations, social structures, and social institutions, for 
example.195  With roots in Marxist thought the relations of meaning and value in music 
are nearly contingent.  The reason it is difficult to separate meaning from value in 
philosophy arising from Marxist thought is that “all music functions ideologically to 
perpetuate bourgeois consciousness.”196  Although Bowman goes on to assert Adorno 
does not completely accept the Marxist argument, especially as it relates to so-called 
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modern music and modern society, the links to Marxism are still present.197  Adorno sees 
as necessity the broadening of an understanding of classical Marxist thought on the 
relations existing between music and society by asserting, 
Music in modern society is situated between two dialectically opposite poles: as 
commodity, it perpetuates false consciousness; as social critique, it subverts 
ideology and serves authentic consciousness…it is capable of revealing with 
utmost clarity ‘the contradictions and flaws which cut through present-day 
society’198 
 
With modern music and the work of Stravinsky as exemplar, what is revealed by music is 
“like critical philosophy, [it] is obliged to attempt to transform ‘the cultural 
consciousness of the masses.’  To do this it must both engage and extend that 
consciousness.”199  Furthermore, “the ‘most advanced’ modern music, then, is music that 
pursues its social obligation not by attempting social ‘relevance’, not by pursuing 
popularity or utility, but rather ‘by developing within music itself…those elements whose 
objective is the overcoming of class domination.’”200  Socioaesthetic theory asserts 
meaning and revelation in music are inextricable with the existing social situation.  “As a 
fundamentally social phenomenon, distinctions between music’s musical and social value 
are completely spurious: music’s socially critical function is exercised within its own 
formal language and technique.”201   
 The points of view on the meaning of music according to what it allegedly reveals 
are numerous.  The reader has undoubtedly noticed at this point that each major 
theoretical perspective in musical aesthetics integrates the major premise of its 
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understanding of the nature of music into what it argues the meaning and/or revelation of 
music is. Whether music reveals a fuller understanding of our environment, the inner 
nature of reality, reality symbolically, or means nothing beyond itself, it is clear that just 
like the nature of music, the meaning of music is an actively debated topic now and in the 
history of musical aesthetics.  It is through the struggle of searching for meaning that 
another component of musical aesthetics emerges, value.   
The final category of contestation in musical aesthetics is value.  Unlike the first 
two categories where each was divided into two distinct and subsequent sections—the 
explanations and problems of such and such, and the theories of so and so—this final 
section is more fluid (closer to how expressivism and significationism were incorporated 
into the writing on meaning in music). The connection between problems and theories is 
more fluid in this final section because of the complex nature of value.  The first layer of 
complexity is the way the idea of value is discussed—as a means of evaluation and why 
music is important.  Added to the two ways in which value is used is a second layer of 
complexity which involves the intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian positions 
on value. Therefore, even though this final section on value is once again broken down 
into two subsequent segments, the problems and theories are covered without as much 
attention to distinction between problems and theories due to the nature of what the 
concept of value includes.  And to avoid redundancy, the section covering theories on 
value will be brief. 
Explanations and Problems of Value 
 
The third domain of focused attention that pertains to examining the problems and 
theories in musical aesthetics is value—musical judgment and why music matters.  
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Fundamentally value based theories are concerned with how it is possible to make an 
evaluation and why music matters at all.  The key problems are rooted in questions such 
as should we care about music, and if so why?  What makes one musical work more 
valuable than another?  On what basis can a determination of the aesthetic value of music 
be made? 
Can a feature be a merit in one [piece of music] and a defect (or neither) in 
another?  Or does calling the feature a merit in one [piece of music] entail, or 
presuppose, a general principle according to which it is meritorious wherever it 
occurs?202 
 
What roles do beauty, truth, and culture have in determining value?203  Finally, “does 
aesthetic experience have value, and if so why?”204 
The concept of value is primarily an idea of assessment which is rooted in the 
analysis of a perceptive, thoughtful response to an aesthetic object or experience.  This 
assessment and analysis lead to some conclusion regarding music’s intrinsic, inherent, 
instrumental, and/or utilitarian end.  Whilst certain aspects of the previously introduced 
concept of meaning may also be construed as responses to music, there is a difference.   
The reason for the separation is that interpreting and comprehending a piece of music is 
                                                 
202 Beardsley, Aesthetics, 464.  In the original quote Beardsley uses the word “poem” where I 
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mainly an intramusical affair with some extramusical components.  In other words, 
whether one is critiquing the music from the standpoint of significationist percipient or a 
musicologist with expressivist tendencies researching various conditions under which the 
piece was composed, the concern is with what it is in the music that elicits emotion or 
signifies nationalist sentiment for example.  It is mainly about the music, what it reveals 
and, at most, is one step removed from the music to the composer or the percipient(s). 
Meaning’s difference from value in relation to the intramusical/extramusical bifurcation 
is a matter of degree. Where meaning may take into consideration if an emotion is 
elicited, the concept of value deals with subsequent questions such as does this particular 
piece bring out such and such emotional quality in a better way than another piece and is 
the emotion something of worth to those who experience this piece of music?  It is one 
thing to suggest that music expresses melancholy and another to determine why the 
expression of melancholy matters or to debate why the composition is judged to have 
artistic merit in its expression of melancholy versus another piece’s depiction of the 
same.  Value moves beyond the attempt to comprehend and interpret by using elements 
from artistic meaning to make judgments of quality in relation to other works and itself as 
well as contemplating music’s worth and importance to us as humans.  This is not to say 
that the focus on value is the lone idea explored in normative theories but rather that these 
theories emphasize value.  I see the notion of value not only from the view of making 
evaluative judgments of quality and worth but also in asking why it matters 
(incorporating intrinsic, inherent, and instrumentalist perspectives).   
Evaluation of music is the first area of focused attention.  What sorts of issues are 
revealed when making a determination of the aesthetic value of music?  As a basis for 
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making a critical determination of value Beardsley divides the “reasons and judgments” 
for evaluating whether one work is better than another into three categories: genetic, 
affective, and objective.205  For Beardsley, genetic reasons for saying one work is better 
than another is a reference “to something existing before the work itself, to the manner in 
which it was produced, or its connection with antecedent objects and psychological 
states.”206  Examples of genetic reasons are “it fulfills (or fails to fulfill the artists 
intention…it is an example of successful (or unsuccessful) expression…it is skillful (or 
shows poor workmanship)…it is new and original (or trite)…it is sincere (or 
insincere).”207 Beardsley dismisses these reasons and labels them as problematic based on 
similar conclusions drawn in his assessment of expressivists’ attempting to find the 
composer’s mindset present in a composition because, “the resulting judgment is not a 
judgment of the work, but only of the worker, which is quite a different thing.”208  And in 
reference to the category of originality he questions if originality is always to be regarded 
highly.209  For example 
Suppose there are two of Haydn’s symphonies very much alike, and we do not 
know which he wrote first; are we going to say that A becomes better when we 
decide that it was the earlier, but reverse our judgment when newly discovered 
band parts give priority to B?210 
 
Beardsley defines affective reasons for evaluating the quality of a work as “the 
psychological effects of the aesthetic object upon the percipient.”211  Examples include: 
“it gives pleasure (or gives no pleasure)…it is interesting (or dull and monotonous)…it is 
                                                 
205 Ibid., 456 – 470. 
206 Ibid., 457. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid., 458. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
82 
 
exciting, moving, stirring, rousing…it has a powerful emotional impact.”212  Problems 
are again revealed with judgments made according to these criteria.  How are fine 
distinctions to be made between the emotional impact of Beethoven’s Piano Concerto 
No. 5 in E-flat Major, Op. 73 and Bela Bartok’s Piano Concerto No. 1, Sz. 83.  
Furthermore, “what in the aesthetic object causes the emotional response?”213  These are 
clearly difficult questions to answer, which leads to the third category of reasons and 
judgments used in evaluation, objective.   
 Beardsley defines an objective reason as one that “refers to some characteristic—
that is, some quality or internal relation, or set of qualities and relations—within the work 
itself, or to some meaning-relation between the work and the world.”214  In this category 
Beardsley relies on material rooted in the nature and meaning of art and divides objective 
reasons into three “canons:” unity, complexity, and intensity.215  Examples of unity 
include: “it is well organized (or disorganized)…it is formally perfect (or imperfect)…it 
has (or lacks) an inner logic or structure and style.”216  Next are examples of complexity: 
“it is developed on a large scale…it is rich in contrasts (or lacks variety and is 
repetitious)…it is subtle and imaginative (or crude).”217  Finally, the term intensity is in 
relation to human regional qualities and examples include: “it is full of vitality (or 
insipid)…it is forceful and vivid (or weak and pale)…it is beautiful (or ugly)…it is 
tender, ironic, tragic, graceful, delicate, richly comic.”218  Beardsley does acknowledge 
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that these so-called canons are not universal but only reveal “general tendencies.”219  
Furthermore, there are philosophical problems revealed when evaluating works according 
to these canons and criteria.  
 The philosophical problems of making judgments relating to value covered by 
Beardsley underscore the difficulty of these types of determinations.  For example, does 
it necessarily follow that when a composition is unified it is good?220  Basically, the 
problem here is one of determining how such critical justifications assessing value can be 
made.221  In the last pages of his chapter on “critical evaluation” he addresses relativism.    
 For Beardsley the relativist argues that restrictions are always placed on critical 
judgments, which include individual, social, historical, and cultural qualifiers.222  
Beardsley suggests the relativist’s position rests on two primary arguments: variability 
and inflexibility.223  Variability is difference in taste, which in the end is a problem for 
the relativist.  For Beardsley, “Variability is an empirical fact; Relativism is a theory 
about the proper way to define the term ‘good.’”224  So, “variability does not prove 
                                                 
219 Ibid., 472. 
220 Ibid., 471. 
221 Ibid., 473.  Beardsley elaborates on two theories that deal with our ability to make normative 
judgments about art.  The first is performatory theory.  This theory is one in which evaluations are mainly 
“nonlinguistic acts,” and, according to Beardsley, asserts that although a definition of “good” cannot be 
made, “critical evaluation utterances may be just or unjust; they are not, however, true or false.  The 
problem here is that the reasons given for determining whether the evaluation is justified or not are 
ultimately normative.  For additional clarification and explanation see Beardsley’s critique on page 474.  
The second theory is what Beardsley calls the emotive theory.  He suggests that “despite its grammatical 
form, a critical evaluation is not a statement, but a combination of two components, an exclamatory 
component, which gives evidence of the speaker’s feeling…and an imperative component, which calls 
upon the listener to share the speaker’s feelings.  The problem for Beardsley here is that the emotivist 
“claims that the emotive aspect of ‘good’ is precisely its normative aspect.  Take away the emotive effect, 
and you no longer have a critical evaluation; keep the critical evaluation, and you have the emotive effect, 
and the fallacy.  On what grounds, then, shall we decide whether the emotive aspect of a word is its 
normative aspect?”474-475, 477. 
222 Ibid., 482. 
223 Ibid., 483. 
224 Beardsley goes on to assert “it by no means follows from the fact that people like different 
aesthetic objects that they cannot do any more in judging them than record their likings.”  Beardsley, 
Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 484. 
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relativism.”225  But the relativist does have a noteworthy counterargument, and Beardsley 
sums it up as follows: “the only way we can justify a standard…is to derive it from 
another, and more general, standard.”226  The other argument in the relativist’s tool kit is 
that of inflexibility, which Beardsley equates with determinism.  It is in the process of 
undermining the inflexibility argument that Beardsley echoes an idea that dates most 
likely from the ancient Greeks and in more recent times from at least the late eighteenth 
century which is the notion of the role of the arts in the elevation of taste and of the 
mind.227  It is also similar to numerous statements given by music educators of the time 
as to the importance of music education.228  Beardsley asserts  
There is a great deal of evidence…to show that individual tastes can be changed, 
that it is possible to increase subtlety of discrimination and range of enjoyment 
and complexity of understanding by appropriate training.  And if it is possible to 
change, or to develop tastes, then we cannot avoid the question whether they 
should be changed.  The Relativist does not meet this question by redefining 
words so that it cannot be asked.229 
                                                 
225 Ibid., 509. 
226 Ibid., 485. 
227 Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1794) in 
part develops and expands Plato’s contention that the arts ennoble the mind. 
228 There were a number of papers, panel topics, and discussions at the MSNC conferences over 
the years that mentioned the importance of music for the mind and subsequently elevating taste such as one 
given by Karl Gehrkens , “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching ,” Journal of Proceeding of the 
Eighth Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference held at Pittsburgh, PA March 22 – 
26 1915, (privately printed), 55 – 65 – panel discussion follows on the topic of “ultimate end” from Julia E. 
Crane, T.P. Giddings, John W. Beattie, George Oscar Bowen, and from the floor on 65 – 76 (No 
publication information is given for MSNC Journal of Proceedings prior to 1926).  Another example is 
from Mary Conway, “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades,” Journal of Proceeding of the Seventh 
Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference Held at Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1 
1914, (privately printed), 78 - 86. Some of these papers also weigh in on the debate between base, good, 
and great music.  One particular example is given by Mary J. Armitage, a music supervisor from Bowling 
Green, Kentucky, who writes “the average child prefers ragtime and the cheap song of the street to the 
classics.  Just as naturally as he prefers candy to soup, or Charlie Chaplin to Forbes Robertson, and it 
devolves upon the Supervisor to offset that taste and give him a liking for something infinitely better.”  
Mary J. Armitage, “How to Introduce Music Appreciation Into Schools which have Never had Music,” in 
the Journal of Proceeding of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Music Supervisors’ National Conference 
Held at Philadelphia, PA March 22 – 26 1920, (privately printed), 51 – 54, 51.  
229 Unfortunately Beardsley does not supply the reader with the “great deal of evidence.”  
However, on the next page and in relation to undermining relativism, Beardsley does supply the following 
line of reasoning:  “the central question is whether there is any conclusive proof that there are certain 
reasons for critical judgments which would be given or accepted by one group of critics but which another 
group of critics would consider completely beside the point, and that there is in principle no rational 
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We are now in a better position to determine the extent to which music educators from 
1907 to 1958 justified music’s value relying on affective reasons of making evaluative 
statements, or if they went further by making statements that infused the so-called canons 
of objective reasoning.  
 Now that the topic of making evaluative judgments of quality and worth has been 
covered we can move to the second use of the concept of value in this dissertation, which 
is determining why music matters.  Beardsley’s exploration of the concept of aesthetic 
value moves beyond accounting for “reasons and judgments” to questioning why an 
aesthetic object and/or the aesthetic experience has importance and matters.  In other 
words, the concept of aesthetic value used in this manner transcends determining the 
quality and good-making elements of a composition, for example, by getting into why 
music matters to humanity.   
Beardsley writes about three theories that deal with aesthetic value.230  The first is 
Beauty Theory.  He explains, “The aesthetic value of an object consists in its possession 
of a certain unique regional quality, called ‘beauty,’ and the degree of its aesthetic value 
is determined by the intensity of this quality.”  That is, in relation to the concept of value 
in aesthetics, “the aesthetic object is aesthetically valuable because it is beautiful, and this 
does not mean that it is beautiful because it is beautiful.”231  Beardsley continues, “The 
beauty theory…may be summed up in three sentences:  1. Beauty is a regional quality of 
                                                                                                                                                 
method of persuading either group that it is mistaken.  I don’t see that the Relativist can present such a 
proof.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 488 – 489.  Italics in the original. 
230 Ibid., 505. 
231 Ibid., 506.  Italics in the original.  It is largely because of this explanation that I take aesthetics 
to be much more comprehensive than how it is often defined, which is as a study and examination of the 
beautiful.  See earlier note.   
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perceptual objects.  2. Beauty is intrinsically beautiful.  3. ‘Aesthetic value’ means ‘value 
that an object has on account of its beauty.”232   
Philosophical problems exist with the term beauty, which led Beardsley to define 
the theory the way he does.  For example, is beauty objective or subjective?233  Can an 
aesthetic object be aesthetically valuable without an element of beauty?  What are the 
properties of beauty?  He also mentions the problems of variability of meaning.234  The 
crux of the theory, according to its adherents, is based on the notion that “to justify the 
judgment that an object has aesthetic value…you first show that it has beauty, from 
which it logically follows that it has aesthetic value.”235  This idea is what beauty 
theorists claim gives music its value. It is unclear, however, if all of this does logically 
follow.236  Beauty theory is only one way of considering aesthetic value. 
 Aesthetic value, according to Beardsley, can also be determined by what he calls 
“psychological definitions.”237  The “psychological” notion of value is primarily 
subjective because it rests on the supposition that for anything to have value there must 
                                                 
232 Ibid., 506 – 507. 
233 Ibid., 506. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid., 507. 
236 Beardsley supplies a number of perspectives on beauty theory, which include the 
“transcendental,” “naturalistic,” “formalistic,” and “intellectualistic.”  Beardsley defines the transcendental 
form of beauty theory as “a platonic universal that exists, or subsists, outside of space and time, but 
supervenes upon the aesthetic, which then embodies it more or less fully.”  He defines the naturalistic form 
of beauty theory as one where “beauty is an emergent from the object, a regional quality like any other.”  In 
relating the two theories he asserts “to this metaphysical difference there corresponds an epistemological 
one: in the Transcendental version, beauty is apprehended by a faculty of intuition; in the naturalistic 
version, it is simply perceived by the senses—heard, or seen.”  He goes on to suggest that “both forms of 
this theory…agree that the occurrence of beauty in the object, whether it is supervenient or emergent, 
depends upon the other features of the object, its elements, internal relations and other regional qualities.”  
Beardsley writes that the formalistic form of the theory suggests “beauty is a function of certain formal 
properties of the object, and it seeks for as exact as possible a description of these beautiful-making 
properties.”  Finally, he defines the intellectualistic form of beauty theory partially in negative terms.  For 
Beardsley, “it is not the elements, internal relations, and other regional qualities of the object that are the 
conditions of its being beautiful, but its embodiment, or showing forth, of some conceptual or cognitive 
content.”  What this intellectual content is, however, is quite mysterious.  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems 
in the Philosophy of Criticism, 507 – 508.  
237 Ibid., 512. 
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be something “in relation, direct or indirect, to the needs or desires of human beings.”238  
And in the case of this theory value is rooted in the psychological states or attitudes 
toward the object.239  That is, proponents of this notion of value theory assert that value is 
attached to something because of how we feel about it.240  Beardsley writes, “To put it in 
a familiar, though casual, way, it is not liked because it is good, but good because it is 
liked.”241  Beardsley also makes the point that these theories on value are intrinsically 
based: “the attitude of liking is understood to be taken toward the object not because it is 
a means to anything else, but simply for its own sake.”242  But problems emerge here 
because value as proposed by this theory is primarily attitudinal which takes us back to 
similar issues mentioned above associated with taste and variability.  Beardsley states it 
this way; “the language of likes and dislikes is an important and useful language, but it is 
not the language of critical judgment.  ‘Is it good?’ cannot be reduced to ‘Do you like 
it?’...or even to ‘Will I like it?’”243  Making a leap from the first question to the second 
would be a problem of consistency, and is a philosophical stumbling point for music 
educators of the period writing on the topic of value.  The last topic relating to value is no 
less problematic and has generated debate in the field of music education for some time.   
Finally, a significant problem associated with any argument of musical value, 
whether it originates from the perspective of a utilitarian, an instrumentalist, or an 
adherent to the idea of the intrinsic value of music, is: are the aesthetic object and the 
                                                 
238 Ibid., 513. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Beardsley notes that both beauty theory and “psychological definitions” see value as intrinsic.  
The main difference is in relation to the object – “ beauty and the value that inheres in it are characteristics 
of the aesthetic object itself, quite independently of the way anyone feels about it.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: 
Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 513. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid., 514. 
243 Ibid., 523. 
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aesthetic experience infungible?  Or to put it another way, can something else be 
substituted for music and the aesthetic experience of it?  And by extension if music is 
infungible, to what other ends has it connected?  These are problems that have bedeviled 
the field of music and music education at least as far back as the time of ancient Greece.  
Some of the perspectives from various theories attempting to give solutions to these 
problems relating to value follow.  I combine some of the problems and theories here so 
the reader will see both the complexity of this final category of aesthetic analysis and as a 
way to have a clearer picture of how theories are used to generate solutions to problems. 
The first view is aestheticism.  The view taken by the aesthete is aligned closely 
with those adhering to the intrinsic and/or inherent value of art and is usually rejected by 
the instrumentalist.  According to Beardsley, aestheticism takes two forms.  The first is 
“not with art for the sake of citizenship, or patriotism or mysticism, or anything else, but 
with Art for Art’s Sake only.”244  The second, a logical extension of the first, “is a pure 
and single-minded view, which maintains the supreme value of art over everything 
else.”245  The aesthete is not concerned with the indirect side effects of music or the 
aesthetic experience. 
The second view Beardsley covers is of the so-called moralist.  Before getting 
into the two main moralist arguments he defines the moralist in basic terms as “one who 
judges aesthetic objects solely, or chiefly, with respect to moral standards.”246  The first 
                                                 
244 Ibid., 562.  Beardsley calls this the Argument from Innocuousness.  He continues “far from 
being a handmaiden to other goals, art gives us immediately, and richly, the best there is in life, intense 
awareness—it gives us what life itself aims at becoming, but seldom achieves outside art.  This part of the 
Aestheticist view is connected, of course, with a Psychological Definition of value; it claims that there is an 
end in itself, an intrinsic good, and that aesthetic experience is that good.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems 
in the Philosophy of Criticism, 563. Italics in the original. 
245 Ibid., 563.  Beardsley calls this the Argument from Aesthetic Primacy. 
246 Ibid., 564. 
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argument is what Beardsley refers to as the “Argument from Reduction.”247  The crux of 
the matter here is determining “whether a particular aesthetic object is a good one or not 
is reduced to the (moral) question whether the feelings it arouses are good or bad.”248  
Beardsley labels the second argument as the “Argument from Correlation.”249  The 
Argument from Correlation allows for a distinction between aesthetic value and moral 
value, but a determination of the aesthetic value is dependent upon the moral worth of the 
object.250  If the object has low moral worth, then it has little aesthetic value.251  The 
problem of a connecting aesthetic value and morality was discussed by music educators 
during the first half of the twentieth century within the context of World War One, The 
Great Depression, and the Cold War.  For example, and in light of these trying times in 
the history of the United States, the argument from correlation has, in the previous 
chapter, been loosely applied by Edward Bailey Birge.  As will be seen in chapter five 
some music education scholars even went so far as to deliberately and thoughtfully 
examine the aesthetic/moral relationship and determined, just as Beardsley states, “an 
analogy is not a causal connection.”252  Other perspectives on aesthetic value, including 
Adorno’s socioaesthetic and/or Marxist positions, are also seen in the evidence. 
                                                 
247 Ibid.  Beardsley asserts the “reductive form of moralism appears in the philosophy of 
Plato…and Tolstoy.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 584.  Beardsley also 
asserts that Aristotle, in response to Plato’s Argument from Reduction, offers an early defense of the 
inherent value of art with his use of catharsis.”  Ibid., 587. 
248 Ibid., 564. 
249 Ibid., 565. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid., 566.  Beardsley writes that the Argument from Correlation “has traditionally relied 
heavily upon a supposed connection between moral order and aesthetic order, and no doubt there is a deep 
and profound analogy between them.  Many of the regional qualities we find in art are most aptly, but of 
course metaphorically, named by qualities taken over from the moral aspects of human nature they are 
‘disciplined,’ ‘decisive,’ ‘decorous,’ ‘controlled,’ ‘sound,’ ‘strong,’ ‘calm,’ ‘bold,’ ‘healthy,’ to cite only 
positive terms.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 565 – 566. 
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Andy Hamilton writes that for Adorno, autonomous artwork has “no direct social 
function but does have a social situation.”253  And that social situation rests in part on 
what Beardsley labels the “Principle of Nonneutrality, which is the statement that every 
aesthetic object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency to promote, 
or to interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.”254  The idea 
that there is an important relationship between music and society, especially possible 
political and economic side effects, would seem to place sociaoaesthetics at the opposite 
end of the instrumentalist spectrum from aestheticism.  Yet almost paradoxically 
Adorno’s so-called objectivist approach argues “the ‘most advanced’ modern music, 
then, is music that pursues its social obligation not by attempting social ‘relevance’, not 
by pursuing popularity or utility, but rather ‘by developing within music itself…those 
elements whose objective is the overcoming of class domination.’”255  Reconciliation of 
Adorno’s aloof form of objectivity with the argument that music is solidly rooted in the 
social situation comes in the form of asserting that music is an important component of 
society not merely a reflection of it.  It is in Adorno’s view that the “most advanced” 
modern [autonomist] music does not have a “direct social function.”256   Just like the 
other theories, however, there are problems explored by the socioaesthetic perspective. 
                                                 
253 Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, 161. 
254 Beardsley asserts the principle of nonneutrality rests on the basic Marxist notion that 
“considerations of aesthetic values are to be subordinated to political ones, for…aesthetic objects cannot be 
politically neutral.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 567 – 568. 
255 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 312 – 313.  The quoted passages embedded 
within the above quote are from Adorno, “On the Social Situation of Music,” 131. op cit. 
256 Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, 182.  Further down the page Hamilton describes a direct social 
function as “one which has to be grasped, in order to have any understanding at all of the event or process 
in question.  Until I know that a certain event is a religious service rather than a university graduation 
ceremony, I will not be in any position to know what secondary functions it may have.”  Ibid., 182 – 183.  
Hamilton goes on to say that there is really no direct social function of attending a concert…“Today, in 
concert performance , Bach’s music exhibits purposiveness without a purpose.” Ibid., 183.   Not only is the 
idea of purposiveness without a purpose similar to what Kant says about art, but also the statement is at the 
heart of what Dewey sees as the problem of art in relation to the life of human beings.   
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A key problem examined by such writers as Adorno wrestles with the degree to 
which art has freed itself from the patronage of the nobility or the church—autonomy—
while entering a so-called market, which, according to the modernist, it simultaneously 
critiques.  For Adorno art is both autonomous and commodified, which is a dichotomy.257  
To put it another way, the question is whether music has merely traded a patron of one 
kind for another—reducing or negating its autonomy—while the aesthetic object is 
bought and sold in a so-called marketplace—increasing the extent to which it is 
commodified.  A component of this problem involves music affiliated with modernism, 
and it is this aspect where music educators of the period make comment.  In the first half 
of the twentieth century, major shifts were occurring in the world of music.  For example, 
the turn toward atonality was altering the traditional musical landscape and Schoenberg 
launched his twelve-tone method, 258 and in the United States specifically Jazz entered 
the scene.  Atonality, serial music, and jazz not only disrupted traditional styles of music 
but also were in themselves considered to embody the principles of modernism.  In an 
odd twist of the autonomy-commodity dichotomy, art music created at this time shows a 
“rupture between high and popular culture, it sets itself against popular culture,”259  
                                                 
257 Andy Hamilton states Adorno sees the ideas of Kant (art as autonomous) and Marx (art as 
commodity) in dialectical relation.  Andy Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music (London, UK: Continuum: 
2007), 167 – 168. 
258 Atonality is defined by Barbara Russano Hanning as “music that is not based on the harmonic 
and melodic relationships revolving around a key center; it is the opposite of tonal, which characterizes 
most music of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”  Barbara Russano Hanning, A Concise History of 
Western Music (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998), 492.  She summarizes the main 
points of the twelve tone  method as: “the basis of each composition is a row or series consisting of the 
twelve tones or pitch classes of the octave arranged in an order the composer chooses; the tones of the 
series may be used both successively (as melody) and simultaneously (as harmony or counterpoint), in any 
octave and with any desired rhythm; the row may be used not only in its original or ‘prime’ form but also in 
intervalically inverted form, in retrograde order (backward), or retrograde inverted form, and in 
transpositions of any of the four forms; and the composer must use all twelve pitches of the series before 
going on to use the series in any of its forms again.”  Ibid., 495.  Italics in the original.  Because of the 
composition being based on a “row or series” of tones it is often referred to as serial music. 
259 Hamilton, Aesthetics and Music, 158. 
92 
 
something the composer and music educator Howard Hanson lamented.  Absolute art 
music could be considered the quintessential example of aestheticism.  Against the 
backdrop of modernism and socioaesthetics, other types of music such as marches, 
funeral music, or hymns, which have a particular function, can cause difficulty in making 
a determination of value because it is unclear how to separate intrinsic from instrumental 
value. Whatever the case for so-called modern music and its relation to society and/or 
itself, the altering of the musical landscape in turn influenced the field of aesthetics.  On 
the one hand musical aesthetics now included such things as socioaesthetics where 
philosophers such as Adorno argued the fragmentation in music reflected what he viewed 
as the fragmentation in society.260  On the other it was argued the isolation of avant-garde 
music from mass culture created a situation where this type of music could only be 
examined objectively in relation to itself.261  Finally, a major problem for socioaesthetics 
was that the analysis of the problems in this branch of aesthetics are squarely rooted in 
time.  Many philosophers argue that philosophy deals with problems that are timeless.  
The problems presented in this last section are by no means easy to solve and are still 
being debated.  For example it is difficult to determine whether the music of Schoenberg 
and Stravinsky reflected a new form of objectivity (the intrinsic) or a more extreme form 
of social critique (the instrumental).  To the Marxist the answer is clear.  Art is not to be 
separated from political, social, or economic life.  Besides intrinsic value and the 
examples of instrumental value of moralism, socioaesthetics and/or Marxism that have 
                                                 
260 Ibid., 153. 
261 Edward Lippman sees a transformation in the twentieth century perspectives of objectivity and 
autonomy in musical aesthetics that is in opposition to socioaesthetics.    It is a shift in the location of 
meaning and value and mirrors a similar transformation in literary criticism between structuralism and 
post-structuralism.  Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, See Chapters 13 and 15. 
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been given, what other possibilities exist for instrumentalism that are not as extreme?  In 
the words of Beardsley, what are the inherent values of art?262 
If music has inherent value then, according to Beardsley, this notion rests on the 
idea of being able to “show that the having of this aesthetic experience…makes its own 
contribution to human welfare.”263  This contribution is unique because it resides in 
having undergone an experience with music itself.  The main difficulty here is the effect 
of aesthetic objects is often supported by evidence that “is scattered, uncertain, [and] 
subject to distortion by faulty introspection and emotional bias.”264  Regardless of the 
nature of evidence on the topic of inherent value, it is explored by numerous philosophers 
and aestheticians.   
Other than referencing Aristotle’s notion of catharsis and ethos theory, 
Beardsley’s work on ideas connected to the instrumentalist position leaning toward 
inherent value does not name some other leading contributors in the main part of his text.  
Even though his list of “predictions” generally takes into account ideas formulated by 
scholars such as Schopenhauer, Schiller, Santayana, Dewey, and Collingwood, it lacks 
the development needed for a thorough analysis of music education discourse.  Therefore, 
in addition to Aristotle, I also include the names and perspectives of those writing on the 
topic of instrumental/inherent value. 
   
                                                 
262 The inherent value of art occupies the last section of his book.  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems 
in the Philosophy of Criticism, 571 – 583. 
263 Ibid., 572.  
264 Ibid., 573.  Beardsley proposes a list of inherent values “in the form of predictions rather than 
outright assertions.”  They are as follows: “aesthetic experience 1. relieves tensions and quiets destructive 
impulses…2. resolves lesser conflicts within the self, and helps to create an integration, or harmony…3. 
refines perception and discrimination…4.  develops the imagination, and along with it the ability to put 
oneself in the place of others…5.  an aid to mental health…6.  fosters mutual sympathy and 
understanding…7.  offers an ideal for human life.”  Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of 
Criticism, 574 – 576. 
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Theories on Value (Additional Perspectives on Intrinsic,  
Instrumental, and Inherent Value) 
 
For the ancient Greeks value was primarily utilitarian with some instrumental 
inclinations.  The Greek notions of musical value, especially utilitarian and instrumental 
value, have manifested themselves in many ideas regarding music to this day.  Generally 
music “was to impart to the soul…what was noble and pleasing…music affords 
enjoyment and recreation; but its higher mission was to comfort and calm the troubled 
soul.”265  For Plato, “music which ennobled the mind was of a far higher kind than that 
which merely appealed to the senses…bold and stirring melodies were for men, gentle 
and soothing ones for women.”266  More specifically, music could be valued for its 
emotional and ethical effects.  For example, 
The manly and serious Doric scale should be exclusively used in the education of 
youth, as it was considered to be the only one calculated to inspire respect for the 
law, obedience, courage, self-esteem, and independence.  The Lydian scale, 
imported from Asia was less highly esteemed.  Plato considered that melodies 
founded upon it had a voluptuous, sensual, and enervating tendency, fitted at best 
only for the accompaniment of orgies…Aristotle ascribed to the Phrygian scale 
the power of inspiration, to the Dorian the qualities of repose and dignity, and, in 
opposition to Plato, attributed to the Lydian scale power of awakening the love of 
modesty and purity.267 
 
Shifting slightly from the arguably utilitarian bent of the above representations of ethos 
theory is Aristotle’s notion of catharsis, which moves toward the instrumental, and 
according to Beardsley the inherent, perspective on value.  In Politics, Aristotle argues, 
“music should be studied, not for the sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, 
with a view to education or purgation; … music may also serve for intellectual 
                                                 
265 Emil Naumann, The History of Music, vol. 1, ed. Rev. Sir F. A. Gore Ouseley trans. F. Praeger 
(London, UK: Cassell and Company, Limited, n.d.), 154.  It is worth noting that this two volume set was 
published in English circa 1880 – 1890 and, therefore, would have been available to music educators of the 
early twentieth century. 
266 Ibid., 153. 
267 Ibid., 134. 
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enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation after exertion.”268  And later in Poetics on the 
topic of catharsis Aristotle asserts, in proposing the elements tragedy, that in addition to 
being “the imitation of an action that is serious,” tragedy also contains “incidents 
arousing pity and fear, wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions.”269  In 
relating catharsis to inherent value, Beardsley writes, “Aristotle’s exact meaning is still 
not agreed upon by scholars, but there is no doubt that he believed the tragic effect to 
justify the social worth of tragedy, because it shows that tragedy accomplishes more than 
idle stimulation of feelings.”270  The manner in which the topic of music showed up in a 
number of works by Plato and Aristotle, such as The Republic, Timaeus, Laws, Politics, 
and Poetics, in addition to the work of Pythagoras, Plotinus, and even what is arguably 
the first treatise solely on music, Aristoxenus’  The Elements of Harmony, shows the 
Greek view of music as possessing value is unquestionable.  The kind of value music had 
for these ancients was arguably utilitarian and instrumental with some indication that 
inherent value was recognized. 
  With the exception of the formalist, in the nineteenth and twentieth century 
normative theories were predominantly focused on the emotional experience or the 
expression of feeling created or produced by music.  The formalist, as mentioned earlier 
by R.A. Sharpe, “is somebody who thinks that the value of music lies in its formal 
properties of design and line and not in its expressive capacity…what matters is beauty 
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and that beauty is a matter of form.”271  Value for the formalist is intrinsic.  Intrinsic 
value is also the position of Organicism, but things are a bit more complex here.  Archie 
Bahm in “The Aesthetics of Organicism” argues that 
organic enjoyment, which includes feelings of pleasure, enthusiasm, satisfaction, 
and contentment as variable aspects is idealized as the type of intrinsic value to be 
kept in mind, rather than either alone, when the aesthetic is referred to as intuition 
of intrinsic value…For Organicism, the end-in-itself quality of intrinsic value 
experiences is aspectival…[since] experience is, by its very nature dynamic, i.e., 
an organic mixture of events and duration…value experiences are more or less 
enduring, and variability in duration is to be expected normally.272 
 
Basically, for the organicist the experiencing of music is to be “enjoyed as an end-in-
itself” in a multifaceted network of aspects.273  From this point forward arguments on 
value move toward the inherent and instrumental.  
Contained within the theories of expressivism, emotionalism, and intuitionism 
and even German idealism are views on inherent value that give music an important place 
in human life.  Generally, for the German idealist the value of music is in its ability to 
reveal the innermost nature of reality.  More specifically, Beardsley asserts for Johann 
Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, “the enjoyment of art and the perception of beauty are a 
necessary state in the development of rationality and freedom.”274  Furthermore, 
Jacquette claims that Schiller “insists on understanding the value of art on its own terms 
for the role it plays in adding meaning and color to our lives, even when its secondary 
purpose is to condition citizens for participation in a morally elevated political state.”275  
According to Graham, Schopenhauer and Collingwood, “both believe that the chief task 
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of aesthetics is to explain the value and importance of art.”276  Or, in negative terms, 
“normative theories of art concern themselves not with the definition of the nature of art 
but with its value.”277  For Schopenhauer, a philosopher whose ideas influence much 
nineteenth century thought in aesthetics, art  
repeats or reproduces the external Idea grasped through pure contemplation, the 
essential and abiding in all the phenomena of the world;  and according to what 
the material is in which it reproduces, it is sculpture, or painting, poetry or music.  
Its one source is the knowledge of Ideas; its one aim the communication of this 
knowledge.278 
 
Andy Hamilton explains Schopenhauer’s theory as “art as a form of knowledge…while 
ordinary perception is focused on particular material objects, aesthetic perception attends 
to the permanent ideas behind them.”279 And, according to Graham, “Collingwood, in 
contrast to Schopenhauer…thinks the value of art lies in its character as the expression of 
feeling, and not some special apprehension of reality.”280  More to the point, Graham 
states elsewhere on Collingwood “the end of art is self-knowledge, knowledge of our 
own emotional state.”281  Colingwood argues in The Principles of Art “to know ourselves 
is the foundation of all life that develops beyond the mere psychical level or 
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experience.”282  So, for him self-knowledge is the value of art, both for individual and 
community.  The idea of community and an individual in the larger community is 
important in determining value for the Dewey.  
Dewey, according to Beardsley, “emphasized the continuity of aesthetic 
experience and life, and has pleaded the cause of the arts as of the highest value to human 
beings because of their uniting and liberating effect.”283  The inherent value of music for 
Dewey lies in the uniqueness of the aesthetic experience it offers.  For another twentieth 
century philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, Beardsley writes that Whitehead argued 
the arts are important particularly in education because “they help people to see things as 
wholes, in their concrete organicity, rather than becoming prey to abstractions.”284  For 
Langer, a significationist, “the significance of the musical image always derives from 
what it shows us of the quality of motion, of passage, of felt time, and most importantly 
feeling.”285  The inherent value of music for her is, “the education of feeling, as our usual 
schooling in factual subjects…is the education of thought.”286  Later, Bowman writes 
what nicely sums up her perspective on the inherent view of music: “music presents us 
with…an image that reveals to us the otherwise hidden truth about how feelings feel.”287  
Each of these aforementioned arguments on the topic on value—whether from Aristotle, 
Schopenhauer, Collingwood, Dewey, or Langer—embrace instrumental and/or inherent 
perspectives on value.  In other words, art has an extraartistic, or in the case of music, an 
extramusical function.  That is the value of the work, process, and/or experience, though 
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not wholly separated from the object, is rooted in the subjective (individual or collective).  
The idea of being extramusical emphasizes what the music helps to accomplish rather 
than what it is.  What it does, or its end, may not be completely musically centered.  In 
the case of normative theory, however, it is argued that the extramusical value necessarily 
comes through contact with music, and, therefore, music is unique in what it 
accomplishes as compared to sports, for example.  This was discussed above in the earlier 
section on value quoting Kieran and is based on the difference between instrumental 
value and intrinsic value, ideas primarily tied to why music matters.  
Last, for Adorno, “the value of modernist artworks lies in their truth and not in 
any pleasure that that they may occasion.”288  Adorno’s assertion, however, brings to 
light a problem for art and music, which is its truth content.  However, since truth is 
primarily an epistemic concern, it will not be covered in my research.  In relation to value 
theory, his view on the value of art is more instrumentalist than utilitarian because it is a 
step back from the Marxist notion of nonneutrality.  Paradoxically it is also rooted in 
formalism because the aesthetician is supposed to look upon the music as music.  Adorno 
does not say that music must always promote or interfere with ideology.  Instead his 
conception of the value of modern music is broader because of “its capacity to confront 
and challenge consciousness or awareness, and to undermine ‘false consciousness’ rooted 
in stereotype and habit.”289  Bowman goes on to argue that 
by wrenching music from the realm of autonomous, aesthetic insularity, Adorno 
paved the way for explanations of music’s nature and value that challenge some 
of music philosophy’s most cherished and time honored beliefs.  As something 
that is fundamentally and invariably social, music is never innocent, never pure.  
In fact, myths of purity and innocence themselves serve the sociopolitical end of 
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masking music’s social complicity, sustaining the social status quo while going 
unacknowledged, unexamined, and unchallenged.290 
 
Arguments regarding the value of music are contested.  If a problem of a 
particular value theory ever appears to be close to resolution, countless new questions and 
challenges arise from those offering opposing solutions.  This generative quality of 
problems in musical aesthetics in relation to nature, meaning and value will likely result 
in reflexivity and the better articulation and understanding of how we think about and 
experience music.  Take for example the work of Adorno, who, according to Wayne 
Bowman, forced a reflexive reexamination of tradition in the field of musical aesthetics.  
By arguing that music is “concentrated social substance,” Adorno not only caused a 
reassessment of long standing beliefs, but by doing so he also broadened the field of 
musical aesthetics which led to an arguably more complete understanding of how we 
think about and experience music.  On a much smaller scale, developing a more complete 
understanding of the philosophical discourse of music educators from 1907 to 1958 will 
enhance our understanding of the philosophy of music education as it relates to musical 
aesthetics.  The task of examining, interpolating and analyzing the evidence through the 
lens of what is the crux and substance of musical aesthetics proposed in this chapter 
enables a deeper understanding of the philosophy of music education in roughly the first 
half of the twentieth century. 
Musical aesthetics, in this chapter, is related as follows: music defined as X or Y 
means either Q or R, and since music reveals Q or R, it may be judged to be good or bad, 
or is important, because of A or B.  Arriving at this point is important in order for an 
orderly analysis of the discourse of music educators to take place. Because of the 
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complexity involved, brevity was not possible.  I do not claim to have covered in detail 
every aspect of each problem or theory, and I have likely left out problems or theories 
and examples in each category of musical aesthetics other researchers will undoubtedly 
criticize me for omitting.  What I have included, however, is, based on an examination of 
the evidence.  What is covered in the subsequent chapters are cases where musical 
aesthetics was an integral part of the discourse in music education from 1907 to 1958.  
By revealing the essence of the discourse of musical aesthetics in music education prior 
to the music as MEAE movement, I achieve the purpose of exposing music educators to a 
deeper understanding of the philosophical discussion relating to the aesthetics.  The 
material presented in this chapter is a way of looking at the discourse of the period that 
moves beyond Mark’s limited interpretation.  The evidence I present in chapters three, 
four, and five revises the limited and confusing conventional views of philosophical 
discourse from 1907 to 1958. 
Part III – Problems with the Conventional View 
It is confusing to determine which of the three alternatives relating to philosophy 
of music education (mere rationale, absence of, or utilitarian) best captures the essences 
of discourse in the period prior to 1958.  Part of the confusion is the result of two papers 
published by Mark.  In his “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from 
Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” Mark writes “Basic Concepts was the philosophical 
culmination, in the United States at least, of thousands of years of utilitarian philosophy.  
Several authors discussed music education philosophy in utilitarian terms.”291  While in 
“A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic Education” he argues: 
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first, the new philosophy brought closure to the venerable relationships between 
music education and societal philosophy…second, the new philosophy did not 
replace an older philosophy.  Instead, its advocates attempted to offer a more 
respectable intellectual support system than could be imparted by the variety of 
rationales that had previously served as a sort of ersatz philosophy.292 
 
It is a mistake to think it possible to have it both ways.  Either there was a philosophy or 
there was not.  The use of the word “new” also implies that something had come before.  
McCarthy and Goble, in “The Praxial Philosophy in Historical Perspective,” also label 
the notion of MEAE a “new” philosophy.293  Again, the use of the term hints at there 
being philosophy prior to the so called new one since there is a developmental quality to 
history, be it dialectical or synthetic.  In Mark’s and Gary’s third edition of A History of 
American Music Education, they suggest that when the influence that progressive 
education philosophy had on a number of school disciplines faded in education, so too 
did a philosophy that would unify the field of music education.294  Mark and Gary 
continue, “One of the most critical needs of the music education profession was a central 
unifying philosophy to replace the philosophical support of progressive education.”295   
This argument denies that any meaningful philosophical writing relating expressly to 
music education came from within the field prior to 1958, and if there was anything 
philosophical being discussed, it came from a philosophy outside the arts and from 
individuals outside of music education.  This most recent historical evidence points to 
there being philosophy but only one category of philosophy (utilitarian) and only as it 
applies to a larger context and still only one provided by a general movement in 
education embraced unilaterally by music educators.  The resolution of the muddled 
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meaning surrounding what existed philosophically prior to the late 1950s is another 
reason for reexamining the evidence of this earlier period.  This reexamination of the 
evidence from the lens of aesthetics clears up what is portrayed as empty, ambiguous, or 
monistic. 
 The standard interpretation that pre-MEAE philosophy either did not exist or was 
exclusively utilitarian as suggested by Mark, implies that previous statements made by 
the writers and thinkers within music education are somehow philosophically empty.  
The early statements given by pre-1958 music educators are often currently understood 
only as mere justification or rationale for teaching the subject in schools.  Not only is this 
a conclusion that deserves investigating because it relies on an examination of evidence 
based on a narrow conception of philosophy of music education prior to 1958, but it is 
also an example of a phenomenon whereby contemporary attitudes, ideas, and thoughts 
are seen as somehow superior to the attitudes, ideas and thoughts of the past.  Little credit 
is given to the work of past writers and thinkers as contributing in meaningful ways to 
what is argued as a significant happening in more recent times.296  Change is privileged 
over continuity.  Assertions that pre-MEAE scholarly writing was either not 
philosophical or philosophically empty, or utilitarian, lead to a logical argument that there 
was a significant change or philosophical shift that occurred in 1958.  What results from 
the shift is argued to be in some way superior, but more importantly as distinct and 
unique, to what came before.  It implies that there was no discourse on issues central to 
aesthetics until 1958.    
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It is not possible at one moment to describe the philosophy of music education as 
utilitarian and at another moment to argue that there was rationale without philosophy 
prior to 1958.  It cannot simultaneously be both, and it does not leave open the option that 
there were other philosophical discussions taking place.  Regardless of the chosen 
position of either case, whether the philosophy that existed was utilitarian as stated in 
Mark’s “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” or 
if there was only rationale as he argues in “A Historical Interpretation of Aesthetic 
Education,” the portrayal of the so-called new direction in philosophy of music education 
is one in which MEAE is still seen as novel.  By showing that there was philosophical 
discourse prior to 1958, music education can move beyond the notion that discussions 
about music were based primarily on its practical social, economic, and political utility. 
Another reason additional scholarship on the topic of philosophical discourse 
prior to 1958 in music education is significant is that the underlying assumptions 
originating in contemporary scholarship are based on non sequitor argumentation and 
lead to the hasty conclusion that utilitarian philosophy guided practice just as the MEAE 
philosophy was advanced to do.  The lack of any formalized or clearly articulated 
statements of philosophy does not necessarily mean that there was an absence of 
philosophy or that philosophy played little or no part in intellectual developments and 
discourse in music education circles at the time.  In fact, there was meaningful 
philosophical discourse in music education prior to 1958, and this study shows a more 
comprehensive and accurate depiction of the period. 
  The evidence used to support the standard interpretation results in a non 
sequitor.  What the standard view espouses is a philosophy for music education (a 
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rationale for music’s inclusion in the curriculum) instead of a philosophy of music 
education (the principles meant to guide the practice of music instruction).  It is a non 
sequitor because the interpretation assumes a link exists between utilitarian philosophy 
and practice—just as the movement for MEAE philosophy did by tying together a 
rationale for the support of formal music classes with a philosophy that guides and 
informs instruction—and is problematic because it relies on the belief that a philosophy 
and purpose for music education is identical to philosophy and practice of music 
education; it neglects any emphasis on the relation of philosophy as a guide to actual 
classroom instruction in favor of a wider view of the importance of music for society.  
The widely accepted view of the so-called utilitarian philosophy for music education and 
the obvious and expressly extramusical claims attached to it have affected the degree to 
which attention has been given to what the leaders within the field of music education 
emphasized in the way of music’s nature, meaning, and value.297  Embedded within the 
problem of a limited view of pre-MEAE philosophical discourse is the notion that any 
philosophical support was given by those outside the field.298  This idea is likely to have 
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had an effect on the degree to which attention has been given to what the leaders within 
the field of music education said about the field themselves.  In summary, the 
philosophical discourse in music education is more complex than previously thought. 
The crux of the standard interpretation is that it was not until the MEAE 
movement that music was taught in a manner that was primarily for the sake of music and 
musical understanding.  This line of reasoning suggests that there was no philosophical 
discourse present that emphasized the nature, meaning, and value of music—this was 
only something to come as a result of the music as aesthetic education movement.  
Although utilitarian philosophy was a philosophy that occasionally guided practice, it did 
not uniformly manifest itself that way prior to the MEAE movement. Furthermore, to 
assert that a utilitarian philosophy was the sole philosophy in music education assumes 
that what was going on in the larger field of education directed what went on in terms of 
guiding music instruction and that progressive philosophy only rested on utilitarian 
premises.  Both of these ideas result from a narrow and limited conception of philosophy 
and its purposes.  Framing an entire period where many dynamic events occurred 
(philosophical and otherwise) is an oversimplification.  
The characterization of any period in time as being particularly static deserves 
questioning.   The period before 1958 was an extremely dynamic time in music 
education.  For example, the orchestra and band movements in schools in the United 
States were well underway.  The child study movement was popular, and music teacher 
preparation was moving out of the normal school and into colleges and universities and 
was becoming more rigorous and formal.  The confluence of these factors created a 
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vibrant atmosphere in music education that provided fertile ground for questions and 
discussions relating to practice to occur.  Furthermore, since course offerings in music 
expanded to include not only band and orchestra but also appreciation and theory, 
discourse on topics in aesthetics were opened up for discussion.  Specific examples of the 
combination of expanded course offerings in relation to instruction in the music 
classroom are the works of Thomas Tapper whose writings include elements of tonal 
theory in addition to utilitarian values such as good citizenship.   
The inclusion of musical understanding is problematic for the standard 
interpretation of philosophy of music education.  In addition to his book The Music 
Supervisor: His Training, Influence and Opportunity,299 which deals with the topic of 
justifying music in the curriculum based on so-called utilitarian rationale, there are also 
two published books of his on harmony300 that were designed for use in the music 
classroom.  What is absent in the harmony books is any mention of music for utilitarian 
purposes.  The focus is on understanding tone, tone combination, and tone thought, all 
formalist ideas about music.  In other words, the focus is on helping students to achieve 
greater musical understanding of “tonally moving forms,”301 not on how the student can 
be a contributing member of society.  It is, therefore, difficult to believe that a teacher 
ignored the phrasing of a particular passage, the tone quality emanating from the clarinet 
section, or attempted to get students to imagine the emotions of the composer while 
expounding on the piece’s supposed civic value.   
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If the discourse was more than a rationale of utilitarian philosophy, then what did 
the philosophical discourse of the period 1907 to 1958 look like?  The next three chapters 
show what the conventional view argues does not exist.  The evidence presented on the 
following pages, using the analytical framework established in this chapter, shows that 
the philosophical discourse of the period was in fact rich, varied, insightful, and 
pervasive. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NATURE 
 If philosophy of music education from 1907 to 1958, more specifically discourse 
relating to musical aesthetics during the period, could be described using sonic 
terminology, the closest is the Greek word συµφωνία (symphonia), or symphony.  
Translated it means a sounding together, a harmony.  The problem with using the word 
symphony is that it implies a sense of acting in concert; also implied is a degree of unity 
and a traditional and pleasing consonance, which the discourse does not fully express.  
Cacophony is no more accurate because there were themes and threads that existed in the 
historical material.  The discourse of the time was much more than a meaningless, 
discordant, and harsh mixture of sound.  The perspectives that reflected and advanced 
ideas from musical aesthetics by the writers and thinkers in the field of music education 
did follow some distinct and semi-predictable patterns.  Quite often, however, multiple 
philosophical points of view are held or seen by an individual in one piece of work or 
over a scholar’s lifetime.  Additionally the aesthetic views held by one music educator at 
a given point in time, sometimes incompatible, were not always held unanimously by the 
entire group but were often one of several.  Change in perspective from one point in time 
to another or one view in opposition to others is not uncommon.  Edward Lippman states 
Richard Wagner’s treatises and essays in the field of aesthetics fall externally into 
five groups separated from one another by intervals of ten years…this body of 
writings contains a remarkable variety of aesthetic ideas, some of which 
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contradict each other, a circumstance that is not surprising in view of the span of 
time involved.1 
 
Consensus of perspective was not the case when it came to discourse relating to musical 
aesthetics in music education.  In fact the evidence supports that views in the field of 
music education during the period relating to musical aesthetics were not only present but 
also varied, noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music 
educators.  Like much in history the perspectives were not a spontaneously or perfectly 
formed set of ideas with accompanying meanings; the ideas were not like the stories 
about the spontaneous birth of Aphrodite or Dionysus.  The thoughts of these writers 
were articulated over time and in time – there was a sense of “sounding together.” 
 The evidence reveals two types of material relating to musical aesthetics on the 
topics of music’s nature, meaning, and value.  The first type of matter includes examples 
where musical aesthetics are at the core of the topic being addressed.  To put it another 
way, musical aesthetics, or a component of it, is specifically addressed, and in some cases 
the purpose of the work is to advance an idea from the discipline of musical aesthetics.  
For example, Will Earhart’s The Meaning and Teaching of Music blends his scholarly 
discovery of the interconnected problems of “philosophy, aesthetics, psychology, and the 
practice of teaching.”2  Often the works of the first type use the work of a particular 
philosopher or aesthetic theory to argue and advance an idea as to what the nature, 
meaning, or value of music and music education is.  The second type of material is less 
explicit regarding its author’s use of ideas relating to musical aesthetics.  By this I mean 
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the scholar was making or advancing an idea on a topic that was not expressly 
philosophical but rather echoed or reflected a particular or underlying philosophical 
perspective.  Gleaning or interpolating an implied aesthetic position or view such as the 
relation of words to music in a work that purports to be about the instruction of choral 
music is an example.  A specific example of the second type of material is Ralph 
Peterson’s “The Unaccompanied Choir—Its Relation to Expressive Speech”3  In this 
paper he argues that a highly trained a cappella singing emphasizing “beautiful speech” 
leads to “more expressive singing”4 while also embracing a significationist perspective in 
what he wants to see choral directors do in practice.  In other words, while a particular 
scholar is conveying, elaborating, or explaining the integration of music with other 
courses in the curriculum, for example, he/she may knowingly or subconsciously accept 
and/or use certain premises and points of view from Dewey’s assessment in Art as 
Experience of the meaning of music. 
 Differentiation between the two types of material is necessary against the 
backdrop or accompaniment of multiple philosophical perspectives (sometimes even 
occurring in one document).  One type of material contains an argument advancing one 
or more ideas from musical aesthetics while another is an echo or reflection of arguments 
borrowed from musical aesthetics.  References to the nature of music, for example, were 
frequently embedded within conversations on meaning and value, so it is helpful to see 
which type of material—first or second—the writer used.  Some material had the nature 
of music as a main idea in the work and referenced various philosophers or theories to 
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support or advance a particular view.  Other papers mentioned the nature of music in a 
casual manner and/or merely as a supporting idea for another point being made.  Just 
because one was a music educator did not mean every aspect of the nature of music was 
thoroughly translated and explored.   When a particular point of view or problem was 
explored, it also did not mean the nature of music was the only topic discussed.  Finally, 
music educators of the period who may have felt or thought they understood what music 
is in a deeper way than did a typical philosopher untrained in music still did not advance 
a unified view of the nature of music.  On the surface it seems musicians should 
understand the nature of music, but after further analysis a variety of perspectives emerge 
on what music really was. 
 Reasons for differing views on the nature of music also varied.  Although the 
reason for the differing views and their links with ideas on the nature, meaning, and value 
of music are difficult to state with certainty, some influences appear that give hints of 
perspectives.  One might have to do with a particular teacher’s outlook, education, and 
experience, a challenge to prove.  Another had to do with currents in the field of 
education happening at the time such as the so-called progressive education movement, 
which is seen in some of the evidence.  During this period in the field of music education, 
transformations also occurred that indicate a slight relation to the differing views on the 
categories of musical aesthetics—nature, meaning, and value.  The birth of the band and 
orchestra happened in the early decades of the twentieth century.  Additionally, music 
appreciation, theory, harmony, and eurhythmics courses were also offered in schools at 
the time.  For the sake of clarity the material in this and the next chapter of this 
dissertation will be divided into two main categories.  The first category that shows 
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particular views on the nature, meaning, and value of music sorts the evidence according 
to the paper’s intended audience – Performance based courses (band, orchestra, and 
chorus).  The second category is the Non-performance courses, which includes music 
appreciation, harmony, theory, where an emphasis was placed on listening.  The second 
category contains two other designations however; generalized topics, which were 
papers, addresses, books, and archival material geared toward the field of music 
education writ large; the second grouping deals with the integration movement in vogue 
during the later decades of the period.  What the remainder of this dissertation looks like 
organizationally is straightforward.   
Each chapter places the evidence into two main sections (performance and non-
performance based material).  And within each section the evidence is comingled 
between the first type of material (musical aesthetics as central to the work) and the 
second (the underlying influence and reflection of ideas seen in musical aesthetics) 
depending upon the musical aesthetics idea being addressed in that space.  The chapters 
are aligned with my view of what musical aesthetics is set out earlier in this work.  
Nature is the subject of chapter three; Meaning is the subject of chapter four; and Value is 
the subject of chapter five.  The intention of organizing the material in this manner is for 
increased focus and clarity of thought as well as for reinforcing assertions made at the 
beginning of this dissertation.  The material presented will show that instead of a time 
that has been characterized as a barren philosophical wasteland, the writings and 
addresses of music educators involving musical aesthetics was varied, noteworthy, 
insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators.  There is more 
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continuity than the standard interpretation allows between the MEAE movement and 
what existed before. 
Musical aesthetics was part of the discourse from 1907 to 1958.  The nature of 
music was one element in musical aesthetics that existed in the evidence of the time.  
Discourse about the characteristics of music occurred in both types of material (as an 
echo of underlying influence from musical aesthetics and musical aesthetics as a central 
part of the work) as well as in the two main sections in the forthcoming chapter 
(performance based and non-performance based work).  Additionally, arguments about 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be considered music 
incorporated views and perspectives from expressivist, intuitionist, experientialist, and 
formalist standpoints.  Not everyone, however, was convinced of the degree to which 
music educators were aware of the nature of music or at least certain aspects of it.  Will 
Earhart, for example, wrote “musicians and teachers of music persistently overlooked the 
aesthetic importance of tone.”5  The differing levels of awareness of the nature of music 
among music educators can be attributed to the fact that these teachers and musicians 
were continually surrounded by tone. The issue of tone is also not the only avenue to 
explore the nature of music. 
Performance Based Courses - Chorus 
Aesthetic theories on the nature of music such as formalism, expressivism, and 
significationism, are seen in the evidence related to performance based courses.  Trends 
emerge in the writings of those on choral music in relation to particular theories on the 
nature of music.  Whereas the performance based work of music educators speaking on 
                                                 
5 Earhart, The Meaning and Teaching of Music, 66.  Tone, for the formalist, is something that 
separates music from other arts, and as such is a unique characteristic of music. 
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issues relating to instrumental music shares many of the same views as the choral 
component, the themes are not as consistent.  Topics in the discourse relating to choral 
music frequently reflected or advanced expressivist views including those of Tolstoy’s 
emotional expression, Croce’s intuition, and Dewey’s experientialism as well as those of 
significationist thought that suggest “music is an iconic sign of a psychological process.  
It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does so by presenting auditory 
equivalents to some structural or kinetic aspect of that life.”6  While these ideas appeared 
in the evidence on topics relating to instrumental music, there were also leanings to the 
formalist and objectivist mindsets.  Rarely, however, did either the vocal group or the 
instrumental group dig into problems on the topic of the nature of music that went 
beyond the categories of musical aesthetics.  Problems like the extent to which regional 
and kinetic patterns of music create greater or lesser degrees of unity in particular pieces 
of music, or what it is that arouses expectation in music were largely absent.  Mention of 
problems on form, structure, and texture might emerge from time to time, but these 
discussions were limited in terms of scope, depth, and frequency.  Regardless of some of 
the inconsistencies pointed out, the discourse on the nature of music was an important 
aspect of the musical aesthetics conversation in performance based courses. 
Instances where the nature of music is part of the conversation reveals in the 
evidence perspectives that are more often associated with a particular theory rather than 
in relation to a given historical context.  W. Otto Miessner wrote, “Art in its LOWEST 
form is but an imitation of Nature…in the HIGHEST form it is an expression of 
                                                 
6 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 333. 
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SPIRITUAL ideals.”7  In this paper Miessner delves into the teaching of the aesthetic 
drawing on Platonic, expressivist, voluntarist, German idealist, and significationist 
positions for the purpose of showing how these ideas are valuable in the teaching and 
production of good vocal music.  For Miessner, reflecting a hybrid expressivist and 
voluntarist view, “imagination is the magical Aladdin’s lamp which kindles the divine 
spark in an art expression, and transforms…mere vocal utterances into expressions full of 
vitality, action, feeling.”8  The core of Miessner’s idea is that music necessarily includes 
“a sense of proportion, of harmony, of designs and the contrasting elements of unity and 
variety,”9 and the use of imagination.  The roles of the teacher and vocalist are important 
because through the use of imagination in music as the latter imitates or expresses, the 
artist can transform the conditions in nature or of feeling or emotion into something 
explicit.10  His ideas on the nature of music that incorporate a variety of influences are 
not unusual. 
Synthesizing the essence of a particular theory’s argument in musical aesthetics 
with another regardless of the degree of compatibility was common among music 
educators at the time.  The synthetic practice of joining this idea with that is common 
practice in philosophical and historical scholarship, and sometimes this practice can 
generate sophisticated results.  Synthesis, however, can also cause compatibility 
problems that may not be resolved over the course of a brief paper or address.  For some 
music educators the synthesis of ideas was the result of trying to advance an argument for 
                                                 
7 W. Otto Miessner, “The Child Voice in Song Interpretation,” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Fifth Annual Meeting St. Louis, MO March 19-22, 1912 
(Privately printed, 1912), 29-35, 29. 
8 Ibid., 34. 
9 Ibid., 32. 
10 Ibid., 33. 
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one thing and using supporting evidence from multiple perspectives to do that.  
Sometimes it worked, and in other instances it did not.  An example of a successful 
attempt at synthesis could be incorporating views from Deweyan thought on the 
integration of music with various subjects in the curriculum and using arguments 
suggesting the value of music is instrumental.  A less successful attempt could be 
defending the practice of learning to read the notes of music using formalist and 
significationist arguments on the nature of music.  In either case there is evidence that 
suggests ideas from musical aesthetics were incorporated in the written work of music 
educators. 
D.A. Clippinger, a voice teacher and scholar from Chicago, explained in 1914 
what he meant by “musicianship.”  For him the concept includes, “melody, harmony, 
tonality, the control of the vast amount of material constituting music…[and] the 
development of tone quality and taste.”11  Formalist notions of music are implicit in his 
understanding of musicianship as it relates to the nature of music.  For the formalist the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of music are the musical combinations of notes on the 
staff paper, and for Clippinger this takes the form of “melody, harmony, tonality,” the 
stuff that “constitutes music.”  Clippinger goes on to say, “The singing tone is round, full, 
rich, steady, resonant, and sympathetic, and these elements of good tone must all be 
definitely fixed in the mind of the singer or they will never be expressed though his 
voice.”12  While this statement still contains formalist tendencies such as “full,” “steady,” 
and “resonant” it begins to address elements contained in expressivist theory.  The phrase 
                                                 
11 D.A. Clippinger, “The Training of a Singer,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1, 1914  
(Privately printed, 1914), 87-101, 94. 
12 Ibid., 95. 
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“sympathetic expressions” gives away the expressivist view.  Later in the paper he fully 
embraces the expressivist position on the nature of music.  He writes, “Art is a transfer of 
feeling, and the feeling is not in the medium…when we listen to the orchestra, the music 
is what we feel…real art therefore consists of pure feeling rather than material objects.”13  
Clippinger does not stop with combining formalist and expressivist views on the nature 
of music; he also adds hints of German idealism.   
Quoting Whistler, Clippinger writes, “Art is an expression of eternal, absolute 
truth.”14  This idea, when coupled with the latter’s next statement that “Music begins 
where speech leaves off.  It can awaken one’s feelings, emotions, and aspirations which 
are beyond speech”15 displays echoes of Schopenhauer and Schiller.  By using elements 
of formalist, expressivist, and German idealist thought on the nature of music Clippinger 
effectively argues for the musical teaching of singing and the development of 
musicianship but at a philosophical cost.  Although the tenets of formalism, expressivism, 
and German idealism are embedded in his argument and reflect his philosophical 
approach to teaching singing, he does not bother with the fact that the formalist position 
does not accept music as analogous to feelings.  For that matter he also does not wrestle 
with whether the embodied feeling was the composer’s—an expressivist view—or if it 
was an expression of the metaphysical Idea—a German idealist view. 
Clippinger’s work is an example of something that reflects some sense of musical 
aesthetics, and the use of this awareness is used to support his idea of teaching.  It is also 
an example that shows how certain ideas were synthesized but not in any thorough or 
successful way.  This piece was also not written for the purpose of advancing an 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 96. 
14 Ibid., 99. 
15 Ibid. 
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argument where one philosophical position is shown to have particular merits while 
another is argued to be deficient.  An example of a work that uses merits and defects of 
certain philosophical perspectives in a synthetic manner comes from Will Earhart. 
In The Meaning and Teaching of Music Earhart argues for the development of the 
aesthetic attitude.  He says, “instead of projecting ourselves into the objective world that 
we might master it, we should accept ourselves as the central fact and allow the world to 
enter us, then we should have exchanged the factual for the meaningful.”16  Throughout 
the book he cites the work of Bell (formalist), Henri Bergson (intuitionist), Santayana 
(expressivist) by name and Croce by implication.  Here, however, the specific concern is 
with the nature of music as it relates to singing.  On this topic Earhart shows the 
characteristic arguments of two theories for the purpose of using these ideas to advance 
his own.  First he cites the work of Richard Wagner, specifically his Opera and Drama 
(1851)17 where Wagner argues music is “emotional speech” or “tonal speech.”18  
“Emotional” or “tonal” speech, according to Wagner, is the beginning and end of verbal 
speech.19  This so-called emotional speech, as related by Earhart, “arose through the 
feeling of the utterer and were intuitively understood by the feeling of the hearer.”20  So, 
                                                 
16 Earhart, The Meaning and Teaching of Music, 50. 
17 According to Lippman this work was written during the period Wagner espoused the theory of 
emotional realism in aesthetics.  Lippman explains the idea of emotional realism as music that contains 
“specific and clearly defined feelings along with representation of external scenes and events…the ideal 
was vocal music rather than instrumental, and in particular opera, in which the greatest realism and force 
could be achieved and the feelings in fact made coincident and apparently identical with those of 
experience outside music.  The central subject matter was sensuous and erotic feeling, which found direct 
and forceful expression.”  Lippman, A History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 239. 
18 Earhart use of the phrase “emotional speech” is from the W. Ashton Ellis translation of 
Wagner’s Opera and Drama (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd., 1900).  Tonal speech is 
the translation given by Lippman, which is likely his own translation since he reads German.  Lippman, A 
History of Western Musical Aesthetics, 256. 
19 Lippman, A History, 256.  From Richard Wagner, Opera and Drama (1851), 91  
20 Earhart, The Meaning and Teaching of Music, 85.  Italics in the original. 
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for Earhart, Wagner saw music as “an art of expression.”21  In opposition to Wagnerian 
aesthetics, Earhart juxtaposes the notion that music’s origins are based on “natural 
sonorities” and, therefore, are characteristically instrumental, not vocal.22  The “natural 
sonorities” theory on the origins of music are based in both Platonic mimesis and 
formalist views on the nature of music.  That is, the tone is paramount and the 
combination of tones imitates sounds originally found in nature and as such are good.  
For Earhart, ‘instrumental music is more specifically musical than song because its entire 
appeal lies in the musical field and is not derived from associated interests connoted by 
song text.”23  Earhart’s critique of the locus of each of these theories led to his assertion 
that the teacher is to arouse in the mind of the student what is contained in the mind of 
the musician, namely “tones, tunes, harmonies, rhythms, forms, which shape themselves 
again and again in his imagination, to his absorbed delight.”24  More specifically, it is 
“musical power…which is to be educated,” and for Earhart, “those powers are…an 
aesthetic sensitivity to tone (the very substance of music) in all its colors, degrees of 
force, ranges of pitch, melodic undulations, modes of rhythmic motions, and 
architectonic arrangements.”25  Earhart’s argument shows the synthesis of assertions from 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 86.  Earhart’s examples regarding choral performance are linked with expressivism. One 
example of the link between choral music and expressivism in Earhart’s book is a brief critique where he 
relates the teaching of music to a kindergartner or first grader.  He says “if we assume concrete life-
situations interest him—and they do; but not musically—we will bring him song-texts of more or less 
literal character, and of less or more poetic quality, and hang theses on questionable tunes that owe their 
dubious nature to the fact that they were regarded as subsidiary to the main purpose anyway.”  Ibid., 92. 
Italics in the original 
22 Ibid., 87-88.  Earhart labels this “pleasure-of-the-Ear-in-Tone theory.” 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Ibid., 118. 
25 Ibid., 119-120.  He continues to explain his idea of the aesthetic sensitivity to be developed 
through education by suggesting that since it is “aesthetic and moving, [it] is not a present sense-perception 
alone, but leaves a residue of auditory imagery which forms the substance of whatever musicalness there is 
in the child and constitutes the foundation of all further development.  To add to this stock of imagery, not 
only in the way of remembering pieces but also in the way of remembering general musical effects, and to 
promote active dealings in these.” 
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various ideas originating in musical aesthetics.  Although his writing on this subject is 
mainly formalist, he advances a philosophical position intended to have an influence in 
music education practice as it relates to performance. 
Earhart’s views are an exception to my argument that the majority of 
philosophical perspectives on musical aesthetics in relation to vocal performance are 
expressivist.  He does, however, acknowledge that in the field of music education, 
expressivist ideas are common in the instruction of songs—more will be said on this 
point in the subsequent chapter on meaning.  Expressivist and significationist 
perspectives on the nature of music in relation to vocal music that reflect and advance 
philosophical views persist through 1957.  During the years of World War II and in the 
period thereafter, however, there is less material on the nature of music in the work done 
on vocal music.  The material from 1941 through 1957 is mainly a reflection of 
underlying ideas in musical aesthetics, and when these ideas are present they are often 
tied to some aspect of patriotism.  For example, in “The Code for the National Anthem of 
the United States of America” it is written, “since the message of the Anthem is carried 
largely in the text, it is essential that emphasis be placed upon the singing of the Star-
Spangled Banner.”26  Furthermore, and continuing along significationist lines, “the 
slighting of note value in the playing or singing of the National Anthem seriously impairs 
the beauty and effectiveness of both music and lyric.”27  When vocals are part of the 
music, as the above example shows, it is difficult to extricate textual meaning from ideas 
about pitch, rhythm, and harmony as well as other musical qualities such as kinetic 
                                                 
26 “The Code for the National Anthem of the United States of America,” Music Education Source 
Book, ed. Hazel Nohavec Morgan  (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1951) , 239.  (page 
citations are to the Fourth Printing 1951). 
27 Ibid. 
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pattern or unity.  Vocal music has a straightforward connection to expressivist and 
significationist notions of the nature of music.  The same does not hold for these 
theoretical perspectives on the nature of music as each is associated with music generated 
by the use of humanly constructed instruments. 
Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and  
Individual Instrument Classes 
 
Courses in instrumental music, which include band, orchestra, and various 
individual instrument classes in group format, such as piano or violin, shared many of the 
same general underlying philosophical ideas in relation to aesthetics as the vocal courses 
did.  Ideas reflected, advanced, and synthesized material from musical aesthetics but the 
difference, as stated earlier, was a greater—though not exclusive—association with 
formalist thought.28   
A reason for the link between formalist musical aesthetics and instrumental music 
is due to the fact that much music written for band or orchestra is absolute music.  
Absolute music, as described by Sigmund Spaeth,  
is music that depends entirely on its own material to establish a mood or create 
directly an emotional or intellectual response.  It has not descriptive title, nor does 
it lean on any other extraneous factors for support.  It is music pure and simple, 
with nothing but tones and time to carry its message…titles or playing directions 
may give a hint as to the gayety or somberness of their mood, but beyond this 
their message is absolute, an abstract proposition, entirely removed from the 
concrete except as it exists in the materials of music itself and the physical 
qualities of the interpreting instruments.29 
 
Absolute music is often juxtaposed in musical aesthetics with so-called program music, 
or music “which, by its title, or descriptive analysis, or its words, actions, scenery or 
accompanying pictures, tells a story, indicates a definite episode, hence follows a distinct 
                                                 
28 One notable exception to this argument may exist in the music written for marching band. 
29 Sigmund Spaeth, The Common Sense of Music (New York, NY: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation, 1924/1933), 86.  This book went through fifteen printings and three school editions. 
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program.”30  Program music need not necessarily be vocal music, but a good example of 
program music is opera.  Likewise, absolute music need not necessarily be instrumental.  
One example might be a chorus humming a piece that has no title.  The point is that the 
music written for the instrumentalist tends to be absolute, such as a Bach or Brahms 
concerto, and its descriptions, therefore, are more readily linked with formalism.  
Aestheticians could provide many counter examples, but in music education the 
association between formalism and instrumental performance is present.  For example, 
Lucy Markham Chinn, in posing a question to a fictitious piano class, asks “What is 
music?...finally, the idea is advanced that music is beautiful sound.”31  A formalist 
response for sure.  For her, “the objective is to begin study with the ear…first, about 
objectives outside music; then we notice the difference between tone and noise.”32  The 
importance given to listening in this example is in place so the piano student is better able 
to acquaint himself to music along formalist lines.  Formalism here, however, is only 
reflected in her argument, it serves as the aesthetic foundation of her practice, but there is 
no critique and problems with this perspective are not considered. 
 Earhart’s work is more sophisticated than Chinn’s because he advances a 
philosophical idea and relates it to instrumental performance.  Examining the merits and 
defects of expressivism, Earhart accepts for music education the formalist arguments of 
Bell and Edmund Gurney.  By using specific examples from Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony 
in C Minor, Op. 67 Earhart argues this monumental work  
expresses something in C-Minor; something that appears to need rather insistent 
reiteration; something that moves restlessly, urgently, but ‘without joy’; that now 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 85. 
31 Lucy Markham Chinn, “Piano Training in the First Year,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators 
National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 314-315. 
32 Ibid., 313. 
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thunders, now whispers, now gropes, now moves confidently; that is compounded 
of sounds by flutes that express flute-meanings; of sounds like timpani that 
express timpani-meanings and horn meanings.  If we seek more explicit 
‘explanation’ than this we shall probably descend for it.33 
 
While this example shows the link between formalist ideas and instrumental music, 
Earhart acknowledges that music education is not limited to instrumental music.  
Therefore, he advances formalist ideas for music education generally because for him  
if one does know, and is keenly responsive to, the factors that constitute music in 
general, he is then prepared to enjoy specific modes of employment of these 
factors that are represented in many compositions of different types.  The material 
presented to young children, therefore, does not represent repertory so much as it 
represents their introduction to tone, rhythm, color, form, design.34 
 
 The inner workings of a piece of music are at the heart of Brock McElheran’s 
argument for generating a more artistic performance.  Although he does not exclusively 
write about the instrumental ensemble, rehearsals of the instrumentalist occupies much of 
his attention.  For him, the use of theory in rehearsals, particularly harmony, “can speed 
up the learning of notes, correct bad intonation, and improve the aesthetic effect of a 
piece.”35  He takes ideas from musical aesthetics to justify his argument that the structure 
of music is important to pay attention to in rehearsals.  His critique of modern practice in 
rehearsal rests on the notion that “most musicians recognize the importance of phrasing 
and hidden themes, but in this age, relatively little time is spent in thinking about the 
aesthetic and emotional quality of structure.”36  Using formalist language regarding the 
nature of music, he makes a comparison between architecture and music.  McElheran 
writes, “It is not too far fetched [sic] to compare the element of structure in music with 
                                                 
33 Earhart, The Meaning and Teaching of Music, 72-73. 
34 Ibid., 105-106. 
35 Brock McElheran, “The Use of Theory in Rehearsal,” Music Educators Journal 36, no. 1 
(September–October 1949): 20, 52-53, 20. 
36 Ibid., 52. 
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the beauty of design in a statue or cathedral…the musical effect may be built up by 
counterpoint, fugue, fugal device, or by harmonic pattern, as is so often the case in 
Beethoven’s key relationships.”37  Rehearsal are then used to help students understand 
“the true nature of form in music”38 through emphasis on certain passages that allegedly 
resemble formal characteristics in the sister arts.   Oddly, the comparison does not rest on 
extramusical associations because what he is comparing is a matter of form and design 
not on what the design means or an emotion brought about by contact with the form 
itself.  Teaching for aesthetic effect and with aesthetic principles in mind was not limited 
to performance based courses.  Topics on and from musical aesthetics are also seen in the 
discourse in other areas of music education such as in the music appreciation class and in 
generalized address on music to the entire field. 
Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory, Harmony, and Music History 
 
 The next area of music education discourse reflecting underlying support or 
rejection of particular ideas in musical aesthetics and/or advancing certain views on the 
philosophical subject are found in the non-performance based evidence.  Like the 
previous section on the nature of music that distinguished the performance based material 
into two categories, the instrumental and the vocal, this section is also subdivided.  The 
first section includes perspectives and ideas from musical aesthetics in the classes where 
listening to music is emphasized.  Examples of these courses seen in many, but by no 
means all schools and mainly in the upper grades—junior and senior high—are music 
theory, music appreciation,39 harmony, and music history.  The material examined in the 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 53. 
38 Ibid. 
39 What music appreciation meant, consisted of, and was designed for was contested.  In an 
explanation that occupies a sort of middle ground, Russell Morgan suggests appreciation” is the chief 
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second division of this section includes topics generalized for all of music education not 
necessarily related to any specific category of music instruction previously mentioned 
and points of view regarding music in the curriculum.  Examples of these generalized 
topics include addresses and discussions like Karl Gehrkens “Ultimate Ends in Public 
School Music”40 and Lilla Belle Pitts’ “The Place of Music in a System of Education.”41  
Unlike the previous section the notion of the nature of music in non-performance based 
courses and in generalized discourse is more developed and recurrent throughout the 
period. 
 Because non-performance based courses necessarily spend less time learning such 
things as fingering technique or proper tonal production—the technical “how to” training 
                                                                                                                                                 
objective of singing, playing, and listening.  It consists chiefly of the development of right attitudes and 
emotional responses—reactions to musical stimuli.”   Russell Morgan, “Developing a Program for Music 
Education,” in Yearbook of the Music Supervisors National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors 
National Conference,1931), 61-66, 63.  Lillian Baldwin also defends a broad conception of what music 
appreciation is in her 1938 address to the MENC.  For her “the feature which distinguishes an appreciation 
class from all other musical activities is that here, history, biography, theory and illustrative playing and 
singing become means to an end which is neither knowledge nor performance but intelligent enjoyment of 
music.”  Lillian Baldwin, “Music Appreciation in General Classes and for Special Groups,” in Yearbook of 
the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938), 
191-194, 194.  Everyone did not accept these broad defenses of music appreciation classes.  In 1932, 
Thomas Briggs encapsulates the divide adequately in his statement “I seem to detect a distinct tendency to 
deprecate the teaching of appreciation without performance.”  Thomas Briggs “A Layman Listens to 
Musicians—and to Music,” in Yearbook of the Music Supervisors National Conference (Chicago, IL: 
Music Supervisors National Conference,1932), 36-41, 36.  On one side of the debate James Mursell asserts 
“First, you will do everything in your power to give the child ample experience in directed listening.  In this 
respect music education of the past years has been lamentably deficient.  Performance has enormously 
overshadowed listening.”  James Mursell, “The Claims of Music in the School Curriculum,” in Yearbook of 
the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference,1935), 
21-26, 22  Disagreeing,  J. F. Messenger writes “educationally, music is for the performer more than the 
listener.  I recognize the value of listening to good music, but that is not the greatest value.  Music is a form 
of expression of ideas and feelings, and as such it does not matter if there is no listener.  It is an expression 
of personality.”  J. F. Messenger, “Living Humanities,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National 
Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference,1935), 54-57, 56.  The modern 
derivation of this debate is seen in the disagreement between Bennett Reimer and David Elliott over 
musical understanding and musical knowledge. 
40 Karl Gehrkens, “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Eighth Annual Meeting Pittsburgh, PA March 22 – March 26, 1915 
(Privately printed, 1915), 55-76. 
41 Lilla Belle Pitts, “The Place of Music in a System of Education, ” in Thirty-Fifth Yearbook  of 
the National Society for the Study of Education  Part II Music Education, ed. Guy Montrose Whipple, 
Prepared by the Society’s Committee on Music Education (Bloomington, IN: Public School Publishing 
Company, 1936), 17-21. 
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elements of playing music—more class hours could be spent on a broader range of 
musical topics.  Examples of possible study include biographical information on 
composers or the elements of folk music infused into particular compositions.  A 
transformation from an emphasis solely on playing to one on a broader understanding of 
music is mentioned by Karl Gehrkens in his “Theory Courses for Students of Applied 
Music.”42  This is not to say that the leader of a performance group did not address 
musical topics as part of the class instruction.  I merely suggest that without the time 
required to put together a performance more time could be spent in the non-performance 
based course on a wide ranging variety of topics and subjects relating to music.  In other 
words, it is rare for the orchestra leader to explore the structure and evolution of choral 
music from the Troubadours to Palestrina and later to the Oratorio, while preparing for 
the upcoming festival or contest. 
 The broader range of topics that could be and were discussed in the non-
performance based courses allowed for a diverse number of perspectives on the nature of 
music.  Formalism in this period girds many thoughts on the nature of music.  In 
Osbourne McConathy’s 1910 address “High School Music” he described coursework 
undertaken at Chelsea High School in Chelsea, Michigan.   
Theoretical music…aims to develop the power to think in tones in correct melodic 
and harmonic relations…the training will develop a keen sensitiveness to the 
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beauties of rhythm, melody, and harmony, and will be a means to opening to them 
the inner purpose of the technical elements of composition.43 
 
Will Earhart presents the report of the Committee of High School Music at the 1912 
MSNC meeting.  Earhart, speaking for the group, argues there must be genuine musical 
knowledge that accompanies the teaching and learning of music.  For the committee 
genuine musical knowledge in music appreciation meant “analysis of the form and 
content of these [great composers’] compositions, together with contributory study of 
musical history, biography, form and forms, and THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF 
THE ELEMENTS AND LAWS OF MUSICAL BEAUTY.44  Not only are formalist 
notions of the nature of music present but this is also an example where practice is 
intended to be influenced, and with an underlying philosophical position.  Although the 
committee does not develop what “the elements and laws of musical beauty” are, it is 
implied that content and form provide the structure on which such elements and laws are 
investigated and realized.  Formalism persisted in its connection with discourse on the 
topic of music appreciation as can be seen in Earhart’s 1948 Music Educators Journal 
article “The Roots of Appreciation,” as well as Sudie Williams’ 1920 address “Music 
Appreciation in the Elementary Grades.”  Citing an unattributed source she conveys 
“music is stored up thought told in beautiful tones.”45  These examples contain 
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underlying formalist ideas.  A more sophisticated approach that cites formalist ideas and 
also exposes problems with differing viewpoints came from Earhart. 
 In relation to formalism in non-performance based courses, and in a philosophical 
manner, Earhart charges the materialist and empirical philosophy embraced by society 
and rooted in the work of Francis Bacon is epistemologically limited.  For Earhart, 
“science, then cannot guide us in moral and aesthetic matters.”46  He takes the aesthetic 
as another way of knowing and uses this idea to encourage teachers of music education to 
consider “(1) What is there in music to be appreciated? (2) What is the nature of 
appreciation? (3) What is its value in human life?”47  It is in response to the first question 
that Earhart supplies a formalist answer, which he acknowledges is adopted from 
Goodhart Rendel’s definition of music in Fine Art.  He asserts, “the material of music is 
commonly said to be tone.”48  In a subsequent passage his formalist position is advanced 
while critiquing expressivism and intending to influence practice.  For him,  
tone is also the one exclusive and distinguishing possession of 
music…considering the universality of response to tone, its basic character, its 
intensity, and its value, it would appear that to seek beauty and purity of tone, and 
develop discrimination with respect to it, in every form of musical activity, should 
be the paramount concern of every teacher…the majestic beauties of form also 
come forth in clearer relief when programmatic and highly emotional interests are 
not advanced to the forefront of attention.49 
 
Although Earhart’s position on the nature of music shows a formalist influence in relation 
to appreciation, his work is still typical of many music education scholars. 
 His work, while incorporating ideas from musical aesthetics, blends two or more 
theoretical perspectives.  Earhart’s writings, as will be shown throughout this dissertation, 
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display aspects of formalism, but however highly he regarded it, it was not the only 
theory for which he expressed support.  “The Roots of Appreciation” is a good example 
of his embracing more than one perspective on the nature of music.  He both 
acknowledges expressivism as a valid position while simultaneously calling into question 
some of the basic tenets of the theory.  For example, and in reference to the nature of 
music, he recognizes “in all the arts, aestheticians find three factors, namely Material, 
Form, and Expression.”50  By taking Santayana’s headings on the nature of art as 
“Material, Form, and Expression” from the philosopher’s The Sense of Beauty and using 
these to justify his argument that music be taught more thoughtfully, Earhart gives tacit 
support to expressivism.  And it is under the heading of expressivism that he both 
supports and calls the theory into question by exposing a major problem with it.  He 
writes, “All agree that any work of art seems somehow to be expressive.  The difficulty 
begins when we ask what is expressed?”51  Here Earhart leans toward an expressivist 
view of a necessary and sufficient condition of music, namely that it is an expression, and 
then he does what formalist critics of expressivism typically do, and that is cast doubt on 
the precision of what is expressed.  More will be brought up on this topic in the chapter 
on meaning.  The point for now is to state that discourse on the nature of music was 
varied, and the variability sometimes happened within a single paper. 
 Variation on the nature of music also appears with regard to perspectives reflected 
and advanced from other theories such as Platonism, German idealism, and views fully in 
support of expressivism.  A.E. Winship argues in a characteristically German idealist 
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manner, “Music is physical and intellectual life spiritualized.”52  Similarly, in answering 
the question “What is appreciation?” Augustus Zanzig calls into questions tenets of 
formalism and an element of significationism by giving an explanation of music and 
music appreciation that reflects an underlying German idealist and Langerian view on 
musical aesthetics.  For him  
Music is often undistinguished from merely sensuous pleasure; from knowledge 
about music; or from the pride of performance…or it is identified with 
sentimentality and with delight in ‘pictures’ and stories supposed to be suggested 
by the music.  But to appreciate a man is to participate completely, self-
forgetfully, in his life; it is in the ideal sense, to live in him, and there feel the 
motion of his spirit, hidden from ordinary sight.  And so is it to appreciate music, 
which is an image of that inner motion.53 
 
Each of these authors asserts that the nature of music “affords intuitions or insights of 
profound transcendental significance.  Music is at once an end in itself and a means of 
spiritual elevation, at once fundamentally mindful and fundamentally felt.”54 
 The expressivist view on the nature of music is also found in the non-performance 
classes.  Franklin Dunham, in “A Music Understanding Course for the Junior High 
School” uses the expressivist view of Walter Spalding as groundwork and an important 
component for approaching deeper musical understanding.  Music, according to 
Spalding, “is a tone picture of an emotional experience, regulated by an overwhelming 
intellectual power.”55  Dunham then asserts that certain things such as “cacophony” or 
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other “harmonious sounds” do not constitute music.56  Therefore, while form may not be 
required, content is.57  Unfortunately, Dunham does not go on to question if form can be 
separated from content, he simply accepts that “Musical Understanding must necessarily 
consist of a knowledge of the form, the emotional and intellectual content, and the 
relative development background which music composition possesses.”58  Dunham 
clearly embraces expressivism by suggesting that understanding cannot be fully complete 
unless there is knowledge of what it is the music allegedly expresses, its “emotional and 
intellectual content.”  Along similar lines Thomas Briggs claims, “Art is anything 
produced which results in a satisfying emotional response.”59  Using a musical example 
to justify his position he writes, “Nothing is art, not even the masterpieces of Mozart, 
Bach, Mendelssohn and Beethoven, unless it results in a feeling satisfying to someone.”60  
It is not clear in Briggs’ paper if eating ice cream in the park on a pleasant summer day 
could also bring about a “satisfying emotional response.”  However, his definition of art 
not only states ideas at the heart of expressivism, but it is also highly subjective.  Both the 
expressivist and subjective components of Briggs’ definition are ideas he advances in the 
course of the paper.  While one might call his definition relativistic, it is, in my view, 
merely a matter of taste and preference.  Furthermore, as Beardsley explains, “It is the 
existence of divergent preferences that gives rise to dispute in the first place; the problem 
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of Relativism is what can be done about the dispute after it arises.”61  While Briggs does 
not offer much on the problem of relativism Beardsley describes, he does justify and 
advance his own position using arguments from variability and the argument from 
inflexibility.62  From the argument of variability he asserts, “art is personal, that it differs 
with individuals.”63  From the argument from inflexibility he argues art “differs with 
fashion, modes and countries.”64 Briggs’ main purpose was to ensure more students 
would be able to appreciate music by making it more emotionally accessible through 
experience.  To achieve this end his inclusion of philosophical arguments displays how 
educators could use a theoretical position in musical aesthetics with the intent of 
influencing practice. 
 Historical context had no substantive effect on the topic of the nature of music in 
non-performance based courses from 1907 to 1958.  Neither war nor peace nor 
depression nor prosperity appeared to have influence over the argument’s underlying 
problems and theories relating to the necessary and sufficient conditions of music in 
musical aesthetics.  In 1945, for example, while there were numerous papers being 
written with suggestions for music teachers to support the war effort, there were, on the 
topic of the nature of music (this is not the same for value), arguments that continued 
from the earlier periods.  Bertha Bailey’s “High School Theory,” for example, presents an 
explanation of what the high school theory course ought to look like.  Embedded in her 
description is the notion that music is a “complete expression.”65  The expression of 
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which she speaks is further defined and fundamentally linked with the structures of 
music.  “Tempo, dynamics, tone, all of these problems are in the music and will only 
come out as they should if one has a good grasp of the construction.”66  Bailey’s ideas on 
the nature of music, much like Earhart’s, have a formalist bent.  Yet, while there is 
similarity on the topic of the characteristics of music, there is, as can be seen in this 
section, nothing anyone would call consensus.  Furthermore, context did not significantly 
influence ideas here.  Whether the material was from Earhart’s Report of the High School 
Committee written in 1912 or his “The Roots of Appreciation” written in 1948, or 
Dunham’s “A Music Understanding Course” written in 1926 or Bailey’s “High School 
Theory” written in 1945, ideas about how music is described were more dependent upon 
a theory’s merit for music in the eyes of the music educator than in the time period in 
which such educators wrote. 
Generalized Topics and Integration 
 
 Included in this last part of the section of non-performance based topics are 
subjects from the field that are generalized to the entire field of music education.  Papers 
and ideas here are as specific as the integration of music within the curriculum and as 
general as arguments on the principles and objectives of school music.  Here again, the 
larger economic and political context has little bearing when it comes to the subject of the 
nature of music.  What one begins to notice, however, is that the larger ideas within the 
discourse are influenced by both social, political, and economic factors as well as the 
educational spirit of the time.  Not too far removed from World War II Howard Hanson, 
in his “The Scope of the Music Education Program,” examines the role of music 
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education in relation to general education “in line with the best in progressive thought,”67 
as well as situating it within the efforts put forth by the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in promoting international 
understanding.  So, while context and setting are important for the analysis of the main 
ideas presented in many of these works, often linked with notions of value, the 
descriptions of music are not fundamentally altered by context.  There simply is not much 
of a story to be told.  The themes in musical aesthetics that appear in the previous 
sections on performance and non-performance based topics, such as formalism, 
expressivism, and significationism, remain and are advanced in the historical evidence 
from music educators.  One notable exception to the lack of context in other theories on 
the nature of music comes from socioaesthetic theory.  Socioaesthetic theory rests on the 
notion that art is “concentrated social substance,”68 and as such it is necessarily bound to 
context.  In any case the discourse in generalized topics relating to the nature of music 
continued to not only be present but also varied, rich, noteworthy, insightful, and 
naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators.  Additionally, of all the 
sections of this dissertation containing material on the characteristics and descriptions of 
music, the part on generalized topics is larger in both size and scope. 
 Absence of a plot and/or any mean spirited debate does not make this section on 
generalized topics in music education on the nature of music devoid of interest.  On the 
contrary.  What is fascinating from a scholarly standpoint is the multiplicity of 
perspectives revealed in an area that the standard interpretation of philosophy of music 
education argues is philosophically barren, especially in relation to aesthetics.  The 1914 
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MSNC convention was held from April 27 through May 1 in Minneapolis, MN, and at 
the banquet held on Wednesday evening at Hotel West, Charles Farnsworth argued for 
the teaching of “right feeling” in music.69  In arriving at this conclusion he asserts, 
“When people get up and say all these glorious things about music,--music is a language 
etc. I feel in one sense, like saying, rot!...it is the feel.”70  Farnsworth’s assertion about 
the nature of music is interesting not only because it displays the underlying expressivist 
view, but also because of the idea that feeling can be and must be taught.  The belief that 
feeling can be taught is an idea from Langer that was attached to the MEAE movement, 
which shows continuity from the first half of the century to the second.  Continuity is also 
seen in Karl Gehrkens paper “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching” and the 
subsequent discussion generated from his address.  A question Gehrkens asks music 
educators to consider is whether the group should develop the “esthetic and emotional 
nature of the child…or shall we emphasize theory-teaching most strongly, assuring that it 
is knowledge about music.”71  At the conclusion of the discussion Karl Gehrkens issued a 
statement at the request of Arthur Mason, president of the MSNC at the time, which 
reflected the attempt to resolve the question.  Gehrkens writes that while the so-called 
scientific side of music is to be studied,  
it should always be as a means to an end and never as an end in itself…these 
technical aspects of musical study must never be allowed to interfere with the 
legitimate working out of those emotional and aesthetic phases of music which 
constitute the real essence of the art; in other words it is the art side of music with 
its somewhat intangible influence which we are seeking to cultivate.72 
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Here, again, in the adopting of an expressivist position where emotion is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of music there is a presupposition that, on some level, feeling is 
teachable.  Following this address and discussion, music educators continued to use ideas 
from expressivist theory in conjunction with explanations of descriptions of music. 
 The address of Herbert Weatherspoon at the MSNC meeting in 1929 titled 
“Aesthetic Education and Music” supports the larger argument made in this dissertation 
in a few ways.  First, his message explicitly links aesthetic education with the instruction 
of music, which predates the standard interpretation’s assertion of the origins of MEAE 
movement by thirty years.  Second, it is another argument for the cultivation of feeling.  
Rhetorically he asks  
are we even now cramming so many little heads full of information and facts, 
instead of leaving a little room for the feeling, for all of the beauty of life which so 
many pass by and wholly miss, just because they never have been taught to see, to 
hear, and to feel?73 
 
Finally, while he does use an expressivist assertion regarding the nature of music, he also 
includes ideas on meaning and value from German idealism, Plato, and some material 
from Bell, a formalist, and perspectives found in the work of Dewey and Collingwood.  
Weatherspoon’s argument that music “arouses the same or like emotions in the crowd or 
in the classroom,”74 is immediately followed by “[it] develops that kind of understanding 
which as Plato says precedes reasoning power.”75  Since it is not the place to go into 
meaning and value in this chapter, it simply stands as an example supporting my larger 
thesis and shows an expressivist outlook. 
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 Expressivist notions on the necessary and sufficient conditions of music are seen 
in numerous other works throughout the period.  In 1933 Orville Borchers writes, “Art is 
a human expression from one person to another of those ideals and expressions of life 
which are governed by laws of beauty and grandeur.”76  James Mursell states, “Two 
aspects of esthetic experience are present in the enjoyment of music…one aspect can be 
described as awareness, interest, and insight regarding music, and the other as emotional 
expression through music.”77  In 1941 Hanson argues music “is the greatest educator of 
the emotions.”78  Scribbled on notebook paper for a music class she was teaching or a 
speech she was preparing Pitts asserts, “music is as direct a conveyor of emotions as a 
‘blow or a caress.’”79  In 1954 Karl Ernst wrote music “is an art of expression and 
communication which goes beyond words.”80  Replete with references to expressivist 
ideas about the nature of music the period of 1907 to 1958 was one in which the 
connection between music and emotion was abundantly evident. 
 There are simple reflections of expressivist ideas from early in the century when 
Gehrkens wrote, “music is a language of the emotions”81 to later when Pitts wrote, 
“music offers a means of expression and communication that goes deeper than reason and 
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beyond the power of words.”82  Also included in the material from this time are 
sophisticated treatments of expressivism.  Earhart’s “Beethoven, The Interpreter of Life” 
written in 1909 is dedicated to considering the insights into human life the composer had 
that are then revealed in his music.  Oleta Benn, a contributor to Basic Concepts in Music 
Education: The Fifty–Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of 
Education,83 states a problem with expressivist doctrine in 1956.  She writes, “the famous 
question which asks whether or not the tonal art expresses emotion, and, if it does not, 
what then does it express?84  Later in the paper, after some analysis of elements of the 
nature of music, she argues that the “material of our art is sound”85 and as such the form 
consists of “tonal combinations or tonal designs which go forward in time.”86  She also 
develops the idea of music being expressive.  She does not think that such a thing as 
“tonal design” is enough to satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for something 
to be labeled music.  Instead she says in addition to the basic element of sound and forms 
“we are obliged to consider the remarkable effects which result from the exploitation of 
the properties of tone by the composer.”87  Benn continues,  
These properties are not so barren when used by the artist in the expression of his 
idea; they are not detached from the impressive form as conceived by the 
composer.  The contrasts, the similarities, the tension, the relaxation, the rapid 
pace, the gradual ritard (sic), the change of mood, of tonal color, the hesitancies, 
the climatic peaks, the gentle close, the short biting staccato, the calm legato 
line—indeed all the means by which expression is achieved, are never divorced 
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from the notational designs in the composer’s mind—they are an integral part of 
the composition.88 
 
Benn gives her readers an answer to the earlier problem by using examples of what is 
expressed in the music although she does not follow it through with specific music 
examples showing such and such is expressed.  Nevertheless she advanced the notion that 
a characteristic of music is not sound alone but rather how that sound and tonal design are 
used in order to express something in the composer’s mind.  The non-conceptual quality 
music possesses, according to the expressivist, is an idea that Dewey also mentions.  It is 
also under the influence of the pragmatists that some music educators wrestled with ideas 
of expressivist thought. 
 Dewey writes in Art as Experience, “Through the use of instruments, sound is 
freed from the definiteness it has acquired through association with speech.  It thus 
reverts to its primitive passional quality.  It achieves generality, detachment from 
particular objects and events.”89  The work of the Pragmatists, especially the ideas of 
Dewey given in Art as Experience, are peculiar on the topic of the nature of music.  The 
ideas are peculiar because the group occupies two camps.  Primacy is in the experience 
itself and as such the experience is at the center of the philosophical investigation.  It is as 
a corollary that the material that relates to or is used in the experience is examined.  
Because of the primacy accorded the experience, the pragmatist school of thought has 
more affinity with the categories of meaning in musical aesthetics.  There are, however, 
clues from these thinkers that show an alignment with expressivism and the nature of 
music. 
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 Music educators of the time spoke of students experiencing music and the 
importance of the musical experience, but it was not as common for these writers to refer 
to an experience in the Deweyan sense when examining the nature of music.  Foster 
McMurray, however, shows the link between the experience and music in his 1956 paper 
“A Pragmatic Approach to Certain Aspects of Music Education.”90  He writes,  
As the listener listens he finds himself responding to heard sounds, and whatever 
he hears, and only what he hears, is that which causes in him a qualitative 
response…if the experience of goodness in an episode of music should lead the 
listener to want to find more of that goodness in the future, then, if he is 
intelligent, he will want to know somewhat of that which a composer must 
know.91 
 
Even here the connection with expressivism is muddled, mainly because the emphasis is 
on having an experience rather than all the correlatives of the experience.  William 
Kilpatrick explains it like this, “the actual experiences as we have them constitute at once 
the matter of study and the stuff of the explanation.”92  That is, you cannot divorce the 
experience from what constitutes it.  If a particular musical passage allegedly expresses 
an emotion of some sort, you examine the emotion in context, that is, in the experience of 
the music.  So, “whenever man by his conscious contriving succeeds in effecting desired 
results, there is art in its broadest but essential definition.”93  Finally, in espousing a 
constructivist view of teaching music where “emphasis is placed upon creative activity 
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and constructive doing,”94 Frank Baker states, “Music becomes a means of child 
development through self-expression, a thing to be lived rather than to be learned.”95 
 Even though ideas relating to the expression of emotion as a characteristic of 
music are as common as adjudicators at music contests, not everyone agreed with 
expressivist sentiment.  Notions of expressivism did not go unchallenged, although 
pointed long-running debates between those calling music expressive and those doubting 
music’s ability to clearly express particular emotions were infrequent.  Again, it is 
difficult to argue that the nature of music is based solely on tonal relations when in the 
same address there is tacit acceptance that music also is self-expression.  Music 
educators, however, who referenced formalist thinkers like Bell and Hanslick and 
displayed skepticism to elements of expressivism and significationism, did just that.  
While this does not necessarily mean the work of these music educators was any less 
philosophical because two viewpoints were used to support an argument, inferences can 
be made regarding where these scholars were in the articulation on material relating to 
musical aesthetics.   First, there was likely confusion on comprehending the compatibility 
of fine gradations of various differences between philosophical theories. That is, for 
example, if music is a language why is it precluded from also being tonally moving form?  
Second, there is the manner in which the schools of thought are employed.  Here, it was 
that elements of a theory lent support to a larger argument where a variety of evidence 
was used to justify a point unrelated to musical aesthetics specifically. Finally, there was 
a sort of pluralism in the field.  Music educators, in attempting to solve problems in 
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music education and because of their experience as musicians etc., possessed a particular 
insight that enabled them to argue music may be more than one given set of precepts—a 
synthesis if you will.  It, therefore, should not be wholly disheartening from a 
philosophical standpoint to work through Earhart’s thoughtful arguments with the 
knowledge that they rest on claims of both Bell and Santayana. 
 Earhart is an interesting case.  He clearly has a formalist leaning which is seen in 
comments such as “all of us who are purists or absolutists in music….”96  But on the 
issue of the nature of music the formalist aspect of his view of music is only partial.  
Earhart is keenly aware of topics central to musical aesthetics.  He begins his address to 
the New Jersey State Teacher’s Association by suggesting that problems in teaching 
music “arise in part from incomplete or imperfect conceptions of the nature and function 
of music.  What music is, how it makes its appeal to us…are questions that aesthetics and 
a psychology of beauty might answer.”97  From there he outlines “two aspects of musical 
aesthetics,”98 which are located in the origins of music and correspond generally to the 
ideas of expressivism and formalism.  In reference to the origins of music and 
expressivism he cites Wagner’s assertion that music is “emotional expression.”99  And for 
formalism he refers to “a contrasting doctrine, which…would declare that music arose 
from the pleasure of art in tone.”100  Earhart follows up his definitions of the two 
contrasting doctrines with an observation regarding how practice is guided by the 
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acceptance of the ideas from one or the other.  He writes “in the choice of music for 
orchestra, band, choruses, and in the quality and trend of our interpretative instructions 
and directions, we all reveal a more or less complete acceptance of one or the other of 
these doctrines.”101  From here he continues criticizing the theories by drawing out 
elements of each on the characteristics of music as well as its meaning, and concludes by 
saying, “the significance of this discussion to a group of teachers lies in its emphasis on 
the purely tonal values that inhere in music.”102  His conclusion reveals his formalist 
stance on the nature of music, but he never truly gives up his affinities for Santayana. 
 Other writers also display formalist characteristics in their views in the area of 
generalized topics on music education.  Mabelle Glenn writes, “Music is a tone pattern.  
In the more complex forms it is merely, to the uninitiated, a confusion of sounds ‘in 
motion’ that, upon closer acquaintance, becomes an orderly arrangement of tone.”103  
Spaeth begins The Common Sense of Music with the formalist statement “music is the 
Organization of Sound toward Beauty.”104  Much later in the book he writes  
the underlying purpose of the composer is always to make his melodic material as 
interesting as possible to the hearer…by introducing even a few of the numerous 
devices known to musical elaboration, he can create a diversion which will then 
emphasize all the more the beauty of the melodies themselves, when they are 
heard again, in part or as a whole.105 
 
The reader has most likely noticed that the emphasis Spaeth gives to the composer’s work 
relies on formalist theory.  The so-called trick of the contrast relies on “numerous 
devices” which need not have any relations to the emotion of the composer or percipient, 
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but are rather “admirably clever”106 constructions of the melody itself.  Spaeth, however, 
does not think that formalist ideas are the only ideas in music since he writes on a great 
variety of material that explains and has as a basis for his arguments material from other 
theoretical schools of thought.  In another case of multiple philosophical personalities 
James Mursell argues that “an essential task of the music program is that of bringing 
beauty to the child—beauty in a peculiarly compelling form—tonal beauty.”107  Formalist 
ideas were also included in the historical material in a sophisticated manner. 
 Hanson writes in a lengthy and highly formalist statement 
  
The greatest problem in the study of music, from the standpoint of the musician or 
layman, is found within the nature of the material with which the art is made…the 
art of music is the art of sound.  Its media are sound and time…the musician, in 
order to make himself, borrows terminology from other fields.  He speaks of 
color, but this is a term borrowed from painting…music is not blue or green, or 
black or white, or bright or dark.  There may be connotations in the mind of the 
listener, but they are only connotations.  The critic may speak of line or form in 
music, but these are terms borrowed from architecture, from sculpture…there is 
no line or form in music, but only tonal or time relationships, and yet we 
frequently speak of writing a symphony as though we were building a structure of 
brick, stone, or steel.  The problems may be analogous, but they are 
fundamentally entirely different.  The musician, whether he be creator or 
performer, only confuses himself by these analogies.108 
 
Hanson makes the reader aware that the difficulties presented in musical understanding 
are rooted in the nature of music itself.  In making his argument, Hanson’s formalist 
position refutes significationist notions of the nature of music calling this latter position a 
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so-called crutch and “an impediment rather than an aid to his understanding.”109  Views 
rooted in aesthetic formalism like Hanson’s above, or those espousing expressivism on 
the nature of music were not accepted by all, and were just two of many theories linked to 
music education where questions arose regarding music’s characteristics. 
 H.L. Butler argues in “The Vital Elements of Music” that such elements are 
originality, sincerity, nobility, vitality, and quality.110  In the course of his paper he 
references Hanslick’s critique of Wagner and cites Calvocoressi’s Musical Taste and 
How to Form It,  in which the latter suggests, “theoretical considerations can never 
provide a standard or proof of beauty…analyzing can only tell us how sounds are 
combined, without ever helping us to know why certain combinations leave us entirely 
unmoved.”111  Once again a writer has not only shown an understanding of theories in the 
field of aesthetics but has effectively used such ideas to advance a related argument, in 
this case that quality music instruction should employ those inner and vital elements 
Butler says are necessary and sufficient conditions of music.112 
 The notion that there are qualities to music outside of the tonal relations or the 
expression of emotion lead us at this point to two other oft recurring theories revealed in 
the evidence—signification and socioaesthetics.  Significationists are those who suggest 
music “is an iconic sign of a psychological process”113 or “signifies, inclines toward, 
and/or refers or represents something extramusical,”114 which includes such things as 
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language and feeling.  Echoing the arguments of the significationist is J. Victor Bergquist 
who recognizes the problem of describing music.  In responding to the problem of what 
music is, he says it is “a language, a universal language, the most comprehensive means 
of expression.”115  Bergquist’s assertion is distinct from expressivism because in this 
brief statement he invokes music’s similarity to language and, while mentioning 
emotions, recognizes that emotions are brought about by the symbolic material of 
language.  He asserts later, with a resounding significationist quality, the philosophy of 
music is “the relationship of beats and tones, and their application to the emotional and 
intellectual life of man.”116  Therefore, in practice, the teacher is to reconcile the 
aforementioned philosophy with an “understanding of the student mind.”117   
In the same book of proceedings, William Bentley writes, blending 
signficationism and Platonic mimesis, “Music is the beautiful language of nature herself, 
for there is scarcely anything on land or sea which cannot be mirrored through music.”118  
He follows this significationist and mimetic assertion on the nature of music with a 
similar statement that uses an example readers today would consider racist.  On the topic 
of folk songs and “negro spirituals” he says, “music is the language of emotion, and in 
the simple songs of simple people we feel the pulse, the temperament, the real character 
of these people.”119  Each of these works not only reflects the underlying aesthetic theory 
of signification but each also closely examines music and its extramusical associations in 
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order to justify their respective arguments.  Bentley even refers to the Greek musical 
philosophy of “celestial harmonies” and “music of the spheres.”120  While his reference to 
these Greek ideas might suggest his paper is really idealist in that it calls on the mimetic 
quality of music, this would be an incomplete understanding.  For Bentley the problem is 
his use of the term mirror, a metaphor to which he applies ideas from many aesthetic 
theories.121  The essence of what he is really trying to get at is beyond simple Platonic 
mimesis.  For Bentley, extramusical associations may take—mirror—whatever form they 
may, be it emotional, societal, or physical, whereas Platonic mimesis is traditionally 
restricted to the good alone.  The point is that Bentley actively engages the reader in 
thoughtful writing that relies on ideas about music found in aesthetics but does it in a way 
that relates to his purpose, which is for the music teacher to be aware that music is far 
more than notes on a page and should be taught with this in mind.  Like Bentley, 
Bergquist uses philosophical material to support a position.  But unlike Bentley, 
Bergquist advances a specific idea relating to a position in aesthetics.  Bergquist’s work 
relies on significationism and he methodically displays and connects the material of 
music with extramusical associations, some of which will be addressed in the following 
chapter on meaning.  Bergquist’s purpose, like Bentley’s is characteristically 
significationist because it calls for educators to “lead students to the wellspring in their 
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own lives.  Let them hear, use, and see, musically.”122  These are ideas that imply 
extramusical associations in a symbolic manner. 
James Koontz also ties together ideas from signification and teaching by 
suggesting “Teachers can and should help students to translate these [musical] 
experiences into the language of feeling.  One of our primary tasks is to develop the 
latent aesthetic sensibilities of our students to beauty in all its varied forms.”123  Koontz 
continues, “some of the highest and holiest concepts developed by the mind of man have 
their expression in the symbolism of art and music,” as such “it is imperative for us 
[music educators] to read and comprehend the symbolism before we can share in the 
experiencing of such concepts.”124  Here again ideas of underlying aesthetic theory are 
used with the intention to influence practice. 
While there are a number of perspectives on what is entailed in the practice of 
music, such as listening, performing, or integrating music with other subjects in the 
curriculum, one of the ways learning of music that was promoted was as a creative 
endeavor.  Often the creative program took the form of students writing their own 
compositions and staging musical events which showcased the work of students.  During 
World War II Pitts even made a connection between the war and creative music.  She 
describes the Victory Corp Project as one where “every Victory Corp School is being 
urged to provide its own Victory Corp song.  This offers a timely and real incentive to 
thousands of our boys and girls…to compose such songs for their own particular 
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schools.”125  Additionally, the Schools at War Project promoted a song-writing project 
that asked students to infuse in their composition the ideas of saving, serving, and 
conserving.126  This type of creative music could be critiqued by a scholar embracing 
socioaesthetic perspectives.  To prove his point the socioaesthetician would argue the 
compositions of a wartime creative project shows how social and economic concerns take 
priority over aesthetic concerns.  The Marxist’s point about endeavors such as the 
Schools at War Project would apply the principle of nonneutrality to prove the argument.  
That is “every aesthetic object of any noteworthy degree of aesthetic value has a tendency 
to promote, or to interfere with, our social and political goals, whatever they may be.”127  
It is not clear, however, if student compositions had any so-called aesthetic value.  
Regardless, the question of whether music generated through wartime creative projects 
was noteworthy or even the subject of analysis by a Marxist or socioaesthetician is 
debatable, especially since a writer embracing the latter position roils at the suggestion 
that music has utility.  Including the idea here does, however, force an examination of the 
evidence reflecting the socioaesthetic and/or Marxist view of the nature of music. 
Socioaesthetics, particularly the work of Adorno, defines art as “concentrated 
social substance.”128  Art itself is, therefore, historically bound and is a product of social 
context.  In “Recognition of Beauty Through Art, Literature, and Music” Dudley Watson 
argues that for art to be creative it cannot be imitative, thus he would reject what Pitts 
called for earlier.  For Watson, “one sees in art a great struggle of youth, modern as 
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everything else. Art today is a reflection of this struggle.”129  Cloea Thomas in “Modern 
Music for the Elementary Grades Children” writes  
The phenomenal speed of mechanical inventions of the past sixty years and the 
rapidly increasing problems of social adjustment were so troubling the creative 
artists in all fields that the various phases of the struggle and the resulting 
nervousness were bound to be expressed.130 
 
She continues, “in music we recall the steady use of dissonance, in the struggle for 
freedom in form, the effort to express man’s reaction to the new mechanical forces in his 
environment, in the use of chromatics, polytonality and atonality.”131  Pursuing the 
Adornoesque perspective in practice the teacher is to select appropriate music that has 
“the characteristics of the movement and [are] not too complex or too long.”132  By 
exposing the students to modern music the hope in socioaesthetic terms, was to give them 
“a feeling for tonal patterns and harmonies and rhythmic combinations that are 
particularly the vocabulary of the modernist.”133  It is clear from this statement how the 
socioaesthetic movement is a descendant of the formalist school where the emphasis is on 
music as an object and the focus is to be “tones and their artistic combination.”134  
However, it is also clear, that while the emphasis is placed on the object, the music, this 
music is itself a construction of history and social relations, something the formalist 
rejects. 
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 Cultural context is at the heart of socioaesthetic doctrine, and since this is the case 
views associated with it are occasionally reflected in music education discourse relating 
to the integration of music with the rest of the school curriculum.  As part of the so-called 
Progressive movement in education the idea surfaced in music education in the 1920s and 
1930s that music should be integrated to both the life of the student and to the rest of the 
curriculum.135  To put it another way, “the child, then must also maintain his personal 
integrity, his sense of being, of existing as a complete whole.  But he also cannot exist 
independently of that larger group we call organized society with which he is by nature 
integrated.”136  And in socioaesthetic parlance  
music, like each of the arts and sciences, is, in turn an integral part of a larger 
whole which we may term life, experience, or state of culture; it is intimately 
related with life situations; indeed, it could not exist independently of them.137 
 
While the crux of Miessner’s argument deals with the problem of maintaining music’s 
integrity as music, he does assent, “music is integrated experience, that it is inseparably 
bound up with life.”138  It is, therefore, incumbent upon the music teacher to enable “the 
children to experience music in relation to other activities in the curriculum.”139  But, he 
goes on to say this must be done in a way that maintains the identity and integrity of 
music.140  In 1948 Herold Hunt also writes about the integration of music, but in specific 
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relation to the humanities courses.  For him “music is truly the finest expression of beauty 
and it is the truest interpreter of social conditions.”141  It is evident from the material 
above that socioaesthetic perspectives share some affinity to ideas in the integration 
movement.  Socioaesthetic views, however, are not the only ones seen relating to 
problems and theories on the nature of music and the subject of integration. 
 Integration and the nature of music are subjects that correlate with one another.  It 
is the purpose of the nature of music to examine the necessary, and sufficient conditions 
for something to be labeled music and the notion of integration brings questions about the 
characteristics of music to the fore.  Questions about the descriptions and characteristics 
of music are apparent in integration because music educators must, in their support or 
refutation of integration, show and explain how music’s characteristics make it music.  
Lylian Niquette Simpson, a supporter of integration and an assistant project supervisor of 
the Federal Music Project, argues  
Without emotion there may be craftsmanship, but not art…our responsibility as 
educators is to help him in his search for material which will be the right medium 
for working out his ideas, his feelings and emotions and to help him in the 
building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of organic and 
environmental conditions and energies.142 
 
An argument for integration from Simpson had to include what her view of a necessary 
and sufficient condition of music was.  In this case the support for integration rested on 
underlying expressivist and Deweyan expressivist notions of music.143  Pitts offers a 
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nearly identical argument.  Wanting to integrate but also maintain the integrity of music 
she argues, “music engages the emotions and the imagination far beyond most school 
experiences; therefore it induces mood and states very susceptible to aesthetic 
impressions.”144  In a piece that mentions Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Berkley, Hume, 
William James, and Dewey, Orville Borchers defines integration as a “dynamic unifying 
force in the complete fusion of a whole experience.”145  For him, in relating music to the 
“complete fusion of a whole,” and in a more cautionary manner, projects selected for 
integration should not view music as a mere adjunct.146  He argues that music must be 
more than a handmaiden to the other subjects because the “emotional aspect is becoming 
increasingly dominant in education.”147  Even though he does not thoroughly defend why 
it is only music that can bring about a particular emotional experience, he does say that 
music is possessed of the unique qualities of emotion, self-expression, and social 
relations.148  Not all agreed, even using expressivist support, that integration was good for 
the field. 
 Osbourne McConathy questioned the role of music in the integration movement.  
For him music “has a significant place of its own, a place which deserves its own 
cultivation apart from all other associations.”149  Interestingly he uses expressivism, 
German idealism, and Aristotelian catharsis as his defense.  “We must do our part, and 
more than our part, to show that music still maintains its place as humanity’s great 
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spiritual and emotional expression and release.”150  Also seeing music against the 
backdrop of integration from more than just an expressivist perspective was Nellie Zetta 
Thompson.  Her view displays an underlying significationist bent.  The core of her 
argument is really about the role of the teacher using music for uplift in the community.  
Her attempt to make the case for uplift relies in part on a specific suggestion that 
“literature and music can be brought into close association by studying music and literary 
types of elements, by viewing them as integral parts of cultural epochs, or by a topical 
bond.”151  Although Thompson’s article is not a demanding or probing work, the 
evidence supports that there were underlying philosophical positions supporting 
statements of belief.  It was, in these cases, the movement toward integration, that 
revealed how debate in one aspect of the discipline was a cause for argumentation using 
philosophical support, regardless of the degree to which the philosophical position was 
understood. 
 Discourse relating to musical aesthetics in the nature of music varied from the 
simplistic reflection of one or another theory to a more sophisticated awareness and 
incorporation of problems and theories from musical aesthetics.  What is also apparent in 
the evidence is a lack of consensus regarding the nature of music, which should not be 
surprising considering philosophers themselves are not in full agreement on any subject.  
If philosophers and other researchers cannot agree on every aspect of a debate, why 
should that be expected of music educators?  Much like the field of musical aesthetics, 
there does not appear to be any particular position that was dominant or more accepted 
than another among music educators on the subject of the nature of music.  As a result 
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there is little movement toward any type of agreement on the necessary and sufficient 
conditions in terms of a philosophical argument.  It may be tempting to assume that many 
music educators believe very strongly that the characteristic of music can be easily 
uncovered.  But even if this assumption were true, further analysis reveals they do not 
always articulate their arguments for this belief consistently.  The arguments for a 
particular position on the nature of music exist, and in some cases they are well thought, 
reasoned, and systematic statements, but even in these cases the field, while “sounding 
together,” has not proceeded in concert.  The fact that there are disparate views on the 
nature of music leads to the question of whether the same holds true for the categories of 
meaning and value. 
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CHAPTER 4 
MEANING 
 The patterns that were revealed in the previous chapter on the nature of music are 
similar to those seen in the material on musical aesthetics from music educators on the 
topic of the meaning of music.  That is, the discourse that included material relating to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be labeled music were embedded in 
the same work that also mentions ideas relating to the interpretative and revelatory 
aspects credited to music.  Also, the arguments in the discourse range from material that 
merely reflects the underlying philosophical problem or theory to arguments that show a 
keen awareness of musical aesthetics and use the branch of philosophy in a way to 
advance ideas.  Finally, in terms of patterns, this time a difference between nature and 
meaning, there are more references to and reliance on expressivism and signification than 
any other set of problems or theory.  This is not to say problems and theories from other 
philosophical systems were not part of the dialogue but rather that theories such as 
formalism, socioaesthetics, and German idealism were not as frequently mentioned in the 
papers and addresses of the time.  While there are similar patterns that surfaced in the 
evidence on the topics of nature and meaning, like choral performance being linked with 
expressivist or significationist thought, there are important differences. 
 Distinctions between the nature and meaning of music, because of their part-
whole relations, are sometimes challenging to parse out because of their 
interconnectedness.  Differences, however, are seen.  For example, an expressivist sees 
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the nature of music as an expression of some quality, emotion, or feeling.  Music, then, is 
a revelation of the embodiment or objectification of emotion.1  The emotional quality 
allegedly invoked in the music must next be examined in terms of meaning.  The 
emotions of say anguish or desire were either placed in the music by the composer in an 
attempt to convey such emotions based on his own experience, or the percipient’s state of 
mind is such that he interprets anguish or desire in the music.  In both cases there is some 
type of extramusical association that has been, in part, influenced by experiences with the 
object of music.  Whether these expressions were intended or received as such is not a 
point to be debated here.  The example is merely to show how meaning is distinct from 
nature.   
 Even though there is some degree of relation between nature and meaning, the 
intent of this chapter is not to compare how the two are used.  The structure from the 
previous chapter, however, is maintained.  The first section covers material in 
performance based choral instruction.  The next section is brief because of the limited 
amount of material on musical aesthetics for performance based instrumental courses.  
Part two of the chapter is much more extensive because there is a great deal of evidence 
for the non-performance based courses (although later in the time period the line is 
blurred between performance and non-performance based course).  There is some 
evidence, for example, that suggests music appreciation begins to shift from being 
primarily a listening based course to one where listening has an added musical 
participation component.  In other instances evidence coming from the performance 
based course documents show a shift to broaden musical understanding by infusing 
                                                 
1 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 327. 
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elements of appreciation into rehearsal.  The evidence for the generalized topics section is 
vast.  First, however, is the section on topics covering choral performance. 
Performance Based Courses - Chorus 
 Significationist perspectives vary, but each rests on the notion that extramusical 
connections are not only necessary and sufficient but also help in making meaning.  
Included in significationist arguments are points of view that music is “an iconic sign of 
psychological processes.  It ‘articulates’ or ‘elucidates’ the mental life of man, and it does 
so by presenting auditory equivalents of some structural or kinetic aspects of that life.”2  
Musical meaning can, therefore, be symbolically related to the “rhythm of life.”  Another 
perspective relating to signification is the fusion theory in which it is argued there is 
correspondence between the words in a piece of music and the music itself.  The meaning 
of music is subsumed by text.  Fusion theory places verbal language in a privileged 
position in front of the music.  Beyond the basic elements of fusion theory are arguments 
that suggest music has its own vocabulary.  In this theory the music is what expresses 
meaning through chord progressions and certain tonal combinations.  For example, a 
“minor second [means] spiritless anguish, context of finality.”3  So, in addition to 
meaning being revealed as symbolic of psychological processes, connection and 
correspondence to language and meaning is also a topic covered in signification theory. 
 Music educators from 1907 to 1958 who conducted choruses in the school setting 
and/or spoke about particular aspects of choral music and choruses in the school setting 
both reflected ideas from signification theory and used significationist thought to advance 
their own arguments in relation to meaning.  One remarkable example of a work that has 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 333. 
3 Cooke The Language of Music, 90. 
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the question of the meaning of music at its core is Miessner’s 1912 paper “The Child 
Voice in Song Interpretation.”   In this paper, Miessner delves into the practice of 
teaching choral music relying on perspectives from musical aesthetics.  Throughout the 
work he reflects ideas from German idealism and expressivism, and at one point he even 
quotes Ferruccio Busoni’s “Sketch of a New Esthetic of Music.”  It is near the end of his 
paper where he directly advances ideas from fusion theory in the teaching of song.  He 
asserts  
We must lead children first of all to grasp the poetic thought, to determine the 
mood, atmosphere or setting…we must teach children how to determine which 
phrases express mood, which WORDS express color, action, feeling, and how to 
EXPRESS WITH THEIR FACES, as well as with their voices, the fuller and 
deeper meaning of these key words.  The tonal beauty of a language, its color 
value, lies almost wholly in its vowel elements, while its consonant elements give 
meaning, character, and express dramatic intensity.4 
 
By way of illustrating what he meant by the above statement Miessner included the 
following material: 
 a   in far (distance)  m   in mother (tenderness) 
 a   in awe (reverence)  m   in mighty (power) 
 a   in May (brightness) d    in dearest (affection) 
 a   in praise (worship)  d    in death (bereavement) 
 a   in afraid (fear)  s    in sailing (pleasure) 
 e   in cheer (happiness) s    in sorrow (sadness) 
 e   in deceived or grieve sh   expressing sympathy 
        (disappointment) 
 o   in glow (warmth)  sh   expressing impatience 
 o   in cold (coldness)  f    in fair (beauty) 
 oo in true (faithfulness) f    in fierce (ugliness) 
 oo in brooding (gladness)5 
 
For Miessner there is correspondence between the “character of the text and the music.”6  
These extramusical associations both aid in understanding and enhance the quality of 
performance. 
                                                 
4 Miessner, “The Child Voice in Song Interpretation,” 34.  Capitalized words in the original 
5 Ibid., 34. 
161 
 
 Fusion theory continued to underpin the work of a number of music educators 
during this period.  Mabelle Glenn writes  
the song content should always influence the tone…the lilt of the poem has its 
influence on ‘lifting’ the tone.  Selecting the climactic phrases and picking out the 
important words in each phrase help in building up in the minds of children in the 
intermediate grades a feeling for measure accent, phrasing and tone color.7 
 
Ralph Peterson argues in 1937 for “making our singers conscious of beautiful speech will 
serve as a desirable short cur to more expressive singing.”8  Support for his thesis is 
generated from a philosophical issue mentioned at the beginning of his paper.   
No matter how fine and resonant the tone, how excellent the dynamics, the 
product is still poor singing if the singer has nothing to say.  Herein lies the 
crucial problem of vocal expression, for the supreme purpose of singing is just 
that—expression—expression of what?  Not words alone, but of ideas, emotions, 
thought, impressions.9 
 
For him, “the verbal and the musical ideas must fit into a unified whole—they must 
match, otherwise one nullifies the effect of the other.”10  Hollis Dann echoes a similar 
position and also includes other aspects from significationist thought.  “The soloist, the 
chorus, must react to the emotional stimuli of words and music, must feel the rhythmic 
swing, the surge of tone, the thrill of the climax; must dramatize the story, sense the 
humor and pathos of the text.”11  Alice Inskeep, in recalling the choral conducting of 
William Tomlins, remembers the “stress he placed on thought in tone, vital, dramatic, 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Mabelle Glenn, “The Development of Beautiful Singing in the Public Schools,” in Journal of 
Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Twenty-Second Year, ed. Paul J. Weaver 
(Durham, NC: Seeman Printery Incorporated,1929), 359-363, 360. 
8 Ralph Peterson, “The Unaccompanied Choir—Its Relation to Expressive Speech,” in Yearbook 
of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1937), 
278-281, 279. 
9 Ibid., 278. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Hollis Dann, “Some Essentials of Choral Singing,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators 
National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1937), 282-285, 283. 
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interpretive expression of the text, and words making up the text.”12  She continues by 
elaborating on an idea central to fusion theory.  Her example is “last night it was so cold, 
but that means nothing unless you prolong your vowel as c-o-ld.  Something is far off, yet 
not so far unless you prolong the vowel and say it was so f-a-rr off.”13  Each of these 
scholars clearly adopts a significationist position in terms of meaning and does so in an 
effort to influence practice and vocal performance. 
 Pursuing musical understanding through practice and performance generated 
debate among music educators.  Much of the evidence reflects one of two views.  The 
first is that emphasis in music education should be placed on building proper technique 
for a solid performance.  The second view considers emphasis on technical aspects of 
musical performance alone to be incomplete music education.  Thinkers identifying with 
the second view tend to support ideas about music education which encompass not only a 
technically sound performance that includes achieving high standards of musical 
reproduction but also other elements relating to musical understanding such as what the 
music allegedly reveals.  George Howerton was a music educator who embraced the 
second view of music education.  He decries what he sees as “our tendency toward 
overemphasis on performance” and asserts “we are attaching much too great an 
importance on technique.”14  Instead of overemphasizing superior technical performance 
Howerton argues, “There should be an indication that the singer has some perception at 
least of the inner content of the text.”15  For him, “technique and emotional expression 
                                                 
12 Alice Inskeep, “In Retrospect,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference 
(Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1937), 75-77, 75. 
13 Ibid. 
14 George Howerton, “Music Education Through Choral Experience,” in Yearbook of the Music 
Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 330-335, 
331.   
15 Ibid. 
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must be combined.”16  Echoing Howerton’s sentiments is Ivivine Shields who writes, “it 
is not the reading of the music, but the reading of something into it that counts.”17  
Shields provides an example of what is meant by the above statement.  Describing a 
rehearsal led by Arturo Toscanini, Shields tells the story of how the noted conductor used 
the imagery of a handkerchief floating to the ground for how he wanted the ensemble’s 
tone to float.18  
It is a Los Angeles high school teacher who also ties together practice, 
signification, and the second view of music education.  Olga Sutherland asserts the “task 
facing the voice teacher of the high school student is that of developing in him the ability 
to interpret his music.”19  Her suggestions for how to accomplish the task of getting a 
student to “interpret his music” relies on views borrowed from signification theory such 
as kinetic pattern, psychological processes and an association with language.  Her first 
step is creating the mood, which the teacher would do by playing a song in its entirety.20  
For her, “there must be a feeling of movement in the song from beginning to end for 
continuity.  Where moods change within the song, the singer must convey that 
thought.”21  The next step for the teacher is to work on phrasing.  Here Sutherland 
suggests, “the musical phrase usually coincides with a thought or sentence.  It is very 
important that the student think in terms of sentences and not in single words.”22  Lastly 
for Sutherland is the topic of imagination.  She calls for the singer to “live his song” so 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 332. 
17 Ivivine Shields, “Special Choral Techniques,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National 
Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 348-352, 348. 
18 Ibid., 351. 
19 Olga Sutherland, “Interpretation,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference 
(Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 358-359, 358. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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that he “re-create it in the mind of the listener.  (The song is a drama without action, a 
picture without paint).”23  Sutherland’s methods reflect various elements of signification 
in order to advance a view that musical performance is much more than flawless 
technique. 
 Choral performance being much more than simply notes and markings on a score 
is not only expressed by those advancing or reflecting significationist thought.  
Expressivism and German idealism also convey that there is a deeper meaning to music.  
In 1912 Alexander Henneman argues that while scientific knowledge of how tones are 
produced by the human anatomy has led to advances in the field, it is a mistake to make 
this the sole basis for how music is taught.  His argument reverberates with material from 
the debate between those espousing technical perfection for performance and those who 
think of music as a grander affair packed with significance.  Combining ideas from 
expressivism and German idealism Henneman argues, “Music, more than all other 
arts…expresses feeling.  The voice being the most human of all instruments, reveals like 
nothing else, our soul states.”24  Clippinger like Henneman argues that, aesthetically 
speaking, there is much more in “Training of a Singer” than vocal methods alone.  As 
mentioned in chapter three Clippinger brings together several philosophical perspectives 
in his paper.  Here, expressivist and German idealist views on meaning are seen in his 
argument.  Clippinger asserts feeling and nothing else is the “material of the singer’s 
art.”25  Taking the expressivist argument practically verbatim, he continues by stating, 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 359. 
24 Alexander Henneman, “Mind and Vocal Mechanism” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Fifth Annual Meeting St. Louis, MO March 19-22, 1912 (Privately 
printed, 1912), 22-26, 23. 
25 D.A. Clippinger, “The Training of a Singer,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1, 1914 
(Privately printed, 1914), 87-101, 96. 
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“The singer evokes within himself feelings which he has experienced and by means of his 
voice transfers these feelings to others.”26  Phrasing is Clippinger’s answer for how 
feelings are apparently transferred from the singer.  Clippinger’s use of meaning is in one 
sense straightforward in that it is achieved through a reliance on vocabulary.27  In a less 
direct way meaning also transcends dictionary like references.   Drawing on Hegelian 
thought Clippinger argues  
By means of imagination we take the materials of experience and mold them into 
idealized forms…every song has an atmosphere, a metaphysical something which 
differentiates it from every other song.  The singer must discover it and find the 
mood which will perfectly express it…the song is that which comes from the soul 
of the singer, it is not in the printed page.28 
 
 Clippinger’s view on meaning and music supports an important though subtle 
argument in his paper which is for music education—specifically relating to singing—to 
“develop the spirituality and imagination”29 of students.  His views remain consistent on 
meaning, which are seen again in an address he gives in 1925, “Collective Voice 
Training.”  In relating meaning to practice he writes  
The pure singing tone is one that may be used to express all normal, healthful 
emotions; such as joy, freedom, courage, affection, sympathy, revereance (sic), 
etc.  You will observe that these are all mental qualities, and the tone necessary to 
express them must be firm, steady, full, rich, resonant, and sympathetic.30 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 97 
28 Ibid., 99.  Clippinger cites Hegel in his paper. 
29 Ibid., 100. 
30 D.A. Clippinger, “Collective Voice Training,”  in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Eighteenth Annual Meeting Kansas City, MO March 30 – April 3, 1925 
(Privately printed, 1925), 56-64, 59.  This phrase is nearly identical to the one used in his 1914 Address.  
Additionally Clippinger mentions he studied aesthetics more or less seriously for twenty five years p. 57 
and his explanation of the aesthetic sense is “the sense of discrimination and judgment,” the basis of what 
we call artistic taste, p. 57 which holds to a tradition in aesthetics that it is the study of how and on what 
basis such judgments can be made.  In other words his statements explicitly show he had, in fact, studied 
and understood aesthetics, an idea that subverts current interpretations of the writing that occurred during 
this time.   
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Choral music and choral music instruction as a means of revealing emotions or some 
other extramusical association as argued in signification theory was not limited to this 
kind of musical performance alone. 
Performance Based Courses – Band, Orchestra, and  
Individual Instrument Classes 
 
 Ideas from expressivism and significationism are seen throughout the period in 
conjunction with the instrumental practice and performance.  Russell Morgan began his 
1926 address “Musical Perception and the Orchestra” by defining musical perception.  
According to Morgan it is “a process of acquiring an accurate mental image of musical 
composition.  This image…includes melody, harmony, rhythm, form, beauty of tone, and 
interpretation.”31  In relation to music and meaning “these elements are foundational in 
building thorough musical understanding on the part of the student.”32  Clearly, Morgan 
believes meaning and interpretation is something that can be understood, and it is 
therefore important for the teacher to bring these ideas out in the process of instruction.  
To achieve this lofty goal of musical interpretation the teacher must understand 
“interpretation depends first upon a concept that is clear-cut in all details.”33  What 
Morgan insists is that the elements of a piece of music must reside in both the music and 
mind of the performer.  For example, a melody must be present and clearly distinguished.  
Once all of the elements contained in the concepts are comprehended and absorbed by the 
performer “freedom begins.”34  The teacher must consciously encourage the student to do 
more than simply play the notes; he must help the student construct the so-called mental 
                                                 
31 Russell Morgan, “Musical Perception and the Orchestra,” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Nineteenth Annual Meeting Detroit, MI April 12 – April 16, 
1926, ed. Paul J. Weaver (Privately printed, 1926), 224-226, 224. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 225.  The concept of interpretation in its “clear-cut details” includes the things Morgan 
mentions above such as melody harmony, form, beauty of tone. 
34 Ibid. 
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image.35  “Having secured this, there comes the task of persuading him to release his 
personality, his whole being, if you please, in an art expression.”36  Morgan relies heavily 
on the notion that there is something that is expressed so much so that he concludes his 
paper by asserting that the development of musical perception from contact with the work 
of the great master acts as a catalyst for a student’s own self-expression.37  Morgan’s 
purpose in the address is in line with those music educators mentioned earlier who 
believe it is important to develop musicians rather than “performers who are not 
musicians at all, but musical mechanics.”38  While philosophical in substance Morgan’s 
arguments do not adequately get at what is to be expressed other than a few passages 
which are primarily formalist.  To put it another way, what Morgan asserts is that in order 
to be a true musician, you must be able to interpret the music beyond the notes printed on 
the page.  However, the only support he uses to identify what is to be interpreted and 
expressed are ideas like various instruments trading parts in the overall melodic flow,39 
an idea which is valid but not consistent with the way he uses the term art expression. 
 Not all philosophical discussions were as ambiguous on expressivism as the one 
above given by Morgan.  In 1954 Melvin Bernasconi wrote a paper for the Music 
Educators Journal titled “Instrumental Music and the Philosophy of Music Education.”  
Bernasconi’s paper is the application of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience applied 
to the instrumental class.  Showing Dewey’s thoughts in action Bernasconi makes it a 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 226 
38 Ibid., 224. 
39 Ibid., 225.  His implicit use of art expression is packed with more than mere dynamics or simply 
one group of instruments fading into the background while another instrument is highlighted, but he does 
not take the time to explain it more than this. 
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point to contrast the former’s emphasis on experience with what traditional philosophy 
counts as knowledge.  He writes 
the student must learn technique to play music.  The classicist would say that 
accumulation of facts represents knowledge per se in connection with the goal and 
that it requires no immediate application to a present purpose; that the function of 
mind in regard to this matter is to collect information.  The experimentalist, 
relating learning to human beings, conceives of the mind as the intentional 
interaction of a person with himself and his environment.40 
 
Meaning is then bound up in the immediate experience, that is, the doing and undergoing 
of ensemble members “where ends are contingent, contextual, related and in process.”41  
Meaning is in the process, and “these children know what to do on the basis of what they 
have done and want to do as a result of that background of doing.”42  Although 
Bernasconi’s statements differ from other expressivists on the subject of meaning in the 
sense that he seeks to explain how meaning is made, it still leaves open what that 
meaning might be.  The indefinite nature of Bernasconi’s work is more intentional than in 
Morgan’s because by applying Dewey’s notions of an experience, meaning is not a fixed 
point.  Bernasconi’s writing is also intentionally meant to influence practice, and it does 
so by advancing a particular philosophical position to achieve this goal. 
 Articulating a philosophical position is often the result of much concentration and 
thought.  The material relating to instrumental performance, while rooted in philosophy 
mainly reflected the problems and theories of musical aesthetics.  For example, Harold 
Friedman argues. “we can teach music as a language, using the piano as the medium of 
                                                 
40 Melvin Bernasconi, “ Instrumental Music and the Philosophy of Music Education,” Music 
Educators Journal 40, no. 6 (June-July 1954): 48-49, 48. 
41 Ibid., 49. 
42 Ibid. 
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its expression”43  Scruton would undoubtedly cringe at Friedman’s suggestion that “all 
elements of language have their counterparts in music.”44  His rationalization of 
signification and structural theory is, nevertheless, plain to see.  He asserts the child is 
“taught to recognize word groups in sentences.  He then builds up a vocabulary, learns 
spelling, enunciation, sentence structure, grammar, etc…we should follow a similar 
course in music.”45 
 The music and language association takes on a different form regarding 
instrumental music than what was seen in the previous section on choral music.  The 
examples from choral music made use of fusion theory while the example immediately 
above from Friedman and what follows below echo the structural similarities noted by 
Scruton.  Donald March, in contributing his view on musicianship from the view of an 
instrumental music practitioner, states, “Music is a language, and we must help our 
students to extract intelligent meaning from its sentences.”46  Furthermore, the teacher 
should carefully direct “attention to such considerations as where a phrase really ends, 
whence it is derived, why a note is stressed or why we must make a false accent here, we 
shall develop taste, imagination and musical insight in our pupils.”47  Notice the links 
with the structural elements of language, the notion of a phrase and how to separate more 
important items from the rest of the material.  March’s example is also another case 
where an underlying idea from musical aesthetics is used to influence practice.  
                                                 
43 Harold Friedman, “Definite Objectives in Piano Teaching,” MENC in Yearbook of the Music 
Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference,1936), 236-266, 
264. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid.  Fay Frisch gives an identical rationalization on the teaching of piano in the Music 
Education Source Book, ed. Hazel Nohavec Morgan  (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 
1951), 90-92.  
46 Donald March, “Instrumentalists or Musicians,” Music Educators Journal 36, 1 (September-
October 1949): 60-61, 60. 
47 Ibid. 
170 
 
References to music as language, or the universal language are quite common in music 
education discourse; these examples show that some music educators thought about the 
connection between the two. 
 Instrumentalist performance papers reflecting and advancing ideas of signification 
and expressive theories might seem slightly surprising since several of the views on the 
nature of music were formalist.  Upon further analysis, however, the fact that there were 
so few formalist perspectives on the instrumental side of performance should not be 
astonishing.  The lack of formalist perspectives is not surprising because the formalist 
would simply assert there are no extramusical associations.  So, while others are apt to go 
on about meaning in terms of expression or association with language, the formalist 
scoffs at such suggestions.  The writing of the formalist in terms of meaning is mainly as 
a rejection of extramusical claims.  The burden of proof remains on the expressivist or 
significationist and so the formalist is mute.  The characteristics of the discourse on 
musical aesthetics from the period, however, are such that compatibility between and 
among various theories and the associated problems was not always consistent.  Whether 
this is the result of trying to provide answers to the many questions in the field of music 
education or that the philosophical positions were not carried to their logical conclusions 
is not clear.  What is evident is that multiple philosophical prospective were seen in the 
work of these writers and thinkers. 
 Philosophical ideas reflected or advanced in this section on the meaning of music 
in performance based courses are of a type that is meant to guide and influence practice.  
That is, there is necessarily discussion that pairs ideas from significationism or 
expressivism with vocal and instrumental education.  Writers on the meaning of music 
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debated the importance of performance techniques in relation to what many concluded 
was far more than just flawless technical reproduction of the markings on the score.  The 
efforts of these thinkers was to advance an idea that authentic musicianship involves 
interpreting and revealing thoughts and ideas of the composer and his music.  Whether 
the revelation came in the form of a choral or band director linking music with language 
or a particular emotion, the important thing was that meaning and performance were 
bound to each other. 
Non-Performance Based Courses – Appreciation, Theory,  
Harmony, and Music History 
 
 Meaning’s relation to performance, an idea held by many of the aforementioned 
scholars, was not limited to just the performance based paper topics.  As a matter of fact 
there is far more evidence from the non-performance based course papers and topics 
generalized to the whole field regarding the meaning of music.  I am not suggesting that 
one path to get at meaning in music is superior to another—performing or listening—but 
am simply stating meaning was a topic addressed philosophically during the period by 
music educators and the majority of the evidence comes from the non(explicitly)-
performance based material.  Numerical support for this statement is straightforward.  
There were nearly twenty papers etc. that reflected or advanced philosophical positions 
on meaning from the performance based choral material.  During the same period there 
were nearly 120 on topics meant for the whole of music education in the public schools.  
Clearly meaning was an important and often discussed subject in music education 
discourse from 1907 to 1958. 
 Music educators talked about issues related to meaning that were not related to 
performance.  Some of the conversations were about the music generally and the 
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experience of interacting with music in a setting that did not necessarily involve singing 
or playing an instrument.  Even without trying to explain meaning in relation to 
performance, the work of these scholars still relied a great deal on expressivist and 
significationist thought.  Still further, it is in this section that there is much more 
questioning regarding meaning and music educators probed questions in a deeper fashion.  
To put it another way, the manner in which and the frequency of authors questioning 
expressivism or significationism or the work of a specific writer on musical aesthetics 
was increasingly present.  There was also slightly more consistency within works in the 
sense of sticking to and accepting a particular philosophical perspective on meaning.  In 
other words, on the topic of how music was to be interpreted there was less vacillation 
from expressivism to formalism, for example, in the same paper, although this is still 
seen regularly.  If an author looked at meaning from the significationist perspective, the 
concepts and ideas from that theory or the problems associated with it were often carried 
throughout the work. While there may have been a greater degree of consistency, there 
was still not any disciplinary consensus.  However, it is very clear in this section that 
signification and expressive theories were where most music educators sought 
explanations for music’s meaning. 
 Writing on music’s meaning in non-performance based courses, which often had 
listening and the analysis of music as primary paths to understanding music, reflected 
many of the characteristics listed above such as an emphasis on signification and 
expressivist views, but other theoretical perspectives also exist.  Additionally it is in this 
section that more debate about meaning emerges. 
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At the 1914 MSNC meeting held in Minneapolis, MN, Theo Fitz delivered a 
paper called “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades” in which he included examples 
of voice placement using a children’s choir and diagrams sketched on a blackboard.48  
Unfortunately no written record could be found of the content and points made by Fitz, 
but another paper was given by Mary Conway after his, and the subsequent discussion of 
her work, against the backdrop of the Fitz work, consumed the rest of that particular 
afternoon session.  The substance of this discussion shows that these early music 
educators were aware of problems with meaning in music. 
The first discussant, Agnes Freyberger [sic], gives an example she used in her 
classes where the children listened to the song Chanticleer by Elizabeth Wheeler.49  The 
children respond to the words and ideas in the song and arrive at the conclusion that 
Chanticleer is a rooster.50  Although this is signification on a very basic level, it does 
show that at an early age children are taught to think that there is a story to music, that 
there are necessarily extramusical associations.  After an exchange between Fryberger 
and Eckert on musical understanding in which the former suggested it could be achieved 
through listening and the latter said it was necessary to also participate through playing 
and singing, Peter Dykema chimed in.  In his very brief response he offers a challenge to 
the significationist perspective using a formalist argument.  He says,  
This particular piece played had no more suggestion of ‘butterflies,’ to me than a 
group of children dancing at a May party—absolutely no more of one than of the 
                                                 
48 Theo Fitz, “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1, 1920 
(Privately printed,1914), 78-86, 78. 
49 Agnes Fryberger was the Assistant Supervisor of Music to Thaddeus Giddings in the 
Minneapolis schools.  Her name was misspelled by the person recording the addresses – the correct spelling 
is Fryberger. 
50 Agnes Fryberger “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades,” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1, 
1920 (Privately printed,1914), 78-86, 81. 
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other.  To me it was absolutely false to try to find butterflies in that thing…we 
must not get into the false notion that a literal interpretation of music is true 
musical appreciation.51 
 
Immediately following Dykema’s statement is another given by Charles Farnsworth who 
also shows problems with signification but more from the position of an expressivist.  
Farnsworth relates an experiment he tried while at Columbia’s Teachers College.  In the 
experiment art student’s listened to piano pieces composed by Chopin and a minuet by 
Paderewski.52  The students were then asked to draw what they felt the music meant to 
them.53  The results showed that while the art could be classified according to the two 
pieces  
no two subjects were alike; there was everything imaginable,--merely showing 
that while the story has nothing to do with it, the mood has everything to do with 
it.  When you play a piece and tell the child the story, you are limiting that mood 
to your own interpretation, and I think that is wrong.54 
 
Differing views on the subject of music’s meaning continued throughout the period of 
study. 
 Dykema and Farnsworth along with others questioned signification theory.  This 
theory was not the only one questioned and/or supported.  Expressivist and formalist 
doctrines had their share of critics and supporters.  Sudie William adopts an expressivist 
stance on meaning in her 1920 address.  She says, “we must impress on the minds of the 
pupils the fact that music is a form of human expression—one of the ways thought is 
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conveyed from one person to another.”55  She relates an example of a boy listening to 
pieces being played at a music contest.  He was apparently so moved by the experience 
he declared that the contest made him love music.56 
For the first time it dawned on me that it [music] had a meaning—that it was not 
merely a jumble of sounds.  In studying the motives and themes and how they 
were used to express the composer’s thought, it flashed upon me as it had never 
done before that it all meant something.57 
 
Williams’ use of this example shows that meaning lies somewhere outside music though 
she does not develop the idea any further. 
 Fryberger’s comments on formalism and expressivism are evident; they also show 
her thoughts on the matter of meaning had been refined since her earlier 1914 address.  
By 1920 she argued, “the mere reading of notes will not make one think of what he 
hears…merely singing is not an end in itself.  The process is too formal, and one knows 
the danger of formalism.”58  Although it is not wholly clear what problems exist with 
formalism and as such it is difficult to determine what she truly means when using it, it is 
apparent that meaning is derived from expressivist and/or significationist thought.  
Fryberger suggests the music appreciation teacher read songs and song books and ask a 
few questions when performing an evaluation of such work.  The third question 
undoubtedly relies on fusion theory and significationist thought: “Does the music bring 
out the meaning of the words?”  Her analysis continues on the next page where she 
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discusses some objective ideas about music such as the “character of its motion (or 
rhythm); the appeal of its melody; the distinctive force of its harmony; the noticeable 
features of its structure and form.”59  There is for her, however, a subsequent step.  It is 
the next step that is more subjective and ties in ideas from expressivism.  “One may 
always ask after hearing music: What emotion does it stir?  What lines of thought are 
aroused?  What imagination does it provoke?  In short, what did the piece mean to 
you?”60  What she expects of the appreciation student is to make intelligent comment on 
the music from both an objective and subjective determination.  In relation to the 
subjective, her point is what is expressed is personal and specific emotions are difficult to 
get at.  So, while she accepts the expressivist position that there is an emotional response 
in the listener, she also asks, “who shall say what the composer had in mind when he 
created a certain piece of music?61  Fryberger’s views are interesting because she accepts 
certain notions from both formalism and expressivism while questioning others from 
those identical theories.  She accepts the idea that there are certain elements of music that 
can only be assessed in terms of what they are as music, rhythm, melody, harmony, etc.  
At the same time, however, she says there is a subjective element which places meaning 
outside the music, something the formalist rejects.  Curiously enough, while she accepts 
the idea there is an emotional response by the listeners, she questions the extent to which 
it has anything to do with the composer. 
 Frances Clark also straddles the line by questioning the formalist position on 
meaning and does so in her 1924 address “Music Appreciation of the Future.”  She 
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asserts “music itself is more than its technique, or its mathematics.”62  Yet earlier, in 
developing a significationist position that rhythm, melody and tone color mirror aspects 
of daily life, she says of melody that  
the bits and fragments of melody called motive and theme that furnish the colored 
threads of the pattern the composer weaves, whether simple or intricate, whether a 
blanket or dull drab or a riot of Basket colors…it always rests upon a definite 
theme or central melodic figure.63 
 
Her characterization of melody is significationist e.g. “Basket colors” and the elements of 
music mirroring aspects of daily life, but the idea’s foundation is formalist e.g. “it always 
rests upon a definite theme or central melodic figure.”  She continues to embrace both 
perspectives later in the paper, much like Fryberger.  Clark asserts, “from simple song 
form and dance form through the suite to the sonata form and the analysis of the 
symphony, the study of form lies in the immediate field of intelligent listening.”64  This 
analysis of form for Clark is a necessary requisite of “Music Understanding, or still 
better—Music Consciousness.”65  It cannot be neglected, however, to mention again the 
end of her address where she quotes T.T. Munger who wrote, “emotion is the summit of 
existence, and music is the summit of emotion—the art pathway to God.”66  The 
synthesis of significationist, expressivist, and formalist views of Fryberger and Clark 
reveal the complexity in musical aesthetics.  It is very difficult to maintain one 
perspective, and attempts to do so are often the subject of intense scrutiny.  This 
complexity also reveals something about music itself, namely that efforts to describe its 
nature and meaning place boundaries on something that is abstract and multi-elemental.  
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In other words, music can be object or experience or phenomenon, or something else 
entirely, and attempts define it or get at what it reveals, if anything at all, can at best be 
merely analyzed from a particular standpoint. 
 Music educators continued to debate ideas relating to meaning throughout the 
period and the problems these debates consisted of recurred.  From the address mentioned 
in the previous chapter by Dunham is material from the discussion that followed his 
address.  S.M. Cate wonders about an issue she has observed in music education and in 
her inquiry questions the significationist position on meaning.  Cate writes 
It seems to me the idea of a story is very much carried out in the grades, and I 
want to know, does so much emphasizing of the story get the child into a frame of 
mind where it thinks whenever a piece of music is played there has to be a story 
connected with it?67 
  
Mohler’s immediate reply to Cate was, “there is never a story in music only when there is 
one.  There is always some beauty of form and some beauty of melody…you can’t have 
beauty without form, you can’t have form without content.”68  While Dunham does not 
mention if form can be separated from content, Mohler’s comments are firm in asserting 
the two cannot be.  Unfortunately, neither scholar fully explains what the content is, 
which would be of great help in making a determination about meaning.  For example, if 
something is written in sonata form, what does the content of that form mean?  How is 
the argument made and justified or supported?  Does the fact that music might be written 
in such a form as a sonata have any bearing on its meaning?  Mohler would say yes, but 
without detailed elaboration on content, it is difficult to be sure.  The closest Mohler gets 
                                                 
67 S.M. Cate, a reply to Franklin Dunham “A Music Understanding Course for the Junior High 
School,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Eighteenth Annual 
Meeting Kansas City, MO March 30 – April 3, 1925 (Privately printed, 1925), 223 – 229, 228. 
68 Mohler, a reply to Cate’s reply to Franklin Dunham “A Music Understanding Course for the 
Junior High School,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Eighteenth 
Annual Meeting Kansas City, MO March 30 – April 3, 1925 (Privately printed, 1925), 223 – 229, 228. 
179 
 
to the relation of form and content is to suggest that “a selection of music” can generate 
reflection based in experience for a student, and once this happens “the substance matter 
of the music” aligns with “a necessary response in the children.”69  At this point he 
introduces the idea of symbolic content and music in order to try to make a connection 
between form and content.  Using the work of Robert Schumann as an example he asserts 
the composer, through observing the play and activity of his children, “caught the 
rhythmic motives that represented their activities, and he holds them in these melodies.70  
So, while Mohler rejects the idea of a specific story being attached to every piece of 
music, he accepts that there is symbolic content that is rooted in form.  Even though 
Mohler’s argument is not a tight argument, it is at least an example of material from 
musical aesthetics permeating a discussion in music education that shows how 
philosophical ideas underpinned and advanced debate. 
The complexity of music and the supposed meaning it has draws people to 
comment on the subject rather than having the opposite effect.  Attempts to comprehend 
music continued and continued in relation to the problems with a solely formalist 
position.  Again, from Bergquist’s “Harmony Alive” is his notion that “mere facts, rules 
about parallel fifths, octaves, augmented seconds, etc. are not inspirational.”71  His basic 
premise is to make harmony a relevant and exciting class endeavor.  To achieve his lofty 
aim of making “harmony alive” he relies on the significationist parallel between music 
and the structural elements of language.  At first the student is “to find an idea in tones, 
balance if [sic] with another.  With every question (antecedent phrase) find an answer 
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(the consequent phrase)…as one sentence is completed add a contrast, then return to the 
first, the simple Ternary form.”72  The next step in his language/music relation presages 
the significationist work of Deryck Cooke’s The Language of Music by 33 years.  
Bergquist argues, “in intervals we find interesting moods’ in thirds, sixths, and open 
fifths, we find much emotional desire; in augmented seconds and Dim. Fourths, etc. we 
find pathetic melodic effects.73  On the surface, to many musicians and music educators 
teaching appreciation, the ideas Bergquist advances on the relation of language and music 
make sense. 
 Willys Peck Kent was desirous of music teachers doing more to teach music 
understanding.  In his 1915 address “Music for Every Man: Suggestions for Courses in 
Music Appreciation” one of the topics he spoke about was “the Analogy between the 
Spoken Language and Music.”74  Peck’s analysis begins 
we find in language many onomatopoetic words, whistle, boom, mew; and in 
music we find one, namely thunder; this is probably the only one, for the other 
sounds of nature the composers try to introduce into their music are so badly 
misrepresented that we have to be told what they mean…so music is but slightly 
concerned with the imitative word.75 
 
He continues “we find in language Arbitrary Words, apple, boat, etc. and in music the 
arbitrary motives of Wagner; the only way one can know what these mean, in nearly all 
cases is to be told.”76  It is his third comparison between music and spoken language that 
most closely aligns with what Beardsley calls kinetic patters or kinetic qualities, which 
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are typical in significationist descriptions on meaning.  His assessment of this third group 
of words “which express an idea in terms of another unrelated idea” is that “music makes 
very little effort to accurately describe concrete things, but aims only to arouse in the 
listener such a feeling as those things would arouse were they present.”77  The best that 
music can do is to “express motions, and emotions, without any definite 
representation.”78  To reinforce his point he introduces a formalist counter-argument to 
the idea of music representing anything in a definite way.  “If the musician is inclined to 
point the finger in scorn at such efforts, the Futurist has only to reply:--listen to 
MacDowell’s Wild Rose; can you hear the five petals?  Do those sound pink to you?”79  
Therefore, the best music can do in terms of meaning is approximate kinetic patterns, 
which is a view in line with significationists such as Langer. 
 Questions about signification and meaning, especially in the relation of words and 
music continued in the period.  Always eager to question the significationist point of 
view, Earhart, in his “The Roots of Music Appreciation,” asserts the goal of “beauty and 
purity of tone…is easier in connection with instrumental music, because in vocal music 
story telling or emotionally charged words constantly beckon toward other effects.”80  On 
expression he writes, “as a function of art [it] is the subject of endless debate among 
aestheticians…all agree that any work of art seems somehow to be expressive.  The 
difficulty begins when we ask what is expressed.”81  But at the end of his paper he takes a 
Langerian tack when it comes to generating some kind of answer about meaning.  He 
suggests “We yield ourselves to the symphony and are borne forth on its current.  The 
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journey will not be uneventful, but every question raised will be answered, every tempest 
encountered be won through, every expectation, every yearning, satisfied.”82  Although 
he appears to be inconsistent here since much of his work had a formalist slant 
particularly when it came to the nature of music, Earhart clings to a view that holds a 
sense of mystery and reverence for music.  In this light his questioning of significationist 
and expressivist thought are tools used to work out his own understanding of music’s 
nature, meaning, and value. 
 In a similar philosophical manner, Kate Mueller studies how to better train and 
measure the ability of the listener.  One of the challenges she faced in designing tests to 
better understand music and musical form was “the part played by words in the 
development of musical ideas and music appreciation.”83  For her, divorcing explanations 
about music and what music means from verbal utterances is nearly impossible.  This 
idea about a necessary connection between words and music poses significant challenges 
for the significationist and formalist.  In her paper it is not so much that she disbelieves 
ideas inherent in significationist and formalist thought, but her beliefs of how humans 
developed language historically to explain our experiences make the problem of any 
relation between the two difficult to solve.  Her grasp of the problem is sound, and she 
explains it in a direct manner.  On the subject of the relation of words and musical ideas 
being debatable she writes, “Some argue that music cannot be described in words, and 
that the attempt to do so befuddles the mind.”84  For this group “music must be 
understood ‘directly’ as pure perception, without any intermediary symbols from another 
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avenue.”85  This idea is akin to Hanslick’s notion that “musical content is nothing but the 
audible tonal forms…music has content, but musical content” and Langer’s idea that 
music is the “tonal analogue of emotive life.”  The formalist and the Langerian 
significationist have similar views here because each does not think “statements about 
musical meaning can be reduced to descriptions.”86  It is on the point of the kind of 
“description” where the formalist and linguistic significationist differ because the latter 
says these kinds of verbal descriptions using “symbols from another avenue” are possible 
and required.  The counter argument to the notion of direct understanding purely 
perceived is “when we lack proper words to use as symbols for manipulating and 
communicating our experiences it is doubtful if the experience is precise or vivid or clear 
to us.”87  Therefore, it is necessary to rely on words for descriptions of music and what it 
may mean.  Mueller writes, “to acquire any other system of symbolization for ordering 
one’s thoughts would be even more difficult than learning a new language, a foreign 
vocabulary and grammar.”88  All of these thoughts on music and language of course pose 
challenges for the teaching of music appreciation.  Therefore, she acknowledges that 
since the time has not come when youth are “habituated in the use of kinesthetic 
perceptions or other types of visual or auditory perceptions, color, shape, pitch or 
tone…children and amateurs who want to understand the music of their times have 
perforce to learn about it through words.”89  Mueller’s statements show a keen awareness 
of matters addressed in musical aesthetics.  She was not alone in thinking matters in 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 332.  
87 Mueller “Studies in Music Appreciation,” 6. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 7. 
184 
 
aesthetics were important in music education, especially in non-performance based 
courses. 
 In 1938 Vincent Jones called for “advanced courses” on a number of topics in 
music, one being “criticism and aesthetics of music.”90  The substantive material of 
musical aesthetics was undoubtedly a component of the discourse.  The frequency of 
material containing substance on topics from musical aesthetics more than trebled in the 
papers and addresses that music educators geared toward the entire field as compared to 
the three areas mentioned thus far.  While some of the statements and perspectives mirror 
the ideas already shown, there is slightly more diversity in this last section with theories 
present here but not in the evidence related to the performance and non-performance 
courses.91 
Generalized Topics and Integration 
 1907 was year one for the conference that became the Music Educators National 
Conference.  Topics of discussion at the first conference in Keokuk, Iowa were varied 
although they generally were geared toward improving music instruction in terms of 
methods used to develop the technical aspects of music making.  Music educators 
discussed teaching music making and continued the ongoing debate, from the nineteenth 
century, of rote singing versus music reading (rote versus note).  Molnar cites Philip C. 
Hayden’s “Rhythm Forms Demonstration” the latter of whom referred to C.A. 
Fullerton’s presentation at the first meeting where he made a connection between “the 
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teaching of music reading and the teaching of reading words.”92  Molnar states Fullerton 
“urged that the pupil be taught to grasp the meaning of the words and music of the song, 
rather than to rattle off meaningless notes and syllables.”93  In 1912 Karl Gehrkens 
recognized that while songs are “based on an interesting story or description,”94 he also 
wanted students to understand the importance rhythm and the beauty of music as 
necessary to music making.  Associations between words and stories and music were part 
of the discussion in the early years of the conference. 
 In 1921 Bergquist examined the connection between language and music.95  He 
extends his elaboration on the relation of music to language to include specific examples 
of what music allegedly says.  His purpose is to help teachers give students the ability “to 
see, to recognize, and to analyze what we hear in order to thoroughly understand.”96  As 
such, “the vision of music as a language should not be lost sight of.”97  He provides a 
practical example for teaching understanding by posing a problem to a hypothetical class: 
“what is music made of and how is it made?”98  His explanation to get the class started is 
that “music is a language, the universal language, the most comprehensive means of 
expression.  What do we express in music?  Our emotions, our feelings.”99  The class is 
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then asked to give examples of feeling while the teacher sits at the piano “and 
improvise[s] on the words suggested.”100  Bergquist then asks the class to express 
themselves musically.  What Bergquist establishes here is the expressivist position in the 
teaching of music.  This expressivist position, however, is not the only idea taken from 
musical aesthetics, so too does he borrow from signification theory.  It is his use of the 
latter theory that is remarkable because his ideas presage the work of Cooke and some 
basic elements seen in Langer’s philosophy. 
 In The Language of Music Cooke argues there is a vocabulary of music that 
contains meaning.  He provides examples such as “minor second:…spiritless anguish, 
context of finality; major second:…pleasurable longing, context of finality; minor 
third:…stoic acceptance, tragedy; major third:…joy; etc.”101  Bergquist, 38 years earlier 
than Cooke, proposes a “dictionary of intervals” for the student to use in writing 
appreciation, and understanding of music.  It is necessary to insert an extensive quotation 
here to in order to capture the depth and fullness of his suggestions.  Bergquist argues 
 A major second,…an active combination, wants to be continued, suggests trouble, 
restless, uncertain, asking, anxious; an harmonic and melodic interval.  An 
augmented second,…taken melodically in its key setting arouses a feeling of 
lonesomeness, of anguish, a questioning character…A major third,…restful 
kindly, peaceful, quiet, a question (why)…the diminished fourth harmonically 
indefinite, melodically a most expressive interval, a pleading character.102 
 
What may be the most telling connection between the two works is not that one predated 
the other but the differences in the so-called vocabulary.  Notice the example of major 
second and major third.  For Bergquist the major second suggests “trouble, restless, 
uncertain, asking, anxious.”  The same interval according to Cooke suggests a 
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“pleasurable longing.”  The interval of the major third suggests for Bergquist a sense of 
peaceful and quiet contemplation while for Cooke it is simply joy.  And it is the 
differences in the supposed vocabulary that pose such a difficult problem for the 
significationist.  Even though each author advances his idea that there is a language of 
music and attaches a vocabulary to such a language, others argue (and noted in the 
inconsistencies in the above examples) it is not possible to have a definite vocabulary.  
The closest Bergquist can really come to a definition of arguable substance is his notion 
that “the relationships of beats and tones, and their application to the emotional and 
intellectual life of man is the philosophy of music.”103 
 Some music educators continued to insist there was a connection between music 
and language.  Miessner stresses in his 1931 paper “Names for Tones” the importance of 
teaching music reading (still debating what was mentioned at Keokuk).  Justifying his 
position on the value and importance of reading music, Miessner incorporates the 
significationist position that music and language are related.  From Miessner’s 
perspective music is “intelligible discourse,” because it “embodies degrees of emotion 
and shades of meaning analogous to poetry and drama.”104  For him music has 
“vocabulary and idioms, as well as structure and design” it has a “means of development” 
that is “rhythmic, thematic, harmonic and dynamic.”105  Even though it appears that 
Miessner has already concluded music is a language, over the next few pages he takes a 
philosophical approach in supporting his position.  He writes, “the questions before us, 
then are these: Is music a language?  If so, What is its nature and how shall it be 
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acquired?”106  He frames a response to these questions that is based on work done in 
philosophy, science, and music history.107  Referencing the like of Aristoxenes, Ptolemy, 
Ambrose, Gregory, and Hucbald in the development of tonality, Miessner asserts  
It is important to remember that, from the earliest attempts to organize musical 
sounds, it was absolutely indispensible, that names for tones should be found, for 
without names for things, no clear thinking is possible.  Indeed it was this vital 
need for signs, names and characters to represent things and meanings that 
impelled the invention of language, numbers, and letters, as well as musical 
names and devices of notation.108 
 
The parallels he draws between music and language include: “First, in that all languages 
words have no intrinsic or inherent meanings, but only those assigned to them and 
accepted by general consent and custom.”109  “Second…laws of simplicity and 
euphony—of easy utterance—prevail.”110  And “Third…children learn their language by 
imitation and constant use.”111  While Miessner is specifically addressing the practice of 
naming tones and tonal ideas, he is doing so drawing support from the manner in which 
he sees language developing.  He is, therefore, not supporting an idea such as fusion 
theory but rather an idea that music, at its core is really a language.  The equivalents he 
advances of each characteristic of language stress his main point which is the importance 
and necessity of teaching the reading of music.112 
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 Lastly, on the relation of music and language is material from the Pitts papers.113  
In one particular set of papers Pitts begins, “Notation is not music, (is not song) but 
merely a systematic way of recording music by means of visible marks, (Signs, symbols) 
‘notes’ made to call to mind the way music goes.”114  From this point she moves to the 
topic of music and language citing the work of Leonard Bloomfield’s Language.  She 
connects the structural elements of language to those of music.  She writes  
melody-tune-phrases-material may be viewed as consisting of any number of 
successive parts in which distinctive features occur (same and different)…word-
‘man’ with one and same meaning, ‘tonic chord’ with many different ‘effects’ 
caused by key changes, context, key, and harmonic changes.  It is, nevertheless, a 
significant and recurring musical idea or phonetic grouping.  Phonology and 
semantics based on assumption that in every speech-community (communicative 
language-music) some vocal utterances are alike in form and meaning.115 
 
In another lengthy but insightful elaboration on the linguistic/music connection in 
relation to practice and meaning she says 
Gross, over-all effect of a phrase of music to the ear and its distinctive features as 
these recur in successive song experiences-Distinctive features occur in lumps (or 
bundles) or groups…a statement of the ‘meaning’ of a musical figure, motive or 
melody is a weak point since it is of necessity one of association with children 
and people who are only normally sensitive to musical relationships per 
se…[therefore] Everything in a hearers world has some effect on his 
interpretation of meaning in the imprecise language of music which is its own 
meaning-its form may be said to express its musical content.  The context in 
which children learn songs, rhythm, of their verbal association should meet a 
child’s need to take for granted the imprecision and associations which a given 
song calls up.116 
 
                                                 
113 Leahkim Gannett, a research Librarian at the Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library at the 
University of Maryland compiled the Pitts papers and notes that “Pitts herself arranged her papers into 
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114 Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in 
Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland.  Underline in the original. 
115 Ibid.  Underline in the original. 
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What Pitts encourages is the teaching of music in a way that lets the child’s imagination 
and creativity connect to a multi-sensory experience that enhances understanding through 
reading music.  Pitts like other scholars wants to have the association between music and 
language both ways.  Her explanation relies on structural signification, but there are hints 
of formalism and Langerian signification as well.  The formalist assertion comes out in 
the phrase relating to the imprecise language of music; it has its own meaning and its own 
content.  The Langerian component enters in when she refers to the “imprecision and 
associations which a given song calls up.”  In a closer link with the work of Langer, who 
she cites at the end of the paper, she writes, “the general picturization to the eye of how 
music feels and goes is the surest way to ‘charge’ or to infuse patterns of notes with 
meaning.”117  Pitts’ thoughtful analysis of music and language takes into account the 
significationist perspectives and concludes the closest link between the two is largely 
imprecise. 
 Besides the association with language, spoken, structural or otherwise, music 
educators also addressed the aspect of music as a symbol.  David Mattern related a story 
at the 1923 conference in Cleveland, OH of the noted conductor Albert Coates.  In a 
rehearsal of the allegro giocoso movement of Brahms’ Symphony No. 4 Opus 98 he said 
to the horns  
‘this passage is like the opening of a furnace door—blazing heat,’ on to the 
trumpets in a martial theme—‘now let the flags fly,’ or again to the horns playing 
the noble theme in the Cesar Franck D Minor Symphony—‘this is the soul of 
chivalry,’ and again, ‘this is the cold grey cathedral at dawn—the snow is 
falling.’118 
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This kind of imagery is said to help in the understanding of music and is typically used 
by significationists, but they are not the only group to enlist the power of an impression. 
 In 1932 Ernest Fowles wrote, “let us make no mistake with reference to 
aesthetics.  They are the real things in life, the intangible, the unseen…music offers a 
training ground for aesthetics more valuable than perhaps that afforded by any other 
subject of human concern.”119  His use of the term aesthetics reflects the notion that there 
is material to be understood in the world that cannot be linked with science and scientific 
understanding, a traditionally Kantian view.  Aesthetics, for him, in German idealist and 
significationist thought represents connection with and understanding ideas that are non-
quantifiable.  Meaning and music are related through “the physical, the material, and the 
emotional.”120  First, in terms of rhythm “everything in the world is influenced by, nay, is 
the embodiment of rhythm; the plants, the tides, the progression of time…rhythm is the 
bubbling, effervescing element of all healthy life.”121  Fowles claims, music has rhythm 
in “a far more definite and spiritual manner.”122  On another topic, this time the mental 
aspects of meaning and music, Fowles played a tune in which the main theme was 
hidden.  After a number of audience members were unable to catch the masked melody 
he said “remember that even very musical people are often oblivious to the inside texture 
of music.”123  Finally, on the subject of music and emotional life he asserts, “The 
emotions work in waves corresponding to the lines of verse or the phrases of 
music…music sublimates them, deifies them, makes them living and human…music is 
                                                 
119 Ernest Fowles, “Music and Life,” in Yearbook of the Music Supervisors National Conference 
(Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference,1932),  21-26, 22. 
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instant in its reflection of these waves.”124  And in a statement that could have come 
directly from Langer, had it not been for his address taking place ten years before the 
publication of Philosophy in a New Key, Fowles says after playing the Episode from 
Chopin’s G minor Nocturne…”the passage holds its power because it pictures so 
inimitably the rise and fall of the emotions of man.”125 
 Echoing this view of Fowles, James Mursell states, “music in particular is 
emotion captured and crystallized in tone.”126  Finally, on the subject of signification Pitts 
made some handwritten notes that may have been for a class she was teaching or a speech 
she was to make.127  She writes, “Signs and symbols are intellectually recognized as 
standing for those things and experiences which are as permeated with personal and 
social significance that we can say they are appreciated and understood.”128  For children 
the idea of signs and symbols acquiring meaning is a challenge, especially when it comes 
to understanding music.  On this subject Pitts writes, “Children confronted with 
translating written musical notation into rhythmic, tonal or moving-sound relations, 
which convey meaning/are patterned, have the bewildering task of finding out the 
essential characteristics of music reading.”129  Signification underpinned much of Pitts’ 
thoughts on music and meaning in her personal papers.  It is also clear from the amount 
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of evidence explored in this section that significationist ideas were ever present in music 
education discourse. 
 Questions about signification as an acceptable theory to explain meaning and 
some of the tenets associated with it often show up in the evidence.  Lillian Baldwin, for 
example, argues, “no person can teach another by direct instruction how to feel…we 
cannot teach feeling as such, yet to minimize it importance…is to make music a craft 
instead of an art…for music is a language of feeling.”130  Here Baldwin questions an idea 
connected with signification theory that feeling can be taught, but simultaneously she 
accepts the relationship between feeling and music which puts her in a difficult place, 
philosophically speaking.  Her way out is to suggest that while the teacher cannot directly 
teach feeling, the teacher can create an environment that prepares “The way for the 
emotional response, the teacher then helps the listener recognize the factors that caused 
it.”131  Harrison LeBaron echoes this idea, asserting “it is very probable that we cannot 
directly teach musical feeling any more than that results will come by saying, let us now 
be happy or glad or sad.”132  Also like Baldwin his way out of an earlier suggestion 
regarding his explanation of musical feelings resulting from music as opposed to 
associations with other fields or experience is similar.  He says, “our educational need, 
then, is to know how to develop perception of the elements, that sensitiveness to each 
may be progressively advanced.”133  Both Baldwin and LeBaron see the role of the 
teacher as one who establishes conditions for understanding, and then it is in the 
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experience with music and making music in these environments established by the 
teacher that deeper interpretation and musical feeling occurs.  Other music educators also 
tried to use aesthetic discourse to solve problems and advance ideas relating to practice. 
 Those looking to advance a particular philosophical position of their own 
questioned ideas associated with signification during this period in a thoughtful manner.  
The work of Edward Howard Griggs, for instance, was a philosophical potpourri, but he 
was skeptical when it came to signification.  In “Music’s Meaning to Humanity” he 
acknowledges Platonic mimesis, Expressivism, and spends time advancing a view that 
ties “music’s meaning to humanity” to German idealism.  For him, “Alone or in 
combination, music does its work, cultivating and refining the sensuous and emotional 
susceptibility, and thus rendering one more finely and deeply responsive to all beauty, to 
love, the moral ideal and religion.”134  He continues in the German idealist view to assert 
that music takes us to a place where “the ideal seems possible, and is more possible.  
Thus the marvelous, fluid, ever-growing temple of sound…recreated in liquid wonder of 
flowing forms by each artist anew, fulfils a wondrous function for the spirit of man.”135  
The German idealist perspective that “music and musical experience are somehow, 
uniquely able to penetrate and reveal the innermost nature of the world and human 
experience”136 is plain to see in Griggs’ writing.  To get to this point Griggs rejects some 
aspects of formalist and signification theory.  From the standpoint of Hegel, while music 
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gets at the inner soul-life, it does so “through its immediacy, vividness, and intimacy.”137  
Griggs agrees with Hegel stating that while an analytical or formalist approach to 
studying music is helpful for appreciation, it is “always a means to an end, and should not 
be confused with the direct response to the appeal of art.”138  The significationist, who is 
searching for those extramusical associations, is not concerned with the immediacy of the 
experience in the same way as the German idealist is.  Griggs provides some insight of 
the difference and why the formalist and significationist approaches ought to be rejected.  
For the former, he asserts, “one may carry the analysis of the structure of a Wagner opera 
so far that one hears the motifs and not the music.”139  For the latter (significationist) he 
relates a personal experience where he witnessed William T. Harris interpreting 
Beethoven’s Moonlight Sonata.  Griggs writes  
The sonata was played over by a masterly artist, and Dr. Harris took it up, passage 
by passage and interpreted the development.  Its central conflicts, he said, 
represented the struggle of Titans with the gods.  …it was all deeply interesting; 
yet if the hearer supposed Beethoven wrote the sonata to illustrate that story he 
would utterly misunderstand the music.140 
 
Griggs goes on to give other examples of conflicts in mythology and history just as 
suitable even suggesting these ideas may help people who have difficulty understanding 
music, “but if it is supposed to give the meaning of the music, it is worse than useless, 
positively hampering a sound response to music, by substituting something else for it.”141  
The extramusical associations draw attention away from the music and thus restrict it 
meaning and power. 
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 J.J. Weigand wrote reviews on some of the research being conducted in music 
education and found a few projects on “musical meanings.”  His brief reports include 
recent studies of the last decade.142  One project by Higginson studied adolescent boys 
with the aim of finding out the nature of associations made while listening to music 
without being given the title.143  Of the various associations the ones that stood out were 
“(a) those that had their origins in a corresponding emotional quality evoked by the 
musical composition; (b) those that had their origins in a perceptual activity; (c) those 
that had their origins in wandering thought.”144  Higginson found nothing definite.  
Reinforcing Higginson’s conclusions, Riggs did a similar experiment with college 
students and “found that it is possible to tell whether music is joyful or sad, but finer 
discriminations are not accurate.”145  The problem with determining so-called finer 
discriminations is precisely a problem Beardsley highlighted with signification theory. 
 Max Schoen gives a stinging critique of Langer’s theory in his 1954 JRME article 
“On Musical Expression.”  In this paper he focuses on association between music and 
feeling and how Langer handles the topic.  According to Schoen, Langer’s central theme 
is determining if music is the language of emotion, a medium of self-expression.146  
Schoen takes issue with her conclusion that music is not the language of emotion or self-
expression but rather “formulation and representation of emotions, moods, mental 
tensions and resolution—a ‘logical picture’ of sentient, responsive life, a source of 
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insight, not a plea for sympathy.”147  Schoen does not agree the so-called logical picture 
is not a case of self-expression and supports his expressivist position in the following 
passage:  “The composer’s knowledge of human feeling is his knowledge, and what he 
expresses is his knowledge in his own unique way, and his expression is therefore self-
expression and nothing else.”148  Schoen’s critique is, again, proof that music educators 
not only debated topics in musical aesthetics but did so in thoughtful, insightful, and 
philosophical ways showing they understood far more about musical aesthetics than the 
common interpretation allows. 
 Two archival documents from Earhart also identify problems with signification 
and say it gets in the way of understanding.  In his undated “The What and Why of the 
Y.S.P.C.” he criticizes the teaching of choral music using the idea of a song story.  His 
goal for the choir is to move toward an instrumental approach to music.  If a choir can 
look at music more as a tonal art, like the instrumentalist or a cappella choir does, then 
the focus is on understanding the music as opposed to the “dramatic literary interests.”149  
His speech to the Department of Music of the New Jersey State Teacher’s Associations in 
1932 titled “Teaching Music: The Art and the Child” also criticizes the tenets of 
signification but more precisely and more powerfully.  Employing a formalist critique—a 
position he acknowledges espousing himself—Earhart argues what is expressed, rather 
than “impressed,” is a function of the form, and this should be enough to bring about and 
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satisfy the need for delight and understanding.150  Those who would oppose such a view 
Earhart refers to as “ardent pragmatists and romanticists”151 who have inappropriately 
used the term expression.  The solution for Earhart is to argue that the term “expression” 
should be abandoned “to the associationists entirely” because it has been used 
“persistently to connote extraneous ‘meanings’”152  Teachers should, therefore, 
emphasize the “purely tonal values that inhere in music,” instead of “the non-musical or 
associational or expressional meanings connected with music to a point that prevents 
attention to the constitutions and behaviors of the tones themselves.”153  Not only is 
Earhart’s argument using language from musical aesthetics—even citing aestheticians 
such as Santayana—but they are also given to influence practice, and in this case it is a 
call to teach music with a “more soul-searching scrutiny of our aesthetic doctrines.”154  
This is obviously an argument that is both rooted in aesthetics and one in which music 
teaching should be conducted along the lines of formalist doctrine. 
 Imanuel Willheim’s formalism, like Earhart’s, results in the philosophical 
questioning of expressivism.  Willheim argues that true understanding comes from the 
structural analysis of the composer’s so-called plan.155  He includes five steps to help 
achieve such structural understanding and argues that “by introducing the student to 
musical organization we furthermore wean him from many erroneous concepts…the 
music-is-an-expression-of-the-composer’s-feeling’ theory becomes superfluous as soon 
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as he is able to trace the logical growth of a musical idea.”156  Willheim does not leave it 
at that in his criticism of expressivist theory.  He continues by saying those who link 
music and emotion fall prey to “the following dangerous corollary: since music is 
emotion translated into sound, the only way the listener can cooperate with the composer 
is by being receptive to the artist’s ‘emotions.’”157  This places “the responsibility of 
comprehension” on the composer which implies a passive audience.158  To those who 
assert the structural approach is sterile because the percipient knows what is going to 
happen before it does, his response is that “the process of co-creating with the artist” 
enhances the depth of enjoyment and subsequent meaning.159 
 Understanding the composer occupies a central role in expressivist theory because 
the expressivist argues that the embodiment of such and such emotion that is in the work 
is, at least in part, a reflection of the composer’s state of mind at the time.  Parks Grant 
thinks an idea like the one just mentioned is absurd.  In “What the Music Educator Can 
Learn from the Composer” Grant argues, “the outrageous notion that the mood of a piece 
essentially reflects its authors emotional state at the time he composed it cannot be too 
insistently stamped out—one of the most naïve to which the gullible mind is prey.”160  He 
continues, “Only a few moments careful reflection would readily show that any piece 
requiring several days or weeks to write would be an incomprehensible garble of shifting 
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moods.”161  In one fell swoop his does away with Tolstoy’s primary argument in What is 
Art?  Parks’ albeit brief statement and paper have plenty of philosophical counter 
argument to undermine the expressivist position.  His goal is for the music educator to 
better understand how the composer approaches his work in order for the former to play 
and interpret it more intelligently.  That is, instead of trying to figure out what emotion is 
expressed, time would be better spent on rendering a particular passage more musically in 
a performance, apart from any specific emotion. 
 Other music educators of the time approach the subject of meaning in a 
philosophical manner as well.  Charles Farnsworth, in his paper “Beauty in Music,” 
argues appreciation and interpretation of the beautiful is necessarily bound to the 
percipient.  Getting to this conclusion he acknowledges that the term “beauty” has many 
applications.162  Since he is primarily concerned with the musical effect of beauty for the 
listener, he spends a great deal of space developing how the listener is to be prepared for 
the experience and not as much clarifying what he means by beauty.  For him beauty and 
music are synonymous in a German idealist’s view.  That is, the percipient is enwrapped 
in the experience, “the soul finds itself, unhampered, in an ideal state.”163  The role, then, 
for the teacher is to help the student to both recognize and be attuned to beauty as it is 
manifested in art that is seen or heard in the everyday lives of percipients.164  So instead 
of beauty being in the object of music alone, as the title suggests, beauty is also a 
desirable response by the properly prepared percipient.  Farnsworth writes, “While 
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beauty has its origin in an external stimulation, this external stimulation does not produce 
the desired effect unless, besides the sensuous and perceptive responses, there is a feeling 
of response that gives the total experience most of its value.”165  Therefore, meaning, 
value, and beauty are part of the subjective experience, an experience where the 
“expression of spirit” conjoins body and soul.166 
 The role of the listener was also a concern of Eugene Stimson.  In “What is Real 
in Music?” he shows that he relies on both expressivist and German idealist positions in 
relation to meaning.  Stimson argues, “music is the expression of the human soul…[it] is 
the human race’s mean of expressing something that no other medium so exactly 
expresses; and the expression of this is meaningless and in vain unless you and I permit 
this expression function through us.”167  His purpose is to encourage music educators to 
bring out in students “that natural responsiveness to music which is the varying but 
universal birthright of all human beings.”168  Music is the expression and our 
responsiveness to what is being expressed as having meaning is the goal of music 
education for Stimson. 
 One of the theories where the role of someone actively engaged in perceiving 
and/or performing and/or composing is highly evident is seen in experientialist 
philosophy.  Oddly, however, while Dewey is referenced many, many times by music 
educators in their writing there are not nearly as many references that specifically relate 
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his work Art as Experience to meaning making in the music classroom.  Therefore, the 
material in this paragraph is taken from ideas embraced by some the experientialist 
progressive educational thought in vogue at the time.169  Lillian Fox was a so-called 
pedagogical progressive.  For her it is important to provide experiences where musical 
knowledge is pursued in a meaningful way.  Echoing a Deweyan goal for art she writes, 
“Music is not something separate and apart from life.  It is an integral part of life.”170  
Defense of this point by Fox includes a number of ideas relying on significationist 
precepts to spark the creative efforts of her students in making and creating music.  That 
is, she used something the children could relate to from observation and experience as a 
spark to initiate the telling of a story through music.  Her end goal, while not wholly 
significationist fell back in line with Deweyan experientialist and expressivist thought.  
The projects were not only a means to build “skills and techniques” as “the need arose, 
but also the refining and deepening of emotions and the enrichment of personality 
through fuller self-expression.”171Again, this is an example of incorporating thoughts and 
ideas from philosophy and aesthetics meant to influence instruction in a very specific 
way. 
 Creative music and the integration movement were efforts at the time where 
student learning was thought to be enhanced if more and better links between life and 
school as well as cross-curricular connections were made.  The integration movement and 
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creative music projects were embedded in pedagogical progressivism.  Pitts stated, 
regarding the movement, “The more I study the philosophy of integration the more I am 
convinced it is not a scientific, but an aesthetic approach to education.”172  Pitts also 
observes that the movement is meant to foster exploration in a curricula which is 
“experience-centered, value-centered, and social-centered.”173  She, for one, saw 
advantages for music to be part of the integrated program.  However, the reader will 
recall from the previous chapter the acceptance of integration for music was not always 
the case.  Many music educators were desirous to maintain music’s integrity as a 
standalone subject.  Many others, like Pitts, however, asserted while it was fine for the 
occasional relation with a social studies lesson, the primary purpose of music education 
must still remain—music must be taught as music.  Still others thought music should only 
be seen as one of many subjects deserving no special recognition beyond its function in 
society, merely another subject that has an important relation to human life but no more 
so than math or literature.  For example, if a social studies lesson on reconstruction in the 
post-civil war era was the topic then the teacher (not necessarily a music teacher) would 
include illustrations of music of the time.  Music for this final group was viewed as 
subordinate. One would be hard pressed to find music educators solidly in this third 
group.  For those in the first or second group the mindset was since music was integrated 
with life, then music ought to be seen as a necessary component of the curriculum in such 
a way that emphasized “not quantities of subjects but qualities of experience.”174  In 
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particular the emphasis on the quality of experience was important because the belief was 
the experience was memorable and important and, therefore, meaningful.   
In much of Deweyan and pedagogically progressive thought social relations were 
vital for more democratic living.  It is on the topic of social relations that there exists an 
intersection of aesthetics’ concern for meaning, modernism, and music education, but one 
in this next case that is hardly Deweyan.  Discourse reflecting and advancing ideas from 
socioaesthetics necessarily involved a social component.  For socioaestheticism, 
especially for Adorno and Marx, and to a lesser extent Busoni, music is inextricably 
linked with the social situation.  Music is a form of social critique, and it can be an object 
of ideological persuasion.  Music, then, is very much a production of its time, and so-
called modern art music in particular is music for itself that simultaneously seeks to 
subvert class domination.  This idea of music existing for itself while having a social 
function at first appears paradoxical.  However, Bowman suggests it is through its own 
formal language that the social critique is undertaken.175  Music, through itself, reveals 
social structures and social relations. 
Socioaesthetic thought is difficult to locate prior to the 1920s, and when it does 
surface in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s it is often, though not always, seen on topics 
covering so-called modern or contemporary music.  One writer in particular—Hanson—
shows elements of socioaesthetic thought in his writing, arguably because as a modernist 
composer (and the director of the Eastman School of Music) he was tuned into the 
subtleties of the movement.  Hanson argues in 1938, for example, the composer of 
contemporary music should be more in touch with mainstream tastes of his time while the 
performers of the time ought to make more of an effort to embrace music written in their 
                                                 
175 Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 314. 
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time.  Hanson’s “The Status of Contemporary Music” has strong echoes of socioaesthetic 
notion on the meaning of music.  He begins by acknowledging any analysis of music 
should also take into consideration the “forces and conditions which directly and 
indirectly influence it.”176  He continues by saying, “the music of today is the only music 
which can embody the consciousness of today.  Composers should be writing honestly 
but fearlessly their own interpretation of their own times.”177  For him there are three 
types of composers of contemporary music, the first type is those who follow the 
trajectory of music from the past.  Examples from this group include Jean Sibelius, early 
Arnold Schoenberg, and Randall Thompson.  The second type of composer desires a 
separation from the past and this group consists of those who employ atonality and 
polytonality in their works.178  Members of this group are Dmitri Shostakovich, Aaron 
Copeland, and George Antheil, and Hanson asserts they are suspicious of “expression and 
sentiment of emotion.”179  The third type of composer has a rebellious streak, “to such 
artists realism in art is all important, and to them realism is synonymous with the 
expression of the tragedies and sordidness of many phases of human life.”180  Hanson 
criticizes this group by suggesting music is not very good social propaganda, therefore, 
since it may be a release from reality, the goal of trying to avoid reality subverts the 
reason music exists.181  While he does not supply the reader with examples here of 
composers in this third group there is enough written to let us know he thinks they have 
missed the mark.  It is not with the first or second group but with the second group that 
                                                 
176 Howard Hanson, “The Status of Contemporary Music,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators 
National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938), 29-37, 29. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid., 33-34. 
179 Ibid., 36 
180 Ibid., 
181 Ibid. 
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we gain an insight into Hanson’s aesthetic propensities.  Hanson’s description of how this 
second group developed its style is reminiscent of Busoni’s views in New Objectivity.  
For Busoni, new music should attempt to explore and express material in new ways but 
do so in “a return to harmony, to melody, to ‘the most highly developed (not the most 
complicated polyphony),’ and away from what is ‘sensuous,’ music as description.”182  
Hanson says of this group, “these composers…turned back to the practice of 
polyphony.”183  Using the work of Palestrina as an example, Hanson writes that there was 
rhythmic independence and the “various melodic lines were integrated and fused” in an 
“underlying sonorous background almost completely constant in structure.”184  If there 
was dissonance it was resolved in terms of the overall consonant structure.185  In the new 
music, using a Busonian description, “the contemporary polyphonic atonalist separates 
from his sixteenth century brother.  In this music there is no underlying consonant 
sonority.”186  The examples Hanson uses in his paper show both the nature and 
underlying meaning of music in Busoni’s objectivity, a forerunner to socioaesthetics.  As 
music it is historically rooted, it consists of traditional musical elements such as harmony 
and rhythm; it also rejects some of the emotional connections often said to be in music—
the last of which is a point which Hanson also sees as problematic—and it is socially 
situated.  Therefore, its meaning is bound to the existing social reality.187 
Hobart Sommes is the obscure music educator I spoke about in chapter two.  That 
is, he is the lone example that exists in the evidence that ties in specifically Marxist 
                                                 
182 Couling, Ferrucio Busoni “A Musical Ishmael,” 350 – 351. 
183 Hanson, “The Status of Contemporary Music,” 35. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
187 For a basic socioaesthetic view and one that shares many perspectives with Hanson’s work, 
particularly in relation to Busoni  see Ernest Kanitz “Today’s Music Teachers and Today’s Music,” Music 
Educators Journal 36, 4 (February-March 1950), 15-17. 
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thought and music.  His general call is for music educators to continue their push for 
music to be a necessary component in general education mainly because of its spiritual 
nature.  He argues that in this age of science the spiritual side of man should also be 
cultivated.188  On the topic of Marxism and music Sommes writes  
The Marxist school asserts that music, as one of the forms of human culture, is 
nothing but a minor byproduct of the economic structure within which it is 
written, and its products are either a justification or a condemnation of the 
economic system which gives it birth…the Marxists say that music can only 
produce an emotion for or against the government.189 
 
Sommes’ mentioning of the tenets of Marxist philosophy on music and its meaning 
shows an astute awareness of ideas in musical aesthetics.  So, even though he does not 
use the perspective of Marx, or refute it in a systematic manner, it is nevertheless 
included to advance his idea that music can be a positive force in the United States and 
the world.  Simply put, contrary to the standard interpretation, the music educators of this 
period were talking about highly philosophical matters. 
 These two examples under the general sociaoaesthetic umbrella also show how 
there is distinction in socioaesthetics.  The Marxist sees music as having a primary social 
function—what Beardsley refers to as the principle of non-neutrality.  As such, its 
meaning is in direct relation to the economic superstructure.  Sommes’ use and 
understanding of Marxist aesthetics subsumes music as a “minor byproduct of the 
economic structure.”  Hanson’s work reveals how the ideas of Busoni and Adorno—
though neither are specifically mentioned—are broader than those of the Marxist.  
                                                 
188 Hobart Sommes, “Shield This Light” Music Educators Journal 37, 4 (February-March 1951): 
26-27, 46, 26.  This paper was originally read at the 1950 convention of the Kansas Music Education 
Association and is reprinted from the Kansas Music review, official organ of KMEA. 
189 Ibid., 27.  Sommes asserts “some of our captains of industry maintain that creative music is one 
of the least material manifestations of culture, and has nothing to do with economic, social, or political 
activities, and should be treated in the same realm as a hobby such as the cultivation of rare orchids—
beautiful, but expensive and unnecessary,” 27.   He argues both parties are wrong. 
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Instead of music being merely subsumed in the economic structure, music is capable of 
much more than subverting or supporting a given ideological perspective.  Hanson’s 
work shows how music is both related to the social conditions—those “forces and 
conditions” he speaks of—yet music most certainly relates to itself, which can be seen in 
the difference between the atonal and polyphonal work of so-called contemporary 
composers and their relation to the past in their newer forms of music.  So, meaning is 
simultaneously musical in the formalist sense, of which objectivism and socioaesthetics 
in the twentieth are offshoots, and socially situated because it is a product of the time.  
This also happens to be an instance where meaning is subtly rooted to context, and 
context will be much more overt in the next chapter on value. 
Meaning, interpretation, or what music is said to reveal contains a complex milieu 
of perspectives and problems, some of which I highlight in this chapter.  Formalist, 
significationist, expressivist, and socioaesthetic points of view in the evidence have 
shown that these views are present and debated.  Sometimes these debates often were 
embedded within arguments unique to music education.  One example seen is this chapter 
was the problem of musical understanding as it relates to the role of the percipient and the 
performer.  Another ongoing debate centered on musical understanding and the learning 
of music—the rote versus note argument.  Music educators were also considering what 
their role in the integration movement looked like or how to successfully introduce 
contemporary art music into the classroom.  Fundamentally, however, when it came to 
considering the meaning of music there was a reliance on ideas from musical aesthetics 
regardless of whether these were embedded in the debates above or as standalone 
questions on what is allegedly revealed in music, for example is music a language?  The 
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complex milieu of problems and perspectives occupied a great deal of space and 
generated much discussion.  The fact that there are many points of view on the problems 
of meaning in one’s aesthetic position as compared to another’s simply displays the 
diversity, or lack of unity depending on one’s perspective, of discourse in musical 
aesthetics.  Varied voices on the topic of the meaning of music in music education were 
prevalent in the discourse.  Many music educators had reflexively considered what music 
means, which is a quality also seen in why this group thinks music matters. 
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CHAPTER 5 
VALUE 
 Diversity in the musical aesthetic perspectives from the last chapter on meaning 
also appears in this chapter on value.  There is, however, an additional element that 
shows up in the discourse on value that was not in the earlier chapters – the larger 
historical context.1  Another wrinkle in this chapter is the two ways in which people use 
the word value.  There is material that covers evaluation, that is, making judgments about 
the quality of music.  The other material connects to the question of why music matters.  
Think of it this way, an evaluative question asks, “What music is good?” and a question 
on why music matters asks, “What good is music?”  Evaluation occupies the first section 
of this chapter and I make no effort, nor is it necessary to subdivide perspectives on 
evaluation into the performance and non-performance based categories.  The reason for 
this is the evidence does not show any noticeable difference in the arguments of what 
good music is.  In other words the point of view of a work on the subject of good music 
for chorus contains a negligible difference as compared to someone discussing good 
music in a paper on music appreciation. 
 
 
                                                 
1 While context did affect discourse on nature and meaning in subtle ways, it was typically seen 
within the context of music education specifically.  For example, the arguments made using support from 
musical aesthetics on the rote versus note debate provide a definite internal context for the question.  
Beyond this there was the educational context, which influenced views on such things as the integration 
movement.  Finally, there were socioaesthetic views that were naturally affected by contemporary 
happenings, but even these were still largely embedded in material related to the field.  One example here is 
the use of so-called modern art music in the classroom. 
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Evaluation and Judgment 
 Evidence of judgments about music is far more uniform here than in any other 
category of this dissertation.  For the vast majority of music educators who wrote on the 
topic during this period, the goal of music education in relation to musical judgment was 
the elevation or cultivation of taste.  Someone with cultivated taste, according to these 
writers, understood why certain types and styles of music were superior to others.  
Therefore, the role of the music teacher was one where developing an understanding and 
appreciation of honest, sincere, and complex music, usually Western Art Music, was 
expected.  Good and great music was Western Art Music, and in order to be considered 
someone with elevated taste, the percipient should be able to recognize and be sensitive 
to differences in quality between a Mozart symphony and Scott Joplin’s ragtime music. 
 Mary Conway was very concerned with what was passing for music in the early 
years of the twentieth century.  She associates rag-time music with evil saying, “a certain 
type of modern song can break down in half a minute the careful teaching of years in 
church, Sunday-school and home.”2  Quality music education was considered a necessary 
requisite to cure the corrupted tastes of the average person. Mary Armitage expressed in 
1920 “the average child prefers rag-time and the cheap song of the street to the 
classics…and it devolves on the supervisor to offset that taste and give him a liking for 
something infinitely better.”3  Many music educators shared her basic view.  Paul Weaver 
                                                 
2 Mary Conway, “The Appreciation of Music in the Grades,” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN April 27 – May 1, 
1914  (Privately printed, 1914), 78-86, 79. 
3 Mary Armitage, “How to Introduce Music Appreciation into Schools which have Never had 
Music,”  in Journal of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Thirteenth Annual 
Meeting Philadelphia, PA March 22 – March 26, 1920 (Privately printed, 1920), 51-52, 51.  While 
Armitage asserts there is a difference in the performing and listening sides of music, an implication that 
there is a distinction here between performance and non-performance based music, her argument for each 
ultimately rests on the same premise.  She asserts, “the great majority of our children will never be either 
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argues in 1929 “the chief concern of all music education is the cultivation of 
discrimination.”4  A number of these music educators advancing the notion that part of 
the role of the music educator was to elevate taste did so in a manner reminiscent of 
Plato, Aristotle and Schiller.  Birge wrote in 1910 “the cultivation of taste is of prime 
importance.”5  Similarly, Anton Embs asserts the purpose of school music is to “develop 
the musical taste of the child.”6  Along those same lines Osbourne McConathy suggests, 
“Music should inspire to noble thoughts and feelings,”7 a classical Greek view.  Echoing 
Schiller, Louis Mohler makes a connection between listening to good music and the 
development of cooperation and more democratic living.8  Spaeth advises the average 
listener “not to worry about your musical taste.  It will develop normally if you hear 
enough music, both good and bad.”9  Little had changed by the 1950s.  In “A Question of 
Taste in High School Band Music” Joseph Doran laments good music does not exist in 
the majority of literature available to the band.  Instead, “it primarily consists of popular 
music and novelties.”10  Like many music educators he equated good taste with Western 
Art Music.  “Public School music—band, orchestra, and vocal groups—must work at all 
                                                                                                                                                 
singers or players; they are to go through life as listeners, and upon the supervisor rests the responsibility of 
teaching them to listen intelligently, and of leading them to enjoy the right kind of music,” p 52. 
4 Paul Weaver, “The Cultivation of Discrimination,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Twenty-Second Year, ed. Paul J. Weaver (Durham, NC: Seeman 
Printery Incorporated,1929), 363-368, 365. 
5 Edward Bailey Birge, “Voice Culture in the Public Schools,” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Third Annual Meeting Cincinnati, OH May 3 – May 6, 1910 
(Privately printed, 1910), 53, 55, 55. 
6 Anton Embs, “Public School Music: Education or Recreation – President’s Address,” in Journal 
of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Twentieth Year, ed. Paul J. Weaver 
(Privately printed, 1927), 168-173, 169. 
7 Osbourne McConathy, “Is High School Music Making Progress,” in Yearbook of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference,1933), 46-50, 49. 
8 Louis Mohler, “The Project Method in Teaching Music,” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
Supervisors National Conference, Seventeenth Annual Meeting Cincinnati, OH April 7 – April 11, 1924 
(Privately printed, 1924), 261-264, 262. 
9 Spaeth, The Common Sense of Music, 29. 
10 Joseph Doran, “A Question of Taste in High School Band Music,” Music Educators Journal 42, 
6 (June-July 1956): 55-58, 55. 
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times to develop taste in the youth of America.”11  To support his point that the band is a 
group capable of artistic production, he urges band directors to not only include marches 
but also the work of Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Ravel, Holst, even Stravinsky and Bartok.  
Mursell shared the same sentiment.  He wrote in 1935 that is was the responsibility of the 
music educator to influence the lives of children with the music of the great masters.  
Referencing Bach, Beethoven, Mozart, and Chopin, Mursell insisted it was the music 
educator’s responsibility to call attention to “the work and utterances of these men.  The 
mere existence of such work is the greatest single reason for music study.”12  Educators 
desired the study of better music, but for some, what better music actually looked like 
was an idea not fully developed.  At the 1937 Eastern Music Educators Conference in 
Buffalo, NY a panel discussion was dedicated to what “more and better music” looked 
like.  Yet even here specificity is lacking.  Russell Morgan, for example, merely drew on 
the traditional delineation between the music of the great masters and “cheap tawdry 
music.”13  The larger goal was for the better teaching of good music.  To this effect, it is 
apparent that these music educators thought taste could be improved and that good music 
had certain prescribed characteristics. 
 Making music judgments is a central idea in musical aesthetics and music 
educators were, in fact, aware of this. In 1925 Clippinger devotes an entire section of his 
address to musical judgment.  He lists several kinds of judgments such as “is the 
tone…too bright, too somber, or is it the right color?...is it too thick or thin?  Is it steady 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 James Mursell, “The Claims of Music in the School Curriculum,” in Yearbook of the Music 
Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference,1935), 21-26, 22. 
13 Russell Morgan, “More and Better Music” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National 
Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1937), 35-39, 38-39. 
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or unsteady?  Is it harsh or mellow and sympathetic?”14  Clippinger also goes on to state 
that the aforementioned judgments “all have to do with musical taste, of which aesthetics 
is the philosophy.”15  Once again, the evidence is overt and in this case it is an example of 
what a music educator understood aesthetics to be as well as keys to making such 
judgments.  Frances Martin specifically asks, “What are some of the criteria of good 
music?” in her article “A Plan for Good Music.”16  She continues by generating a series 
of questions that enable teachers to judge the merits of a composition.17  For starters she 
judges a good work on the basis of whether the composers name appears “in studied 
music reference books.”18  The follow-up question also relates to the noteworthiness of 
the composer and his music as being necessary criteria for something to count as good 
music.  Questions four and five inquire about the appropriateness of the score considering 
what kind of group will perform it and whether it corresponds well with the original.19  
The remaining questions, (six, seven, eight, and nine) delve into the musical experience 
itself.  However, while Martin’s perspectives rest on the notion that good music must 
“have some value, whether it be technical, social or educational,”20 she does not spend 
any time developing how good music has social value.  She also does not discuss what 
elements of her view of good music enrich the experience.  Not all views of what good 
music is were as simplistic as Martin’s. 
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 Anne Pierce also made suggestions for music educators to consider when 
selecting music.  First on Pierce’s list is that the “materials must be of good quality.”21  
And in determining the worth of the music Pierce includes the characteristic that it 
possesses certain qualities.  She, unlike Martin, acknowledges there are differing views 
on what constitutes good music.  Pierce writes that for some, good music is music that is 
structurally sound, and for others music that has withstood the test of time is good.22  
These perspectives, for Pierce, are incomplete.  Her recommendation is that instead of 
using these two criteria alone, the teacher is to seek “the superior and permanent.”23  Her 
notions of good music share in a simple way the genetic, affective, and objective reasons 
given by Beardsley in making judgments of musical worth.  Specifically, Pierce writes 
good music “is sincere in expression,” (a genetic reason); it is “presented in such a way 
as to arrest and hold attention and interest,” (an affective reason); and finally, it is “well-
planned and constructed…in fact the details of melodies, chords, cadences, dissonances, 
motives, and phrases must be so worked out as to give the listener an impression of 
coherence,” (an objective reason).24  Once again is it unmistakable that some of the music 
educators of the period understood and could make well formed arguments on the subject 
of separating good and cheap music using language of evaluation from musical 
aesthetics. 
 H.L. Butler is another example of a music educator who has reflexively thought 
about the notion of good music.  Mentioning Hanslick, Butler argues that good music 
                                                 
21 Anne Pierce “The Selection and Organization of Music Materials,” in Thirty-Fifth Yearbook  of 
the National Society for the Study of Education  Part II Music Education, ed. Guy Montrose Whipple, 
Prepared by the Society’s Committee on Music Education (Bloomington, IN: Public School Publishing 
Company, 1936), 147-165, 147. 
22 Ibid., 148. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  Refer to chapter two for the explanations of these reasons in making an evaluation of what 
is good music. 
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possesses certain inner qualities.  For him, these elements are “Sincerity, the true and the 
honest; Originality, the genuine output of the individual imagination; and Nobility, the 
freedom from cheapness, vulgarity, and banality.”25  He continues by arguing the sum of 
these three elements is vitality, a quality that enables a masterpiece to persist.26  In other 
words, a tune “is not great because it is difficult to sing from a technical standpoint.  It is 
great because it has in itself the vital elements, originality, sincerity, and nobility, which 
in turn give it vitality, or the power to live.”27 Butler’s assertion, like those of Pierce, also 
echoes Beardsley’s reasons for making judgments, in this case genetic reasons.  But 
while Beardsley took issue with qualities of sincerity, originality, and nobility, Butler 
simply accepts these ideas as the vital elements of music—ideas specific to making 
evaluations.   
 There were other music educators who also showed an awareness of and 
advanced ideas from musical aesthetics in their work.  Minerva Bennett deliberately and 
explicitly incorporated arguments and theories in musical aesthetics in her Master’s 
thesis.  On the topic of taste Bennett relies on the work of M.D. Calvacoressi, Dewey, 
Frederick Lund, and W.H. Hadow.  From Calvacoressi she borrows the idea that taste can 
and should be developed, and some music educators ought to help students refine their 
ability to discriminate between good and bad music.28  In order to develop the ability to 
discriminate, she advocates the application of Deweyan thought.  The student and teacher 
are involved in the process of learning what it is the artist experienced as the work was 
                                                 
25 Butler, “The Vital Elements of Music,” 67.  Italics in the original. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.67-68.  Italics in the original. 
28 Minerva M. Bennett, “A Study of Aesthetic Values Inherent in Music and Music Education”( 
Master’s thesis, Temple University, 1935), 101-108.  She also acknowledges that Calvacoressi’s view from 
his Musical Taste and How to Form It (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1927) rests on the notion that 
those in the best position to cultivate taste are the most studied and the most experienced, which implies 
that their sensibilities guide the field as a whole. 
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produced.29  She takes from Hadow’s work his evaluative reasons for something being 
labeled as good music. 
 Bennett applies Hadow’s four principles of judgment from his Studies in Modern 
Music for the purpose of arguing that education and experience are the foundations for 
making authoritative judgments about the quality of music.30  These are “the principle of 
vitality…the principle of labor…the principle of proportion…fourth, that of fitness.”31  
Explanations given for each of these principles of judgment adhere, like the works of 
Butler and Pierce, to Beardsley’s description of genetic, affective, and objective 
reasons.32 
 Approaches to evaluating music appear in Henry Moses’ “An Icky Looks at Good 
Music.”33  Moses posed two questions to nearly 850 students: “(1) Define what you mean 
by good music. (2) On what basis do you judge whether music is good or not good.”34  
The students’ answers to the second question fell into distinct categories of reasons for 
being able to make such judgments.  It will not surprise the reader at this point to find out 
that the reasons given by the students fell into the affective and genetic categories.  In 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 106.  Minerva argues further it is “through education [that] the taste of music becomes 
refined and sensitiveness to the best in it is developed,” 107. 
30 W.H. Hadow, Studies in Modern Music, 2 vols, (New York, NY: MacMillan and Company, 
1892-1893), vol. 1 chapter 2. 
31 Bennett, “A Study of Aesthetic Values Inherent in Music and Music Education” 101-108. 
32 Vitality for Butler is different from Hadow’s use of the term as seen in Bennett’s thesis.  
Bennett’s paraphrasing  of Hadow asserts vitality has to do with “the conception of the ideas expresses in 
the composition their originality and their genuineness,” qualities Butler attributed solely to originality.  
Hadow’s principle of vitality would have been classified by Beardsley as a genetic reason.  The principle of 
labor is also akin to a genetic reason because it is measured by “skilled and finished workmanship,” p. 108.  
The principle of proportion is “objective” because it’s focus is on how well organized it is—something that 
can be determined in a fairly straightforward manner.  Finally, fitness is closely related to affective 
reasoning since it is concerned with “the mood to be expressed, ” p. 108 
33 Moses explains an “Icky is a jitterbug term for one who doesn’t know the latest in jive.”  Henry 
Moses, “An Icky Looks at Good Music,” Music Education Journal 31, 1 (September-October 1944): 28, 
31, 65, 28. 
34 Ibid. 
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fact, Moses notes “there was little factual basis for objective reasoning.”35  There is, 
however, an interesting twist in Moses’ analysis based on discussions he had with groups 
of students involved in the study.  For “music to be great, [it] must not only be well 
written and well played but must also have a good purpose…[it] must also carry out that 
purpose.”36 
 Finally, Howard Murphy points out the difficulty of evaluating modern music in 
“Judgment Values for Contemporary Music.”  Since “a conservative is a man who 
worships dead radicals,”37 fair evaluation of so-called modern music is problematic.  He 
notes that Beethoven was criticized harshly in his time and until perspective is gained 
meaningful evaluation is difficult.  What, then, can be done?  Murphy suggests that 
modern music can be evaluated effectively.  To do so requires making the new music 
more familiar through repeated hearing.38  The next task is to better understand the 
composer’s use of “new technical devices.”39  It is this second category that aspires to 
objective reasons for evaluation.  Here Murphy divides the structural aspects of modern 
music four ways: “(1) The extensive use of dissonance, (2) the new melodic line, (3) 
rhythmic complexity, (4) the new formal structure, or means of obtaining continuity.”40  
Changed conceptions of music, according to Murphy, should enhance rather than obstruct 
our ability to evaluate modern music.  So, while tastes change, percipients are in no 
worse a position to make an educated evaluation if they become more familiar with the 
music and group the technical devices used by the composer.  And in his follow-up 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 31. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Howard Murphy, “Judgment Values for Contemporary Music,” Music Educators Journal 37, 4 
(February-March 1951): 34, 36, 36. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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article in the next issue of the Music Educators Journal, he sets out to establish specific 
criteria and make such an informed judgment. 
 Murphy’s ideas about judgment are meant to influence practice.  He explicitly 
states that teachers teaching modern music “must make some evaluations, however 
tentative.  As teachers of music we cannot evade this responsibility; indifference is as 
deplorable as dogmatism.”41  He thus establishes basic criteria for the teacher to consider 
in performing such evaluations.  Once again, the criteria fell into the categories 
mentioned by Beardsley.  The first question of new music is, does it successfully “convey 
mood or emotion to the auditor?”42 which combines genetic and affective reasons.  
Second, does the new music possess a quality of unity in its design?43  According to the 
criteria Murphy lays out, “new music is to be judged primarily in its power of 
communication, on its sincerity, and on its technical competence.”44  These judgments, in 
turn, rest on genetic, affective, and objective rationales. 
 The recognition and establishment of criteria for evaluating music is yet one more 
way the evidence points to important matters from musical aesthetics finding their way 
into the discourse of music educators.  Although there were definitely music educators 
who were content to suggest an underlying association with basic principles in musical 
aesthetics such as the objective of elevating taste, not everyone was satisfied to leave it at 
that.  Several scholars probed issues associated with how it was possible and in what 
ways evaluative judgments about music could be made.  Whether the topic was music 
appreciation, a performance based piece, or something generalized to the entirety of the 
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42 Ibid. 
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field, these music educator’s perspectives were explicitly attached to ideas on evaluation 
and cultivating taste that were directly linked with influencing practice.  Separating good 
music from that of lesser quality and applying criticism for doing so to make some 
evaluative judgment is only one aspect of questions about musical value. 
Why Music Matters 
 The idea of value was one of the most personal and possibly the most volatile of 
all the categories of musical aesthetics discussed in music education.  The divergent 
views are the result of the steady and careful articulation of ideas and reflexively 
considering music’s value in light of new developments in the field such as the orchestra 
and appreciation courses, and the larger educational and historical contexts.  The question 
of why music matters has been a constant one for music educators.  Mursell writes “as 
applied to our own field, it takes the form of asking why music should be taught in 
schools.”45  Music’s inclusion in the general curriculum has been supported using 
numerous arguments, which rest on four distinct ways of understanding value: intrinsic, 
inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian.  Mark’s interpretation would have us believe that 
for a thousand years the answer to the question “why music matters” rests solely on 
utilitarian claims.46  Mark’s assertion would have us believe that aesthetics has no 
concern with extramusical associations whatsoever.  While utilitarian claims are present 
in the evidence, they are by no means the only ones.  It is in the category of value where 
some of the deeper probing of ideas from musical aesthetics occurs, which in part 
                                                 
45 James Mursell, Human Values in Music Education (New York, NY: Silver, Burdett and 
Company 1934), 251. 
46 Mark argues “music education philosophy developed over 1,000 years.   The developmental 
process was not evolutionary because the philosophy remained essentially the same from Plato’s time to 
mid 20th century.”  Mark, “The Evolution of Music Education Philosophy from Utilitarian to Aesthetic,” 
15-21, 20. 
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explains the divergent views.  It is also in relation to value where music educators display 
they are beings in time, subjects who question ideas to better understand the present.   
 The question of why music matters has persisted and will continue to persist.  
Therefore, music educators have often relied on contemporary influences that are either 
accepted or rejected to argue a point for the value of music, and, by extension, music 
education.  These writers and thinkers have at times observed the effects of the 
intensification of industrial production and have commented upon the positive 
development of the industrial age as well as problems stemming from an obsession with 
materialism, especially during the Depression years.  Other threads exist in the evidence 
such as ideas of value tied to the integration movement and the performing versus 
listening debate.  Additionally, there are utilitarian claims for music during World War II 
and the Cold War years, yet here too are a group of music educators who reject those 
claims.  While there are pregnant internal questions related to value such as whether 
music be considered “art or science”? or whether its basis is “intellectual or emotional”? 
these questions are nevertheless anchored in the explicit material and the subtext of 
evidence.  Perspectives on intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value are both 
plain to see and underlie the arguments presented by music educators. 
 Much like the previous section on evaluation, there is a negligible difference in 
the evidence on the topic of value that makes any pointed distinction between the 
performance and non-performance categories superfluous.   Any noteworthy difference 
on a specific topic relating to value between the performance and non-performance 
categories I bring to the reader’s attention when a point needs to be emphasized.  
Problems and theories of musical aesthetics have overlapping elements on the question of 
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value.  The Moralist using an argument from correlation, for example, suggests that for a 
work to be adjudged as having merit it must have a moral component.  If the moral 
component of the work is high, then its value is high.  In this instance the quality of the 
work—an evaluative statement—is inextricably linked with notions of why music is 
important, why we should care about it—a normative statement.  To put it another way, 
the judgment of the quality of the work is related to its inherent, instrumental and/or 
utilitarian value.  It is not enough simply to judge the work according to its own merits; 
there is necessarily an extramusical component attached to its worth, and how far that 
extramusical component is extended depends on the theorist’s take on value.   
 Moralism, because of its connection to evaluation and explanation of value, is a 
good place to transition from the first section of this chapter to the last section on the 
subject of value in music education.  Echoing Plato’s ethos theory, which suggests music 
could be valued for its emotional and ethical effects, Ralph Baldwin argues, “the teaching 
of music in the public schools should exert an influence in the upbuilding of character 
and affect for good the conduct of the children.”47  He continues by suggesting music 
“should have a restraining and refining influence upon character and conduct, and thus 
certain ethical value should accrue.”48  Baldwin’s argument assumes music is a moral 
force and as such is one that sees music as having utilitarian value.  Bruno Ussher writes, 
                                                 
47 Ralph Baldwin, “Efficiency in School Music, Teaching and Practical Test of Same,” in Journal 
of Proceedings of the Music Supervisors National Conference, Seventh Annual Meeting Minneapolis, MN 
April 27 – May 1, 1914  (Privately printed, 1914), 43-48, 44.  I am using the words moral and ethical 
interchangeably with the knowledge that this may displease any number of philosophers.  So, while the 
substance of the terms appear as distinct, the implications of each are similar.  Therefore, a single term is 
used that conflates the aims of the two, and that word is good.  Ideas on moralism are manifest in Platonic 
ethos theory; the difference lies in the degree of value applied: inherent, instrumental, intrinsic. 
48 Ibid. 
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“believing as I do in the educational, character-forming mission of music”49 leaving little 
doubt of his Platonic view of music.  McConathy expressed similar sentiment by 
asserting, “Music should inspire to noble thoughts and feelings.”50  And for McConathy 
the idea of moral uplift was utilitarian.  He suggests that since the Depression was having 
such a negative effect on the lives of people “music can contribute to the upbuilding of 
morale, to the steadying of nerves, to the welfare of our community.”51  The emphasis 
here is on the good that can be achieved through music. 
 Another example showing the issue with judgment that incorporates the moralist 
perspective is given by J.F. Messenger.  His argument in “Living Humanities” is for 
music teachers to teach music to help students lead better, fuller, richer, and deeper lives.  
Music is part of our human nature and as such is a means to individual and societal 
improvement.  Messenger writes, “I recognize the value of listening to good music, but 
that is not its greatest value…help me to develop a larger and nobler and sweeter 
personality.  If music will do that, then music is good.”52  Messenger’s moralist bent 
moves away from utilitarianism toward instrumentalism.  True, there is still the hint of 
having a noble mind, but his view is more general than the preceding perspectives of 
Baldwin and McConathy.  The effect music has on the personality may lead to benefits 
for the individual and society, but he does not go so far as to propose a view that is fixed 
and final, he leaves it open.  This is not the case for Baldwin and McConathy who make 
direct and practical connections to life.  McConathy sees music being helpful in tough 
economic times and Baldwin speaks of ethical values as if they are currency stored up to 
                                                 
49 Bruno Ussher “Film Music and School Music,” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National 
Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Educators National Conference, 1939-1940), 74-76, 74. 
50 McConathy, “Is High School Music Making Progress?” 49. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Messenger, “Living Humanities,” 56. 
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be spent in a practical manner.  Messenger’s moralist stance is more instrumental and less 
utilitarian because the focus is in line with the argument from reduction.  That is, the 
feelings aroused by contact with the object (music) causes good feelings, therefore, the 
object is good.  Subsequently, the effect on the personality and feeling may be for good, 
but the good is not necessarily predetermined.  The emphasis is on the idea that music 
can be moral rather than what the moral specifically leads to.  Admittedly, this distinction 
between utilitarian and instrumental value is very fine, especially since moral issues are 
linked with utilitarianism.  The distinction here is due to Messenger’s moralist position as 
it is proximally related to evaluation. 
 Mursell gives us one of the most developed arguments relating to music and 
morality in his Human Values in Music Education.  In chapter five “Music as a Moral 
Force” Mursell’s basic claim is there must be a moral component to music education.  He 
deviates, however, from an outright acceptance of a straightforward Platonists view.  As a 
matter-of-fact he question’s Plato’s supposition in The Republic that “the Ionian and 
Lydian modes [were] lax, effeminate and convivial.”53  Instead, Mursell asserts, “no 
music, good, bad or indifferent, has in itself any direct intrinsic magic, moral power.”54  
For him “music is a moral force in education simply because it lends itself to the creation 
of morally and socially significant situations.”55  Mursell’s treatment of the topic of 
music and morality is thoughtful and well developed.  He presents what he sees as 
fallacies on the topic and systematically undermines each view that he sees as incorrect.  
                                                 
53 Mursell, Human Values in Music Education, 141. 
54 Ibid., 142.  He also says “in view of the whole nature of music, as an art which can catch and 
convey emotion, but which cannot formulate ideas or doctrines, we are unable to resist the conclusion that, 
to attribute to it various kinds of intrinsic moral influence, is sheer superstition and mythology…we cannot 
magically expect, for instance, that it will magically transform a bad man into a good one; or that it is 
capable, alone, of preventing a child from sliding into a criminal career.” Ibid., 163-164. 
55 Ibid., 142. 
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After he completes his critique of the subject of music and morality he advances his own 
view that shares elements from the argument from reduction, and inherent and 
instrumental explanations of value. 
 Mursell’s assertion regarding music and morality is “that music properly 
organized and presented is a constructive factor in human life.  Music favors the kinds of 
attitudes leading to constructive and creative social adjustment and effective self-
expression in a social medium.”56  Mursell takes from the argument of reduction the 
notion there are certain attitudes generated from contact with music, but this is as far as 
he develops his line of thinking here.  From instrumenalism he assumes that there is some 
social and personal “adjustment” derived from the experience with music.  Finally, in 
relation to inherent value, he follows his claim with a portion of the chapter that deals 
with the evaluation of music.  For Mursell, it is only through music, more specifically 
“superior music,” that a certain type of experience is had.  It is “superior music,” that 
favors “the kinds of attitudes” that can have a moral dimension; not mathematics for 
example.57  Music is a specific kind of moral agent, a view linked with inherent value. 
 Mursell was not alone in his cautious attitude and perspective on music and 
morality.  William Finn argued in 1917 that since music is “sense-impressive” it can, at 
least, relate to morality indirectly.  Furthermore, “it must be concluded that great as the 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 164.  Bennett questions that supposed ethical implication of music in much the same way 
Mursell does.  In fact, she cites Mursell’s work Human Values in Music Education.  Like Mursell Bennett 
asserts “a careful study of morality, however, reveals quite clearly the fact that right and proper behavior 
does not come as the result of exposure to good things.”  Bennett, “A Study of Aesthetic Values Inherent in 
Music and Music Education,” 146.  She eventually espouses an inherent and instrumentalist position on 
value by using Dewey’s ideas from Art as Experience.  The educated imagination in the aesthetic 
experience with music can be “an instrument of moral good.”  Ibid., 148 
57 Ibid., 165.  Mursell describes what he means by superior music and explains how it is better at 
lending itself as a moral force than inferior music.  His arguments are aligned with the genetic, affective, 
and objective reasons for judgment laid out by Beardsley. 
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potentialities of music may be, there is no definite ethical significance in its essence.”58  
In arriving at that conclusion, Finn questions the argument from reduction.  For him, 
“there is no law of music structure by which a specific idea on a particular mood can be 
unvaryingly generated by specific sounds.”59  As an example he states, “there is no 
patriotism in ‘patriotic’ music save by association…there is no vernacular in the sayings 
of music. Nor can a lexicon be found for defining her speech.”60  So, for Mursell, 
Bennett, and Finn the analogy of the music/moral relationship is false, which is akin to 
Beardsley’s contention that “an analogy is not a causal connection,” further proof that 
philosophical matters were a part of the discourse of music educators from 1907 to 1958.  
 Philosophical perspectives also appear in the evidence in relation to the various 
ways of explaining value—intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian.  To some 
extent these ways of explaining value appears in the discourse on moralism, specifically 
in the work of Messenger and Mursell.  Quite often, however, arguments regarding 
intrinsic, inherent, instrumental, and utilitarian value surfaced that were unrelated to 
evaluation and went beyond the notion of music as a moral force.  One view in particular 
rejected connection with any extramusical association. 
 The point of view that argues music has not extramusical associations is referred 
to variously as the position of the aesthete or the formalist or the absolutist.  Aestheticism 
and formalism are views which insist the value of music is intrinsic.  In other words 
music is for music’s sake, music has value “independently of any means-end-relation to 
                                                 
58 William Finn, “Music and Morality (A Psychological Phase),” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Tenth Annual Meeting Grand Rapids, MI March 19 – March 23, 
1917  (Privately printed, 1917), 79-83, 82. 
59 Ibid. 
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other objects.”61  Purely formalistic statements regarding the intrinsic value of music are 
curiously absent.  The cause of this paucity of material is due in part to music as 
necessarily relating to education.  These writers and thinkers did not have the luxury of 
considering music as wholly separate from what was undertaken as a larger project, the 
education of students.  It simply was not expedient for music educators in the public 
schools to make arguments in terms of value that music was only attached to itself.  
While these teachers could get away with making such statements on the topics of nature 
and meaning, the view of music only having intrinsic value is difficult to maintain in the 
school setting.  Some music educators mention Bell and Hanslick in their writings but 
only in correlation to the nature and meaning of music.  There is, in some cases, an 
awareness of the formalist perspective of value, but rarely are these positions advanced.  
Rather, when acknowledged, the view of intrinsic value is merely to call attention to 
another more practical and realistic perspective.  Two brief examples follow.  First, 
Earhart comments on the development of sensitivity to tone in music appreciation.  The 
percipient ought to understand “the factors in music that make it music,” in order to better 
comprehend “the intrinsic value of compositions as compositions.”62  Second is from a 
resolution adopted by the MENC in New York, NY on April 2, 1936.  In regard to the 
position of music in integration it was  
resolved…that its greatest power lies in the intrinsic feeling and beauty and that 
the values peculiar to music should be carefully safeguarded whenever music is 
integrated with any other subject…such connections should always be used to 
enhance the meaning of music itself.63 
 
                                                 
61 Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 510. 
62 Earhart, The Meaning and Teaching of Music, 105.  Italics in the original. 
63 “Resolution” in Yearbook of the Music Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music 
Supervisors National Conference,1936), 404. 
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Sometimes it is what is absent that gives us insight into what is present.  Music for 
music’s sake is a challenging view to maintain in public school education. 
 Do not be fooled into thinking that the lack of evidence supporting the formalist 
or aesthetes point of view on value substantiates blanket utilitarian claims in music 
education.  There is a middle ground between intrinsic and utilitarian perspectives where 
there is absolutely no shortage of evidence.  In fact there are a number of instances where 
music educators make explicitly anti-utilitarian arguments on the topic of value.  The 
philosophical working through of these ideas in the area between the intrinsicality and 
utility of music is no simple matter.  Russell Morgan shows the difficulty by making an 
attempt to explain how music can aid the positive development of social values but does 
so while adhering to his “point that music can contribute its own worth-while values to 
human living without attempting to tie it up specifically with outward events.”64  Morgan 
even goes on to rank the purposes of music education as “(1) Aesthetic Experience (2) 
Emotional Development (3) Creative Attitude (4) Social Values (5) Skills and 
Knowledge.”65  Inherent and instrumental notions of value occupy the middle ground 
between the aesthete and the utilitarian.  The inherent position relies on a couple of key 
arguments to support claims of value for music in the classroom.  First, music’s 
infungibility, or what Beardsley labels a “function class.”66  Music educators’ views on 
value as they are used to argue for music as important in education rest on the notion that 
it is only music that can accomplish what it does (whatever that may be) in the way it 
                                                 
64 Russell Morgan “Present and Future Trends if Public Education Affecting Music in the Junior 
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65 Ibid., 167. 
66 Beardsley’s explanation is “there is something that aesthetic object can do that other things 
cannot do, or do as completely or fully.” Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 
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does.  Music cannot be replaced by math, literature, or the visual arts in this view.  
According to a number of music educators, music is unique. 
 Charles Lake asks, “What is it that music may do that cannot be done better by 
some other subject?”67  For him music occupies a unique role in education because of its 
capacity to foster expressive and emotional growth.  Much the same can be said about the 
views of Lewis Hilton.  In addition to expressive and emotional growth, Hilton adds 
spiritual growth and the social nature of participation.  In regard to possible social 
benefits of music Hilton questions whether the social benefits that may exist relating to 
participation are as great as those who support the notion claim they are, especially “since 
they may be equally attributable to membership in the pep squad, or playing with the 
Swiss handbell society.”68  He makes a case for the infungibility of music because “of the 
intrinsic values in music itself, not its byproducts.”69  Music as infungible, or function 
class, is one type of argument, and it connects with the second, which is music’s 
“immediate function is only to provide a certain kind of experience that can be enjoyed in 
itself.”70  The “certain kind of experience” may be moving, a spiritual connection, a type 
of sensuous excitement, or imaginative discovery; regardless, it is the specific nature of 
music that ensures the unique experience is had.  For an adherent of inherent value, the 
experience is largely self-contained. 
 At the 1915 MSNC conference Gehrkens delivered a paper titled “Ultimate Ends 
in Public School Music Teaching” to which there were follow up addresses to his initial 
                                                 
67 Charles Lake “Integrating Values of School Music” in Journal of Proceedings of the Music 
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Paul J. Weaver (Privately printed, 1926), 227-234, 227. 
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69 Ibid. 
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report on the topic.  Gehrkens lays out a number of normative questions with the aim of 
encouraging the field to be more reflexive and to wrestle with issues of value that 
hopefully lead to a clearer statement of purpose.  One of the main topics of discussion 
was where the emphasis on the teaching of music should be; intellectual, emotional, 
aesthetic and cultural.”71  George Wilmot weighs in on the topic by asking “whether we 
should devote very much time to the aesthetic side of music in the grammar schools, [sic] 
if we have to sacrifice too much of the technical worth to do so.”72  Farnsworth disagrees.  
For him the teaching of music should awaken feeling rather than emphasize how it is 
constituted.73  More specifically, and in relation to inherent value, “the intellectual 
element of analysis is in the aesthetic process merely as a means to the end of helping the 
mind grasp all that we hear and see in an art-work.”74  Notice the implied difference in 
his statement between intrinsic and inherent value.  An educator of more formalist bent 
sees the construction of music and its analysis as being intellectual, and in this case the 
way music should be valued.  To someone like Farnsworth, who thinks of music having 
inherent value it is what the music generates as a result of that specific experience with it 
that is to be valued, and therefore emphasized.  Farnsworth’s “Ultimate End” of music 
teaching is “stronger feeling, not further knowledge.”75  His suggestion that music 
teaching should emphasize stronger feeling precedes Langer’s assertion that the inherent 
                                                 
71 Gehrkens, “Ultimate Ends in Public School Music Teaching,” 57. 
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value of music is “the education of feeling, as our usual schooling in factual subjects…is 
the education of thought,”76 ideas which would be incorporated into the MEAE 
movement.  Additionally, Farnsworth’s use of the term aesthetic implies nature, meaning, 
and value are elements in the process of musical analysis and understanding.  Discussion 
and debate on the topic of value did not end here. 
 Julia Crane’s answer to the question of music’s “ultimate end” squarely placed 
her in the utilitarian camp.  Her response on the value of music was “to produce a higher 
quality citizenship.”77  Not all of the panel discussants agreed, however, and each 
subsequent response backs slowly away from Crane’s claim.  Thaddeus Giddings, for 
example, who acknowledges that education in general is to make productive citizens 
asserts, “the ultimate end of school music is to make the pupil as musical as possible.”78  
He backs away from pure utilitarian claims for music by infusing a hint of 
instrumentalism.  Yes, citizenship is important, but it is through a child’s study of music 
that he will, according to Giddings, also understand and appreciate music as music apart 
from specific fixed ends-in-view.79  I am not arguing that Giddings was an instrumentalist 
but merely suggesting that his statement begins to back away from a purely utilitarian 
motive for music education because he makes a distinction between music and general 
education where musical ends are also valued. 
 Backing still further away from Crane’s purely utilitarian perspective is 
Farnsworth who, once again, states that music teaching’s ultimate end “is that music 
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should do for the child musically what training in the other branches of study does with 
reference to those subjects.”80  He continues, “Music teaching should prepare the child 
for his present and future musical needs.”81  His focus is on inherent value in music, not 
citizenship or better math students.  George Bowen echoes Farnsworth’s basic premise 
but does so from an instrumentalist perspective.  Bowen argues the ultimate ends “are the 
cultural, the ethical, the educational values which are secured through a proper 
appreciation of value.”82  In the body of his response Bowen shows support for each of 
the components of his thesis.  One example of music being instrumentally valuable is in 
relation to “the cultural.”  The cultural allows for spiritual development and “a fuller 
understanding of things which pertain to the soul.”83  The notion of spiritual development 
does not necessarily inhere in the music, but it is through contact with music in the 
experience that music becomes a means to an end that is not fixed, final, or even 
practical.  In this case the amorphous end is spiritual development.  The differences 
between inherent and instrumental value as I mentioned in chapter two are blurry.  
Spiritual development, for Bowen and the German idealists, is an instrumental value 
because music “is a means to the production of an object [spiritualness] with inherent 
value.”84  Thus, the production of spiritualness or spiritual development comes as a result 
of contact with music, and for Bowen spiritual development and spiritualness also have 
inherent value.  If Bowen embraced the inherent value of music, then spiritual 
development would have to be something found in music; it would have to be something 
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that could not be separated from the substance of music itself.  The instrumental value of 
music is due to music’s being a medium through which emotions, feelings, and moods 
can be expressed.  Instrumental value implies there is an outward movement a value 
emanating from the music with the music being necessary for such a projection to 
happen.  Inherent value has the experience of music moving inward and becoming 
inseparable with the qualities in the music itself.  The discussion in music education 
certainly did not clear up perspectives on the type of value music has. 
 What the debate did encourage was further discussion and articulation of the 
ultimate ends of public school music.  At the conclusion of the paper, panel discussion, 
and audience discussion Gehrkens crafted a statement sure to generate papers and 
discussions on what is important in music education.85  For this early group of music 
education scholars  
the ultimate aim of music teaching in the public schools is to cause children to 
know, to love and to appreciate music in as many forms as possible, and thus to 
bring added joy into their lives and added culture and refinement into their 
natures.86 
 
Finally, what music teachers were to emphasize was the “emotional and aesthetic phases 
of music which constitute the real essence of the art; in other words that it is the art side 
of music with its somewhat intangible influences which we are seeking to cultivate.”87  
Gehrkens concluding proclamation rests on inherent and instrumental notions of value.  It 
is not a declaration infatuated with utilitarianism. 
 Statements made by music educators supporting inherent and instrumentalist 
value positions often argued against utilitarian claims for music.  Frank Beach’s 1922 
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87 Ibid.  Italics in the original. 
234 
 
presidential address was about the relationship between music and “new education.”  The 
“new education” he refers to consists of ideas pulled from the pedagogical progressive 
education movement, which generally saw the value of education in instrumental terms.  
That is, the ends-in-view of education were not fixed or final.  Beach’s examination and 
acceptance of the “new education” led him to assert “a narrow utilitarian view of 
education stunts the growth of those brought under its influence.”88  Implying music 
education he says of so-called new education, it “stresses the importance of education for 
itself rather than as a means to an end, commercial or otherwise.”89  Echoing a similar 
sentiment Earhart, quoting Ruskin, writes the focus of education is so-often 
“advancement in life…it never seems to occur to the parent that there may be an 
education which, in itself, is advancement in Life.”90  Music is more than a worthy use of 
leisure or a handmaiden for other utilitarian interests, according to Earhart.  Music will 
not achieve its highest aims until it shakes itself loose from such base ideas.91  Earhart 
sees the theory that relates the teaching of music to “social needs or social utilities”92 as 
inadequate.  He asserts that this view offers a static conception of life instead of a 
progressive one where movement “come[s] from men who had visions of principles far 
above utility.”93  Earhart is also critical of music as a worthy use of leisure.  Other than an 
indictment of a societal disconnect between work and interests, Earhart says music “is not 
merely the pastime of an occasional hour but is an influence that may persist in the whole 
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affective state of an individual.”94  It is reference to the idea of music as a worthy use of 
leisure that Earhart applies the idea of music as a function class or infungible.  If music is 
only for leisure, how is it any different than billiards?95  These comments on the place of 
music in life and music as an art whose influence is intangible and difficult to measure 
questions the wisdom of the efforts by so called administrative progressives who sought 
to manage schools using Fordist efficiency models. 
 Another instance of the debate over the value of music occurred at the 1927 
Department of Superintendence of the National Education Association Discussion Group 
on Music Education meeting.  The reprint of the meeting is included in the 1927 MSNC 
Yearbook published later that year.  The discussion topic was “A New Evaluation of 
Music in the Curriculum.”  Dykema gave opening remarks highlighting the instrumental 
and utilitarian values used by music educators since 1838, and eventually asked, “What 
are the values of music?”96  Some members of the committee had already assumed at this 
point that music’s place in the schools was important as a “citizenship developing 
medium,”97 an overtly utilitarian claim.  The most philosophical treatment of the subject 
of value in music came from Earhart, who mentions by name Schopenhauer, Bergson, 
James, Bell, and Gurney.  He argues “that whenever we speak of value at all we must 
speak in terms of subjective testimony.”98  While he mentions music as a socializing 
force, a utilitarian value, and vocational value, also utilitarian, these are not the most 
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important kinds of value, although they do contribute to the greater value.99  Relying on 
his broader notion of value and using the work of Vernon Lee, he makes a distinction 
between the good and the useful in relation to the beautiful, which is a highly 
philosophical question.  Basically, his analysis highlights the difference between 
utilitarianism and the inherent and/or instrumentalist views on the value of music.  
Without belaboring the point too much, good implies a usefulness, but that may not be 
the case for beauty since beauty may have no use; it may simply be enjoyed in the 
moment.  “The beautiful is thus distinguished by the fact that it holds not future 
advantage but present value.”100  This statement alone throws into question the idea of 
utilitarian value because this view of value relies on consequences which follow the 
experience.  The instrumentalist, however, can accept this position based on the doctrine 
of immediacy, that is, it is “something that is immediately experienced and known.”101  
Earhart’s view also reflects aspects of inherent perspectives on value because the 
experience with the object, music in this case, “has taken us utterly into it”102  Echoing 
beauty theory, Earhart asserts music has a particular kind of value.  It is of the beautiful 
“but instead of being understood as beauty [it] has been popularly conceived as 
emotion.”103  Earhart also gives a pointed critique of utility.  He asks, “shall we continue 
to believe that utilitarian thought and labor, if only spurred more feverishly so as to 
produce more tonnage, will bring about the millennium it so long has promised?  Do we 
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not know that self-interest breeds self-interest, that utilitarianism breeds utilitarianism, 
even as war breeds war?104 
 Anton Embs, president of the North Central Music Educators Conference, is also 
dismayed with the pervasive administrative progressive’s view of musical utility.  He 
relates a story of a superintendent who considered the school band primarily as “an 
adjunct of athletics.”105  Embs’ response to this view of the band was “public school 
music is thus reduced to the status of mere utility; it is not an educational factor at all but 
a ‘servant in the house,’ tolerated only for the service it can render!”106  In the same 
yearbook there is a paper by Dykema titled “The Re-Evaluation of School Music.”  In 
this document he references four views on the value of music to show how ill-defined, 
understood, and vague the notion’s of music’s ultimate purpose in schools is.  Dykema’s 
paper is a call to action.  “It is time that we started to study what music is doing to affect 
life and that we stated the results of our study in definite convincing form.”107  What he 
wanted from such a study was already concluded in his mind, and it is quite the opposite 
of what Embs and Earhart rejected, which is no surprise since Dykema’s work in music 
education focused a great deal on the administrative side of schooling.  For Dykema 
music is part of the educational scheme for what it could allegedly do.  More specifically 
the  
final standard of value is the connecting of music with life, with citizenship—
those are the means by which we will justify our subject and ourselves, by 
showing that music can help to develop finer men and women who will aid in 
carrying out the purpose for which these United States were founded.108 
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Dykema’s views on value, then, are more consistent with administrative progressives, 
which are utilitarian. 
 The debate over value is ubiquitous.  During the Depression years the tenor of the 
debate did not vary much.  To put it another way the ongoing back and forth that had 
ensued between the pedagogical progressives, who largely embraced instrumentalist 
and/or inherent views on value, and administrative progressives, who embraced utilitarian 
views, continued to focus on the question of whether art had “social value or artistic 
value.”109  While it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that the Depression led to 
more acceptance of inherent and instrumentalist views of music what comes across in the 
evidence of some music educators is disillusionment with the obsession that music could 
help generate more productive citizens.  Some writers used the challenges of the time to 
make certain claims for valuing music in a particular way, but there were just as many 
supporting one side of the debates as there were the other even as much of the industrial 
world sagged.  Music for some was an escape; it offered solace, and, therefore, brought 
about questions relating to value in a way that drew attention away from an overbearing 
focus on material concerns.  It is during the Depression that Earhart begins his book The 
Meaning and Teaching of Music with a critique of modern industrial society.  This 
lengthy quote encapsulates Earhart’s concerns in context:  
The disarray with which the world now faces a partial retreat from a robust 
industrial faith, and the sense it gives us turning from a full and vivid world to one 
that is somewhat empty and very strange, may possibly be thus explained.  In the 
rational and mechanistic world to which we have become accustomed, we have 
not been thinking primarily of men as human beings, but have rather considered 
them as employees and employers, producers and consumers, as an abstraction 
called the ‘economic man’—in short as industrial and economic units.  The 
thinking, feeling, willing, human being, full of desires, imaginations, aspirations, 
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impulses both fine and foolish, has not been foremost in our thought.  Now we 
must become acquainted with him again.  It will probably take a long time.110 
 
Earhart’s take on value in this book reflects his earlier views on the subject, so it would 
be difficult to argue that the Depression altered his perspective.  In Earhart’s case the 
Depression was used to place his argument in greater relief, the argument that music’s 
value is inherent. 
 Published in 1934, Mursell’s Human Values in Music Education has a largely 
instrumentalist take on value.  Unlike Earhart the views in Mursell’s book, also written 
during the Depression, display his notion of “human values” with an instrumentalist and 
sometimes utilitarian bent.  Mursell writes, “music in a vacuum, music for itself alone, 
music as a show, loses enormously in artistic values.  In proportion as it becomes woven 
into the texture of our daily living it acquires a new artistic significance.”111  For Mursell 
the human value of music “enables one to live more richly and completely; to be a 
stronger, better, happier, more cooperative person; to succeed more fully in the business 
of being human.”112  The specific “human values” he systematically evaluates are 
individual, moral, and social.113  In relation to the individual music is to be valued 
because it is a cultural inheritance and it is an emotional experience, that is “education in 
and through music must mean, first of all, participation in noble and humanizing 
emotion.”114  He also asserts that music ought to be a means to “educate children for 
emotional stability and permanent happiness.”115  The effects of musical experience on 
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the individual bring about a certain emotional and cultural relevancy.  The end-in-view 
presented by Mursell here has the quality of being wide-ranging as well as particular. 
 The ends-in-view from Mursell’s perspective of the social value of music are also 
practical.  It is on the topic of social value, specifically the notion that music is a worthy 
use of leisure, that Mursell’s thoughts differ from Earhart’s.  Earhart saw the idea of 
music as a worthy use of leisure as problematic and a disconnect between work and life.  
Furthermore, social utility theories and ideas that support the view music is a worthy use 
of leisure neglect that life is a unified whole, and the affective influence of music is far 
more than just on occurrence during leisure time.116  Mursell, while using similar 
language, sees the leisure time activity of music as socially valuable.   
Music can do much to meet the social needs and the personal problems created by 
the growth of routine jobs…it is one of the human occupations best adapted to 
such a use because of its great personal richness as an individual experience, and 
also because it is enjoyed on such a wide variety of occasions.117 
 
The differences between Mursell and Earhart highlight each scholar’s distinctive take on 
the importance of music.  Each claims that music is important in human life.  Mursell’s 
view places music as a kind of adjunct for what really matters in life, work.  Music’s 
value, then, is utilitarian because it helps the worker cope with the drudgery of the daily 
routine.  Earhart’s view on this topic is instrumental because it seeks to fuse music into 
everyday life, into a unified whole. 
 Earhart also had more to say on the topic of social value. In his “What Place Have 
Cultural Values in Education” from 1933, he states the difference between materialistic, 
utilitarian, technological and rational, on one hand, and the cultural and aesthetic on the 
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other, lies in a fundamental difference of views about man and his world.”118  For Earhart 
the aesthetic cannot be utilitarian.  The “materialistic, utilitarian, and technological” are 
“valued because of their power to bring us something else that they themselves are 
not.”119  This is not the case for music because it is “one direct and immediate satisfaction 
of higher human needs.”120  Again, the doctrine of immediacy places his ideas on why 
music matters in the instrumentalist camp. 
 Farnsworth also addresses the question of social value.  In “How Music Educates” 
he posits “what its value is to the race.”121  He philosophically questions if the value of 
music is pleasure that is attached to it.  While pleasure is a value, it is not the ultimate 
aim of music at least in terms of “sensuous pleasure felt.”122  The ultimate value of music 
according to Farnsworth is its “ministering to the spiritual side of our natures.”123  His 
explanation of music’s value is one where music possesses inherent value.  Connection 
with our spiritual nature, in the German idealist tradition, is both a valuable end and a 
means in which the spiritual nature of music is internal to that end.  Similarly, Gehrkens 
writes in his 1923 president’s address, “the chief value of music lies in its effect upon the 
spiritual life of the individual.”124  Again, an espousal of the inherent value of music.  In 
fact, he makes a statement distinguishing his view on value from instrumentalist and 
utilitarian views.  Gehrkens argues, “Music must not, however, be thought of principally 
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as a mind trainer, as a therapeutic agent, or as a religious or socializing force.”125  Music 
for many of these music educators occupies a unique role in education. 
 Just what unique role music has is at the heart of the issues on value.  Perspectives 
have been influenced by contemporary events.  The debate over a particular value of 
music continued throughout the period uninterrupted, but it is during World War II and 
the post war years that the voice of those arguing music’s value, especially in education, 
was primarily utilitarian.  Arguments from the utilitarian perspective were present in the 
field ever since 1838, but it is during the war that there was a definite, intensified, and 
concerted effort to justify music’s value along these lines.  In fact, there were various 
projects such as the Victory Corps Project, and The Schools at War Project where the 
value of music was based on utilitarian claims.126 
 Utilitarian claims for music education during WWII were omnipresent.  Even 
before the United States officially entered the war music educators were taking notice of 
the pressures of an ensuing war.  In response to the developing events of the time, the 
Board of Directors of the MENC adopted as their theme in 1940 for the current two year 
period “Unity Through Music.”  By 1941 the idea developed into “American Unity 
Through Music.”  A general outline of this project is in the March-April 1941 issue of the 
Music Educators Journal.  In a baldly utilitarian statement the committee responsible to 
the writing of this article said 
On the vast tidal surge of patriotic fervor now swelling to every nook and corner 
of our country, our people can be united positively and idealistically through 
music, thus averting the inculcation of base or even beastly thoughts that 
accompany hate, hysteria, and fear.  With music we can help to generate and 
mobilize the thoughts and feeling which spring from deserved pride in our 
country.  With music we can build and sustain morale.  Such building for better 
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citizenship on the part of our entire populace, in and out of training camps, is 
quite as important as man power, machines, and guns.127 
 
This statement is followed by an outline of “specific music activities for defense,” which 
includes such things as singing patriotic songs “fervently,” and arranging parades “using 
music in keeping with the unity themes.”128  Tucked in near the end of the report is an 
acknowledgement that these aims for music are “practical and nationalistic,” but music 
educators are also encouraged to remember “that without providing a measure of joy and 
beauty to which these other ends must be subservient, we defeat the very purpose we set 
out to achieve.”129  This group of music educators hoped to have it both ways in terms of 
value.  As if to say “We understand that music can have utilitarian value, but even at this 
time we do not want it to have too much.” 
 The work of the committee and that of other music educators, however, continued 
to contain strong utilitarian value claims for music.  For instance, Glenn Gildersleeve, 
chairman of the MENC Committee on American Unity Through Music, encourages 
teachers to submit material to the MEJ that may be helpful to others so they might be “led 
to think, feel, and act together.”130  He asserts, “Only through organized effort on our part 
will music be made most effective in sustaining morale and promoting National 
Unity.”131  Pitts, another committee member argues “music performs its greatest service 
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when used by all of a people to communicate and to further their common purpose and 
ideals.”132  And L. Bruce Jones in “How Can the School Band Serve in Defense?” writes, 
“We must, for instance, include more music in our rehearsal and concert repertories that 
express patriotism, love of country, and the ideals for which  this nation stands.”133  
Charles Dennis even goes so far to suggest that a soldier is more valuable if he is 
musical.134  As part of the Schools at War Project the Music in the Service of Schools at 
War Committee printed in the 1944 MEJ an excerpt from a Treasury Department bulletin 
that encouraged the MENC to figure out ways schools could contribute to the cause.  
What the committee encouraged in essence was hyper-utilitarianism. The charge given 
was to use music to help sell war bonds.  This would be achieved “directly, through the 
concert admission charge of a bond or stamp.  Indirectly, through helping build a sense of 
community solidarity.”135  These are just a few of the documents during the World War II 
era that answer the question of music’s importance with utilitarian claims. 
The utilitarian perspectives on value were prevalent in the literature, of which 
these are a mere smattering.  There was, however, the occasional cautionary voice who 
questioned the degree to which music was being put in service to support the war.  In 
1941, just before the start of the war Hanson anticipated the demands and expectations 
society would place on music education in the very near future.  His request of music 
educators was to be true to the values of music education, especially since he saw it as 
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“the greatest educator of the emotions.”136  In a measured tone with hints of German 
idealism Hanson advises music educators to carefully adhere to music’s primary aims.  
He writes 
As we go into the program of national defense which is occupying so much of our 
thought, we must see to it that the emphasis upon national defense does not leave 
us spiritually bankrupt.  We must preserve our ideals…in saving our bodies we 
must not lose our souls.137 
 
Hanson’s statement shows far less of a utilitarian mindset than those of his fellow 
committee members on the American Unity Through Music project. 
 Also unsure about values adopted for music in music education during the war, 
Lillian Baldwin calls for continuity that links pre-war, war, and post-war perspectives on 
the importance of music.  In other words music educators ought to continue to emphasize 
the emotional and spiritual aspects of music, which is extremely important for children 
growing up during these tumultuous times.138  Using the war as a backdrop Charles 
Seeger is curious to see what music programs will look like in schools at war’s end. 
 Seeger’s historical assessment of the value and purpose of music in the United 
States during the last century runs counter to Mark’s thesis that the philosophy of music 
education was the culmination of a thousand years of utilitarianism.  Seeger writes of the 
purpose and value that  
after a century of music as a ‘good in itself,’ we swing into a program of music as 
‘good for something’…in one decision the supreme criteria of ‘beauty for 
beauty’s sake,’ ‘music for aesthetic pleasure’…have been, at least temporarily, 
held in abeyance or proved false.139 
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Seeger’s comments are not meant to lament the change but rather to show the influence 
the war had and will continue to have on culture and music education in the United 
States. 
 Although the combat ended in World War II, utilitarian views on the value of 
music continued.  Furthering utilitarian perspectives were due in part to the new conflict 
that emerged following WWII, the Cold War.  The hyper-utilitarian views held over from 
WWII were slightly transformed with ideology that stressed the United States’ way of 
life was in jeopardy.  The United States had just concluded four years of armed struggle, 
and it appeared as if the country was moving from one crisis to another.  Like many other 
citizens music educators were aware of the newly perceived challenge even with the 
relative calm in the immediate post-war years.  Making adjustments to utilitarian 
perspectives on value merely required slight reorganization of the existing view to meet 
the new conflict.  One particular adjustment during this period is the emphasis placed on 
utilitarianism in relation to democracy.  That is, democracy is identified and considered 
to be specifically attached to utilitarianism and utilitarian goals.140  
 Earnest Melby explores how the term freedom is used in contemporary language 
as compared to how it is applied, specifically as it relates to creativity.  After lamenting 
the affects of McCarthyism and the present fear of the Soviet Union, he lauds the ideas of 
John Foster Dulles.141  What did this mean for music?  For Melby this meant a rejection 
of aestheticism.  For him, “the preservation of freedom is everybody’s job.”142 
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 Ralph Rush, outgoing president of the MENC in 1954, wrote an article titled 
“Music Education in a Democracy.”  In it he discussed “the task of developing music 
education for democratic participation and leadership.”143  For Rush “Music, like 
democracy, is a way of life; both are expressions of an inner vision of an ideal in peaceful 
happy living.”144  Music, for many of these music educators was necessarily attached to 
ends which were practical and had social, political, moral and/or economic effects for the 
participant. 
 Much like the utilitarian claims for music that persisted after the war, so too did 
questions about this kind of value for music.  Immediately following the war James 
Nickerson examines music programs during the war and offers a critical evolution of his 
findings with the aim of drawing on lessons learned to advance music’s future.  
Nickerson was concerned with what he saw as “an uncritical acceptance of wartime 
music.”145  This so-called uncritical acceptance “revealed many careless judgments and 
careless practices.”146  Furthermore, he argues, “There has been a tending to emotionalize 
about the power of music.  As teachers we have plead the cause of music as a morale 
booster.”147  Nickerson is critical of these utilitarian associations for music because he 
recognizes the value of music from an instrumentalist bent.  For him, “Music as a factor 
in personal adjustment can stand on its own merits and does not need extravagant 
statements.”148 
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 Karl Ernst acknowledges the difficult position music has in general education by 
highlighting two perspectives on music’s value.  Citing material from two different 
journals, Educational Music Magazine and Musical America, he brings to the attention of 
the reader that school administrators criticize music teachers for not placing enough 
emphasis on the social values of music, and musicians criticize music teaching for 
focusing too much on the extramusical.149  Picking up on an aspect of the above problem, 
Ernst recognizes that groups such as the National Association of Secondary School 
Principals have argued music contributes to good citizenship and a fuller life.150  He 
rhetorically asks, “Does it?  Are students in our classes better integrated than those who 
are not?”151  He asks the question in such a way that the reader is supposed to understand 
he wants music educators to accept responsibility for teaching the subject both as a 
unique subject and as an integrated part of a larger whole.   His view moved him away 
from a solely utilitarian perspective on value to one that includes the inherent and 
instrumentalist outlooks.  It is not enough to teach music for its social, moral, or political 
effects; music must, if taught properly also coincide with values that are inherent in it 
such as sensuous excitement or imaginative discovery. 
 The issue of the purpose and importance of music and music education were at 
the heart of the work of The Commission of Basic Concepts.  One member of that 
commission, Benn, dealt directly with the topic of aesthetics and value two years prior to 
the publication of Basic Concepts of Music Education: The Fifty-Seventh Yearbook of the 
National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1.  In her “Esthetics for the Music 
Educator: The Maturation of the Esthetic Sense” she asks, “whether or not art exists for 
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its own sake or for the sake of man?”152  Her development of a partial answer is a 
complete rejection of utilitarianism.  For her,  
Music must remain music…if music is in the schools as a subject to be taught, as 
mathematics, or literature, or science are subjects to be taught, we are not 
permitted to change its nature from that which all musicians recognize as music.  
If we do so change it, we are morally, ethically, esthetically, and pedagogically 
suspect…we must stimulate children toward more musically impressive 
performance, making them aware of musical ends involved.153 
 
She concludes her paper with a look to the future.  The future of music education for her 
is one where “musical sensitivity” and “esthetic discrimination” are at the heart of the 
endeavor, there is absolutely no mention of teaching for political or social improvement. 
 William Schumann struck a chord by taking a stand on the value of music as 
being specifically musical.  Like Benn, but more specific, Schumann questions the value 
of music along social and therapeutic lines.  He criticizes music teachers for focusing too 
much on the extramusical.  What he sees as an overemphasis on a misguided perspective 
of the value of music has resulted in declining standards of musicianship and 
performance.  He asserts, “Any performance of a piece of music which is unmusical in its 
projection, and falls below acceptable technical and aesthetic standards, does harm to the 
art of music.”154  For Schumann it is the music that is important in a formalist sense, and 
the teacher who claims to be a musician will ensure its value is properly placed. 
 Theodore Normann’s rebuttal to Schumann rested on an understanding that music 
is in the schools “because of what it can do for, in, and to people in terms of human 
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values.”155  Normann cites the existing difference on value as being rooted in two 
differing philosophies of music.  The first he calls isolationist (aestheticism in this 
dissertation).  The second philosophy is contextualist, or those who assert “art for 
people’s sake.”156  The second position is in line with the instrumental views on value.  
For Normann, “We should not be so concerned with the isolationist’s concern with 
‘doing a disservice to the art of music’ but more importantly with the contextualist’s 
position of doing service to our students through music.”157  His statements about the 
value of music are instrumental. 
 Since music was an established component of the general curriculum, arguments 
for its value focused on both keeping it there and the best way to achieve that.  The 
evidence presented thus far has included intrinsic, inherent, instrumentalist, and 
utilitarian views on both aspects of the place of music, that is, first as an important 
subject among the other school subjects but also on what basis its value genuinely 
existed.  To put it another way, music should be in the schools because of X where the 
varieties of X (intrinsic, inherent, instrumental or utilitarian value) were debated as to 
which was the most appropriate for X.  In addition to the issues relating to value already 
mentioned, there are additional arguments that warrant distinction. 
 Beyond the argument of the moralist, the aesthete, and in the German idealist 
tradition—seen in inherent and instrumental theories of value in music education of the 
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156 Ibid., 20. 
157 Ibid., 21.  Parker LeBach also responded to the Schumann article.  He sides with Schumann 
ending his paper by asking,  “Is it possible to maintain a valid philosophy of music education unless the art 
of music itself is honored as the central pillar around which our work acquires its unique value and 
meaning?”  Parker LeBach “Why We are Criticized: A Music Educator’s Analysis,” Music Educators 
Journal 43, 2 (November-December 1956): 18-19, 19.  Italics in the original. 
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time—other specific views require attention as distinctive cases on the intrinsic/extrinsic 
spectrum.  While each falls somewhere on the spectrum, these additional arguments draw 
on the work of specific theories proposed by philosophers who considered the value of 
music.  The ideas of Aristotle, Collingwood, and from socioaesthetics occupy the final 
section in this chapter. 
 Catharsis has value because particular emotions could, through the music as 
representation of an emotion, be purged and released.  Aristotle’s inherent view on value 
is an early break from the utilitarian views of Plato.  Catharsis is a response to a direct 
revelation of reality, and as such has inherent value.  One example of this particular 
notion of value is seen in Paul Diederich’s evaluation of the Eight Year Study at its first 
quarter mark.  Diederich remarks, “One of the original purposes of this study was to 
permit the arts, which had been crowded out of the program by college requirements, to 
assume their proper role in the education of adolescents.”158  One of the aspects of the 
program as it relates to the arts, including music, is to evaluate three primary “objectives 
of work in the arts.”159  The three objectives the research sets up as being integral, 
important, and valuable to study in the arts are: “(1) sensitivity to beauty…(2) the 
creative process, and its results in the discovery and clarification of new meanings in 
nature and in art…(3) emotional adjustment, resulting from the release of tensions.”160  
Unfortunately it is in the third “objective” that “we have nothing very tangible yet to 
report.”161  However, the fact that this third so-called objective is in the study is evidence 
                                                 
158 Paul Diederich, “Educational Outcomes of Instruction in Music,” in Yearbook of the Music 
Educators National Conference (Chicago, IL: Music Supervisors National Conference, 1938), 395-398, 
395. 
159 Ibid., 396. 
160 Ibid.  italics in the original. 
161 Ibid., 398. 
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that Aristotelian catharsis was important enough for these researchers to include in their 
work trusting it has value. 
 Catharsis is also one of several values Carleton Stewart argues coincides with the 
playing of an instrument in orchestra.  First on his list of value is that music is an 
“emotional outlet that is essential for well balanced living.”162  Stewart’s examples reflect 
rather than develop particular philosophical views on value.  In “Music Education for 
Health” catharsis is the basis on which E. Thayer Gaston promotes the value of teaching 
music.  Citing a number of sources that are from the discipline of psychology, Gaston 
concludes that music education helps students “to look to music for catharsis of undue 
tension and relief from worry.”163  The premise for his argument is as follows: “the basic 
reason for the arts [music] throughout the history of mankind has been the resultant 
mental hygiene benefits.”164  Music’s inherent value is in part psychological, an idea that 
goes as far back as Aristotle. 
 Aristotle’s influence resurfaces in a class discussion led by Pitts.  The class 
discussed different kinds of value music has for “young people.”165  The value of music 
as seen in the notes is “Recreation,” “Amusement,” “Release,” “Solace and Comfort;” it 
also has value as an “experience,” “creative self-expression,” Group activity,” and 
                                                 
162 Carleton Stewart “A Word for the High School Orchestra,” Music Educators Journal 30, 3 
(January 1944), 31.  In addition to emotional release, Stewart also asserts the experience of performance 
has value because it is a “cultural force…it offers social benefits…it trains him in self-discipline…the 
experience of working with others…is develops self-reliance.”  Italics in the original. 
163 E. Thayer Gaston, “Music Education for Health,” Music Educators Journal 31, 4 (February-
March 1945): 24-25, 25. 
164 Ibid., 24.  Italics in the original.  He cites the psychological work of Mursell, Max Schoen, and 
Charles Diserens.  Views similar to Gaston’s are in F. Melvyn Lawson “Music For What?” Music 
Educators Journal 35, no. 6 (May-June 1949): 11-13, 34; Don Russell, “Music as a Therapeutic Aid,” 
Music Educators Journal 39, no. 5 (April-May 1953): 63-64 and; Edward Podolsky, “Music and Mental 
Health,” Music Educators Journal 40, no. 2 (November-December 1953): 66-70. 
165 Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in 
Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, 
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“feeling.”166  The notes made on the value of music as release include the idea that music 
is a “release from the irksome, the factual, the humdrum and commonplace.”167  While 
not well developed (the class discussion itself may have given further clarity) notions of 
music having cathartic value exist in the evidence.  Here, again, is an example where 
philosophical views underpin conversations about value. 
 Aristotle’s theory on the value of music as catharsis is often connected with 
inherent value.  Collingwood’s assertion that music is valuable because it leads to self-
discovery and self knowledge of our emotional state, like catharsis, also arises in the 
evidence.  Collingwood’s point of view places his ideas in line with those supporting the 
idea that music’s value is inherent, or at most instrumentalist.  In 1910, in a paper that 
predates Collingwood’s The Principles of Art but is in no way nearly as developed, J.S. 
Collins writes that the value of music lies, in part, in its “power to translate the 
conventional symbols of musical notation into the sounds they are intended to represent 
[which] means the power to read into one’s own mind and life the thought and feeling of 
another.”168  The majority of uses of self-knowledge as a value, however, appear in the 
evidence after the publication of Collingwood’s first edition of The Principles of Art in 
1938.   
 Using Collingwood-like arguments, Francis Horn writes the value of music is 
beyond Platonic notions of worth.169  Horn asserts, “Music does more: it contributes to 
one’s knowledge of himself and his fellow-men, to his sense of values about life and its 
                                                 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168 J.S. Collins “Educational Value of Music in Public Schools,” in Journal of Proceedings of the 
Music Supervisors National Conference, Third Annual Meeting Cincinnati, OH May 3 – May 6, 1910 
(Privately printed,1910), 85-86, 85. 
169 Francis Horn, “Music in General Education,” Music Educators Journal 40, 1 (September-
October 1953): 25-26, 26. 
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meaning.”170  It is on this basis that music deserves a place in general education, claims 
which go against the standard interpretation that music justified its place in the 
curriculum only in conjunction with utilitarian thought.  With a similar sentiment to Horn 
Raymond Reed espouses, “The arts that embody emotional participation come the 
nearest…to man better understanding himself.”171  Again, the alignment with 
Collingwood is reflected in the work, but it could stand further development especially 
since he includes elements from German idealism and other hints of instrumental value.  
The most developed material that relates to Collingwood comes from Pitts. 
 Likely written between 1938 and 1954 is a paper with the heading “How-to 
(Know-How).”  Pitts explores “keeping ends and means in proper relationship”172 in the 
education of children.  With reference to the former she asks two questions: are music 
educators “to nurture and develop the latent musical expressive power that is born in 
every child” or is “the end in music to be that of equipping children and young people 
with fixed amounts of knowledge?”173  Her answer to the first question uses an idea from 
Collingwood in explaining what the means are to the ends of “developing the latent 
musical expressive power.”  The art of making music is a child’s “only means of 
exploring and discovering themselves—of finding out (or acting out) the meanings of life 
and themselves.”174  In relation to this comment, she continues by talking about general 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 Raymond Reed, “Some Basic Educational Concepts,” Music Educators Journal  40, 2 
(November-December 1953): 52, 54, 52. 
172 Lilla Belle Pitts, Series 1 – Classroom Music, [ca. 1928-1956], Special Collections in 
Performing Arts, Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library, University of Maryland, College Park, 
Maryland.  Underline in the original. 
173 Ibid.  Underline in the original. 
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human values in music.175  For her the arts are a “means of cultivating sympathetic 
insight into one’s own relations to life.”176  Again, echoes of Collingwood surface, but it 
is unclear if she ever read Collingwood and much of her work in music education did not 
follow these ideas here which reflect a view that art is valued because it is self-
knowledge. 
 It is also not clear if Carroll Reed read the work of Aristotle or anything in 
socioaesthetics, but ideas of each, especially the latter, arise in his “Difficulties in 
Comparative Measurement of Factual and Aesthetic Values.”177  Reed refers to the 
Seashore test and the Kwalwasser-Rush test that can adequately measure a student’s 
understanding of basic concepts in music such as pitch, rhythm, and recognition of tunes 
from note reading.  Reed suggests, however, that while items such as pitch and rhythm 
are factual and as such can be measured, there is another set of values, the aesthetic, that 
“evade measurement but which always seem to be a driving force behind general 
aesthetic understandings and expression.”178  For Reed the teaching of music ought to 
contain both sets of values, the factual and the aesthetic.  He argues this point because 
one cannot exist in isolation from the other.  So, even though a teacher or administrator 
cannot measure such things as “personal enjoyment,” “depth of personal feeling,” or 
“creative stimulation which carries out into life,”179 it does not mean these should be cast 
aside.  To support his argument Reed relies on the socioaesthetic perspective.  He writes, 
                                                 
175 Her reference to human values may be a slight nod to Mursell, a colleague of Pitts’ at 
Columbia, but his work does not elaborate on Collingwood’ ideas.  Mursell’s book was published in 1934 
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176 Ibid.  Underline in the original. 
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“Any artistic expression must be understood as a personal reaction to a social pattern.  
The teacher must be intelligent about the society in which he is teaching, and sensitive to 
the ideals and emotional expression of times and place.”180  Therefore, the teacher must 
be aware that “great art has sprung from social conditions where these factors [aesthetic 
values of the personal and social nature] were best accommodated.”181  In teaching 
music, then, “art may exist for art’s sake in the studio or in the sophisticated circles of the 
intelligentsia, but in school it exists for its contribution to the lives of children.”182  Music 
matter’s because it can serve a dual purpose.  For some circles it is rooted in the social 
situation even though it does not have a direct social function.  But in other circles such 
as the school it does have a role in contributing to the lives of children where even these 
young people should be exposed to how society and music interact. 
 The social is inextricably linked with music and creativity in socioaesthetic 
doctrine.  In a highly philosophical work John Mueller examines “The Social Nature of 
Musical Taste,”183 a topic that unites the first and last sections of this chapter.  He 
conflates the idea of what is good music, an evaluative use of the term, with what good is 
music, a normative question.  His purpose is to “discuss the problem of music…from the 
standpoint that music is one of many forms of human behavior with norms set up by 
society.”184  Mueller wholeheartedly embraces the socioaesthetic position as a way of 
understanding the value of music.  He criticizes the German idealist standpoint he sees in 
the field as it connects to ethos theory and does so by referencing an ambiguous phrase in 
                                                 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Mueller contributed a similar paper to Basic Concepts.  
184 John Mueller, “The Social Nature of Taste,” Journal of Research in Music Education 4, no. 2 
(Autumn 1956): 113-122, 114.  Mueller suggests “the esthetics of music are the principles of music in 
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the Music for Childhood Committee Report contained in Music In American Education: 
Music Education Source Book Number Two.185  His rejection of German idealism and 
ethos theory is also a rejection of the instrumental, moralist, and utilitarian conceptions of 
value.186  He wants to believe that individuals and societies can be improved through 
contact with music but he simply cannot accept that point.  He asserts “I am dubious of 
the premised intrinsic ethical linkage.  Music is no more moral than a card game 
immoral.”187  Not only does Mueller question the moralist he does so in relation to the 
infungibility question. 
 Mueller relates a story about a neighbor of his.  Each spent his leisure hours 
differently, one doing chemistry and the other practicing his instrument.  Both, according 
to Mueller, stayed out of trouble in their youth and each went on to successful and 
respectable careers. Why was music any more valuable than chemistry in this instance?  
He asserts no substantive difference could or should be made—“we are making claims 
for music which will not hold up…they raise hopes and expectations which cannot be 
fulfilled.”188  Music educators, in his view, are generating problems for the field.  
Confusion for the field does not stop with the issue of infungibility and leisure time 
either, according to Mueller. 
 The next ambiguous element of value he addresses is the notion of good music.  
For him, making determinations of good are confused because of the ways in which the 
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term is used.  Here he outlines four ways good is used in the field of music education, 
many of which I already addressed in this chapter.  What he does is problematize notions 
of good.  Each view of what “good” is systematically evaluated and dismissed leaving the 
idea that “good” is socially subjective.  That is, the answer to “what is good music? may 
differ from epoch to epoch, from person to person, and even from time to time within the 
same person, as well as the particular occasion.”189  The concept of good music is 
mutable, which Mueller acknowledges “is very distressing to many musicians.”190  The 
changing nature of society, however, does not lead to evaluative judgment as being 
relativistic.  Norms are “reinterpreted” but still “present plateaus of stability.  
Furthermore, the social nature of taste falls under Beardsley’s argument from 
variability.191  Mueller argues that evaluation and normative statements are 
manifestations of social conditions.  Quoting at length and implying socioaesthetic 
doctrine, Mueller concludes  
 esthetic tastes display a broad consensus, they are codified; they are the 
foundations of a system of theory, are culturally transmitted through school, the 
church, the home, and other social avenues.  They are the beneficiaries of an 
esthetic conscience—analogous to moral conscience—which labels discrepant 
tastes as wrong and resist radical intrusion of new codes and systems of taste…it 
reflects the vicissitudes of society and of the social organism.  But its social 
functions are pluralistic.192 
 
His point is that the value of music and notions of taste, rather than being “dogmatic, 
mystical finalities,”193 are mutable and should simply lead to a better understanding of 
music for the field of music education. 
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 Both the normative and evaluative uses of the term value, are frequently 
mentioned topics in the field of music education.  Furthermore, like perspectives on the 
nature and meaning of music there is not nearly as much consensus as the standard 
interpretation asserts.  Not all conversations on value focused on music’s utility.  Notions 
of evaluation which codify good music, for example, do so not on the basis of one point 
of view but for genetic, psychological, and objective reasons.  Even the moralist 
perspective that good inheres in the music and good music has a moral component was 
not accepted by everyone, least of all Mueller.  In fact, there was not even consensus on 
the infungibility of music, an idea it seems all music educators would willingly advance.  
Additionally, views on the intrinsic, inherent, instrumentalist, and utilitarian value of 
music range from German idealism, to Aristotelian catharsis, to self-knowledge, Platonic 
ethos, and socioaesthetics, not just utilitarianism.  The last chapter brings to a close the 
multiplicity of ideas and conceptions regarding musical aesthetics as seen directly and 
indirectly in the evidence of music education discourse from 1907 to 1958. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CODA 
 Mark and Gary argue that Basic Concepts and Foundations and Principles of 
Music Education “are significant because they expose the music educator to aesthetics, 
the philosophical field devoted to examining the value of the arts.”1  My evidence proves 
that their assertion is incorrect.  As a matter of fact, Clippinger mentions that he studied 
aesthetics more or less seriously for twenty five years, and his explanation of the 
aesthetic sense is “the sense of discrimination and judgment,”2 the basis of what we call 
artistic taste, which holds to a tradition in aesthetics that it is the study of how and on 
what basis such judgments can be made.  In other words his statements explicitly show he 
had, in fact, studied and understood aesthetics, an idea that subverts current 
interpretations of the writing that occurred during this time.  Not only were music 
educators aware of aesthetics and gave papers displaying an astute awareness of the 
discipline of philosophy but Mark’s and Gary’s notion of aesthetics is also too narrow.  
Value is merely one aspect of aesthetics—nature and meaning round out the study of 
musical aesthetics.  Further, philosophy is not necessarily a self-contained and restricted 
idea existing only between the front and back cover of a book or journal article.  
Philosophical ideas can be worked out systematically over time, an allowance Mark and 
Gary do not make.  Philosophical conversations can just as easily take place across 
decades as they can in the pages of a Platonic dialogue. 
                                                 
1 Mark and Gary, A History of American Music Education 2d ed., 355. 
2 Clippinger, “Collective Voice Training, 57. 
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 What I found in the evidence was not only that music education discourse on and 
relating to aesthetics existed but also that the material of the conversation was varied, 
noteworthy, insightful, and naturally embedded in the perspectives of music educators.  
The music educators of the time who were concerned with the field of music education 
generally in the hopes that practice would be influenced by their ideas incorporated 
numerous theoretical stances on the nature, meaning, and value of music.  In fact, the 
evidence ranged from a simple grasp of aesthetic perspectives and ideas to citations of 
philosophers and aesthetic theories and even further still to independent thought that 
incorporated and critiqued aesthetic positions for the purpose of supporting one view over 
another or advancing an argument of one’s own.  Clark and Earhart, especially Earhart, 
were much more than mere “forerunners of the aesthetic education movement that began 
in the late 1950s.”3  There were far more music educators who deserve mention as 
contributing to aesthetic discourse in music education in the period prior to the MEAE 
movement.  Scholars like Pitts, Hanson, Farnsworth, Gehrkens, Miessner, Mursell, Benn, 
Bernasconi, Finn, Sutherland and many others, contributed to the philosophical 
development of music education prior to 1958.   
 The real issue for music education in relation to aesthetics is not that the period 
prior to 1958 was barren or only included rationale.  Quite the opposite.  It was as if there 
were too many perspectives that called for attention.  The range of views on aesthetic 
principles, problems, and theories spawned disagreement.  Talks on the nature of music, 
for example, in music theory and music appreciation, frequently revealed formalist views, 
while expressivist and significationist perspectives were ubiquitous in the discourse on 
meaning, with much attention being directed toward music’s relation to language.  Music 
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educators fixated on evaluation and the elevation of taste using the German idealist 
standpoint.  Thoughtfully examining the aesthetic/moral correlation led some, such as 
Mursell and Finn, to conclude that great as the potentialities of music may be, there is no 
definite ethical significance in its essence.”4  Several other music educators saw the value 
of music through the lens of utilitarianism.  But it is untenable to assert that these were 
the only claims music educators made reading music’s value.  Opposing value based on 
the utilitarian perspective was a group of music educators who rejected the point of view 
that music’s value had extramusical benefits such as enhanced political, social, or 
economic life.  This group who rejected utilitarian views supported the notion that 
music’s value was intrinsic or inherent. 
 Utilitarian views, however, exploded in the period immediately preceding World 
War II, and during the war years there was a hyper-utilitarianism that pervaded the 
discourse.  One area for possible future research is to further develop the relationship 
between the hyper-utilitarian views emanating from WWII and the Cold War with the 
MEAE movement.  That is, the MEAE movement was a reaction to the resounding and 
intensifying hyper-utilitarian claims during WWII and the early Cold War years.  Music 
educators such as Britton, Leonhard, and House, perceived the field to have moved 
enough away from its predominantly musical roots to generate concern.  A select group 
of music educators intuited a problem which offended their sensibilities regarding 
music’s aim.  Reemphasizing notions of inherent and intrinsic value in music was their 
way of getting back to basic principles. They even attempted to insulate and protect the 
field from groups questioning its purpose in education.  For example, if music had a 
privileged language of its own like math and science, then it may also appear to outsiders 
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to be a viable subject in the curriculum.  Making explicit the connections between the 
MEAE as a reaction to the WWII hyper-utilitarian views of WWII era music education 
would be valuable.  Seeger’s 1943 paper is one example of a link between the ever-
present hyper-utilitarianism in music education discourse of the war years and the 
departure of the position of “a century of music as a ‘good in itself.’”5   
This study also opens up additional areas of research within the period of the 
study as well as for earlier periods.  One examination could be the extent to which the 
integration, as tied to pedagogical progressivism, was itself a so-called philosophy of 
music education prior to the MEAE movement.  The integration movement generated a 
number of philosophical and thoughtful questions about the purpose of education 
generally and music specifically.  Scholars like Pitts, Miessner, and Simpson infused 
questions dealing with the nature, meaning, and value of music into arguments for and 
against integration.  Another possible study could focus specifically on the historical 
continuity between pre 1958 philosophy and the MEAE movement using this study as a 
basis for comparison (since the MEAE movement was not the focus of this work – my 
assertions of continuity are inferred).  Research could also be conducted on the extent to 
which expressivist views are seen in the writings of early music educators like Lowell 
Mason or Charles Aiken. 
Finally, additional research may lead to a continuation of this study or the outright 
rejection of it.  In terms of a continuation there were a few sources that may have had an 
important bearing on sections of this dissertation that were either not included because of 
an oversight or other important material I had trouble locating.  One particular example is 
a reference in the 1936 Music Education Research Council’s (MERC) biennial report 
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which states a concern “with four studies during the past biennium.”6  Number three on 
the list of four is “A Philosophy of Music Education.”7  There was no mention of the 
content of the study other than the committee’s statement “The report on Philosophy has 
been discussed and agreement as to the desirable direction and scope of the study has 
been reached by the council.”8  By 1938 the MERC did not appear to make any progress 
on the study.  In Russell Morgan’s biennial report the philosophy of music education 
study is still in the preparation and development stages.9  The next clue regarding this 
study’s initiative is seen in the May 1940 issue of the Music Educators Journal.  In the 
article “Straight from Los Angeles” is the announcement of the forthcoming Research 
Council Bulletin No. 20.  This bulletin “contains an outline of ‘A Program for Music 
Education, which is the general title for the course of study on which the MERC has been 
working for several years.”10  The program, which included “(a) Philosophy and 
Psychology of Music Education”11 was supposed to be published in one volume.  Even 
after enlisting the support of three outstanding research librarians, Vincent Novara and 
Leahkim Gannett from the Michelle Smith Performing Arts Library and Kirstin Dougan 
of the Music and Performing Arts Library at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champagne, the closest material to this report were basic outlines in 1965 (beyond the 
scope of this study).  The conclusion drawn between these researchers and myself is that 
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Bulletin 20 was not ever published, even though the committee had set a date to publish 
the piece over six months prior to the United States entering World War II. 
History and philosophy are inherently replete with gaps and lost arguments, which 
makes the job of researching complicated.  It is my hope, however, that the material 
presented in this dissertation—gaps, omissions, and other problems notwithstanding—is 
seen as an honest, accurate, and sincere appraisal of the philosophical work of music 
educators on the topic of musical aesthetics from 1907 to 1958.  The idea of the nature of 
aesthetics as a “vaporous, far flung quintessence of problems and points of view”12 
permeates music education discourse during the period just as it does general 
philosophical discourse since the eighteenth century.  If anything, the diverse nature of 
the subject should be a lesson to music education philosophers and historians that 
pluralism need not necessarily be negative or problematic.  In the pursuit of wisdom it is 
possible that more voices can generate more varied discussion.  Soundings from various 
perspectives invite introspection and can lead to more informed conversation.  The aim of 
examining past and present music education discourse is to enable better understanding 
of the field.  Simply put, music, as a human creation and endeavor, is worthy of study 
because it is one more way we, individually and collectively, can better understand 
ourselves. 
                                                 
12 Dalhaus, Esthetics of Music, 3. 
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